

# The Philadelphia Police Department Protection of the 2016 Democratic National Convention:

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*A Quick-Look Analysis of Public Safety Best Practices and Lessons Learned*



April 2018



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Prepared by the Police Foundation in partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA),  
U.S. Department of Justice and BJA National Training and Technical Assistance Center.

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# Executive Summary

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Large Scale Security Events (LSSEs) pose unique challenges for public safety and security planning and operations. Presidential Nominating Conventions and other events of national significance as determined by their political, economic, social, or religious nature that may be targets of terrorism or criminal activity are categorized as a particular subset of LSSEs, known as National Special Security Events (NSSEs). Due to the high-profile nature and large number of attendees, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Secret Service (USSS) classified the 2016 Democratic National Convention (DNC) as a National Special Security Event (NSSE).

In order to update local law enforcement on planning and operational best practices and lessons learned related to planning and securing these events, the Police Foundation (PF)—through a technical assistance agreement from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC)—developed updated Quick Look Analysis reports for the 2016 Republican National Convention (RNC) in Cleveland and the DNC in Philadelphia. This Philadelphia Quick Look Analysis Report (Quick Look) highlights preliminary lessons learned and best practices for use in planning future LSSEs.

In developing this Quick Look, PF leveraged LSSE and NSSE subject matter experts as PF team members. These team members reviewed relevant media reports and documents, interviewed key members of Philadelphia’s convention security planning team, observed LSSE discussions, documented key decisions, and visited local venues and activities related to the planned DNC convention and its security. The PF team also conducted post-event interviews with key personnel to gather input and develop promising practices, lessons learned, and other recommendations.

## Major Observations

The City of Philadelphia hosted the 2016 DNC; the process of planning and hosting a National Scale Security Event (NSSE) was nothing new to the city. Philadelphia hosted the Republican National Convention (RNC) in 2000 and also hosted the World Meeting of Families/Papal Visit (WMOF/PV) in September 2015, as planning for the DNC was underway.<sup>1</sup> While there were significant differences between the WMOF/PV and the DNC in terms of attendance and attendees, potential weather concerns, and general public safety needs, the City of Philadelphia was able to simultaneously debrief and identify best practices and lessons learned. Applying them to planning for the DNC positioned them well for a successful DNC. The improvements focused on having the right personnel and resources in the right places in order to facilitate streamlined decision-making; enhancing coordination and communication between agencies and

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<sup>1</sup> The World Meeting of Families/Papal Visit (WMOF) is a week-long, religious gathering of the Roman Catholic Church, which occurs every three years in a different city around the world. In 2015, the WMOF was held in Philadelphia and concluded with a two-day visit by Pope Francis and a public outdoor mass on the Benjamin Franklin Parkway. The WMOF drew approximately 15,000 participants and the outdoor mass drew nearly 1 million, and was designated as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). The RNC was hosted in the same arena as the 2016 DNC (though at the time it was called the First Union Center) from July 31 – August 3, 2000.













# Section 1: Event Overview

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Due to the size and high-profile nature of the 2016 Democratic National Convention (DNC), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) classified the DNC as a National Special Security Event (NSSE). NSSEs are events of national significance due to their political, economic, social or religious nature. In addition, these events may be targets of terrorism or criminal activity. Especially on the heels of officer-involved shootings and shootings of officers in the weeks leading up to the DNC, in addition to the successful completion of the Republican National Convention (RNC)<sup>6</sup>, the City of Philadelphia was on high alert.

The following section provides an overview of event planning and response operations during the DNC, with special attention given to the efforts of the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD).

## Background

The 2016 DNC took place July 25 – July 28, 2016 at the Wells Fargo Center, in South Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. An estimated total of between 60,000 – 75,000 persons—comprised of local, state, and federal elected delegates and their families and friends; dignitaries and other invited guests; volunteers; national media; and, demonstrators – were in attendance. Over the course of the week of the DNC, more than 450 events occurred throughout the City. While the Wells Fargo Center was the primary location of the DNC, official events and other unassociated permitted activities took place in Center City—including the Pennsylvania Convention Center—Independence National Historic Park, and the designated Free Speech Zone in Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) Park. In addition, a number of free speech demonstrations and marches were planned, primarily Broad Street and Market Street.

## Authorities

Authority for the planning and operations of local security for an NSSE can vary by jurisdiction and is often reflective of the size and capabilities of the local departments and agencies. In many cases, local law enforcement will take the lead due to the security focus of the mission; however, in other jurisdictions the local Emergency Management Agency/Office of Emergency Management or the fire department may play a larger role. These agencies will also be complemented by federal law enforcement in the planning and event phases.

Given the NSSE designation, a significant public safety footprint was required for the 2016 DNC. City, state, and regional stakeholders played a central role in the planning and execution of this event. At the local level, the Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management (OEM) coordinated the public safety planning aspects of the DNC, and worked in support of the Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) and the Philadelphia Fire Department (PFD). At the federal level the USSS served as the lead agency responsible for the design and implementation of the operational security of the event (at designated venues). Crisis management and counterterrorism fell to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and consequence management

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<sup>6</sup> The Republican National Convention (RNC) was held in Cleveland, Ohio, from July 18-22, 2016.

was assigned to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).


The OEM served as a liaison among planning and response partners; produced the overall Incident Action Plan (IAP) and Concept of Operations (CONOPs); handled logistics; and assisted with planning and operations related to consequence and emergency management. The PPD served as the lead Pennsylvania law enforcement agency and coordinated activities such as field operations; responded to demonstrators in FDR Park; and conducted transportation and traffic enforcement. PFD was a key contributor on the fire/emergency medical services/public health response; hazardous materials/Explosive Ordinance Disposal support; and code enforcement inside the Wells Fargo Center aspects of the DNC.

A DNC Executive Steering Committee of local and federal law enforcement agencies was responsible for coordinating and sharing planning efforts. Finally, the DNC Committee (DNCC) and DNC Host Committee (DNCHC) were responsible for coordinating the actual event.

## Supporting Agencies and Organizations

To ensure the 2016 DNC was carried out safely and securely, local, state and federal law enforcement agencies collaborated with local organizations to fulfill the security goals of the event.

### *Unified Command.*<sup>7</sup>



### *Law enforcement agencies.*

The City of Philadelphia primarily used PPD officers for the public-facing law enforcement components of the DNC. However, the City’s public safety footprint was enhanced through limited mutual aid and other specifically-requested partners including: Pennsylvania State Police (PSP); regional tactical law enforcement personnel; regional EMS assets and personnel; and Medical Reserve Corps (MRC). The conscious decision to limit mutual aid was made to ensure that PPD would maintain control over the law enforcement narrative emerging from the DNC. The Pennsylvania Army National Guard (PAARNG) was also staged in reserve and ready to assist as needed.

### *Local businesses, media, and community organizations.*

The City of Philadelphia and the PPD worked closely with local businesses in Center City, along

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<sup>7</sup> *Democratic National Convention-After Action Review(AAR)* (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management, 2016). Provided to the Police Foundation by the Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management via email on September 22, 2016. Reviewed by PF team September 2016 – February 2017.

the demonstration routes, and near the Wells Fargo Center to review security plans and explain to them the expected event operations and the potential impacts that demonstrations and rolling detours would have on their businesses. Business owners were also provided specific information through the Virtual Business EOC (VBEOC) that included conference calls twice daily to key commerce liaisons. Meeting minutes were distributed as a Business Situation Report, which was then forwarded through various networks. Local businesses also provided video feeds from their outward-facing cameras to supplement the camera feeds in the EOC. The Joint Information Center (JIC) also played a key role in providing a common voice to the public and other news outlets through daily press meetings, public alerting through Ready Philadelphia and social media campaigns. The JIC DNC Daily Digest was also issued to the public each morning at 8:00 AM as a daily information bulletin.

## DNC Operations

The DNC was held from Monday, July 25 through Thursday, July 28, 2016. However, DNC operations officially began at 7:00 AM on Saturday, July 23, when the EOC opened under a partial activation. Between Saturday morning and Monday morning, agencies with a primary role in the final preparations and build-out assigned liaisons to the EOC. Shortly before the EOC was fully activated, the Transportation Cell—which was the DNC-contracted-busing operations and city traffic monitoring center—was activated. The EOC was fully activated with 24/7 coverage at 7:00 AM on Monday, July 25 until Friday, July 29. During this time, the City of Philadelphia received an estimated 60,000 – 75,000 visitors, including delegates, media outlets, demonstrators, dignitaries and supporting personnel. Security management for the event was a large task that required coordinated communications and execution of each of the areas of operation.

The EOC and PPD event operations concluded on Friday, July 29, 2016 after attendees departed Philadelphia.

### *Event Venues.*

The DNC consisted of three primary event venues and two areas of concern (listed in Table 1). The demonstration routes of Market Street (through Center City) and Broad Street (from City Hall to the Wells Fargo Center) were considered areas of concern. In addition, 26 delegate hotels and countless other venues including restaurants, bars, and other event sites were open to the public.

Table 1. *Primary Event Venues and Areas of Concern*

Venue/Areas of Concern	Address	Dates of Operation
Wells Fargo Center	3601 S Broad St, Philadelphia, PA 19148	July 24-29, 2016
Pennsylvania Convention Center	1101 Arch St, Philadelphia, PA 19107	July 25-28, 2016
Demonstration Site: FDR Park	Pattison Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19145	July 24-29, 2016
Area of Concern: demonstration routes	Broad Street and Market Street	July 24-28, 2016

The EOC took the lead for logistical and resource support operations, and PPD took the lead for public safety operations during the DNC. The EOC used a coordinated structure in order to establish and maintain control throughout the event, with liaisons from all of the relevant city, state, and federal agencies present and able to communicate with their counterparts in other operations centers. PPD utilized its traditional command structure and ensured that all mutual aid agencies and federal law enforcement partners were able to contact PPD leadership when necessary.

Additional command centers were activated throughout the event. These allowed each agency/stakeholder to establish an all-hazards response and maintain situational awareness both internally and externally. Table 2 lists the command centers activated during the convention.

Table 2. *Event Operations Centers*

Event Operations Centers
City of Philadelphia Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
DNCC Fusion Center
Joint Information Center (JIC)
Philadelphia Police Department – Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (PPD-DVIC)
U.S. Secret Service Multi-Agency Communication Center (MACC)

*Secure zones.*



Two major secure zones were established in Philadelphia. The USSS controlled a higher security zone (“hard zone”) in and around the Wells Fargo Center, with PPD providing the majority of the personnel. This zone perimeter was secured with traditional jersey barriers and temporary eight-foot high security fences. In addition, security personnel from PPD and mutual aid agencies conducted car-sweeps and credential checks at various access points around the Wells Fargo Center. An outer secure zone was also maintained by PPD personnel.

In Center City, the Pennsylvania Convention Center hosted official party events including caucus and council meetings. During these events, PPD and Pennsylvania Convention Center private security staff controlled the security operation within and around the Convention Center. USSS personnel were responsible for security operations when any of their protectees attended events at the Convention Center.

#### *Demonstrations.*

PPD planners anticipated a total 60,000 – 75,000 people at the DNC, with the press estimating that 30,000 – 50,000 people from across the country would participate in demonstrations over the course of the week. Significantly fewer actually arrived in Philadelphia. Major protest groups included Black Lives Matter, Greenpeace, Earth First, Clean Energy Revolution, Bernie Sanders March, Amnesty International, Poor People’s Economic Human Rights Campaign, American Civil Liberties Union, Gun Owners of America, Women Against Gun Control, Quaker Groups, as well as dozens of grassroots groups.

In anticipation of the protest activity, the City of Philadelphia passed new ordinances reclassifying the crimes generally associated with mass demonstrations—including, Disorderly Conduct, Failure to Disperse, Public Drunkenness, and Obstructing the Highway—from criminal summary citations to lesser civil penalties and/or fines. In addition, ordinances against camping in FDR Park were not enforced the week of the DNC. FDR Park was set up and utilized as a free speech zone and the Department of Parks and Recreation and supporting agencies oversaw operations. This was used as a secure gathering location, where demonstrators could exercise their First Amendment rights, and at the same time, authorities could limit disruptive behavior.

#### *Financial Management.*

Approximately \$50 million in federal funds for the DNC was made available for award to Philadelphia on April 19, 2016. Beginning in early 2016, BJA convened regular conference calls with the City of Philadelphia to coordinate grant management activities and to quickly identify concerns as they arose. During the planning process, BJA also dedicated staff to meet the needs and requests of the City and coordinated with the Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to conduct fraud prevention training to help ensure all expenditures were adequately documented and approved in accordance with regulations. BJA staff also conducted one in-person technical assistance visit prior to the event to review the procurement and documentation processes and to provide any additional assistance. After the OIG conducted an audit of the funds used, as is standard for recipients of BJA’s Nominating Convention grants. BJA also conducted a final programmatic and financial monitoring visits in early 2017.

# Section 2: Operational Assessment

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This section of the report reviews the efficacy of law enforcement operations for the 2016 DNC.

Observations are organized by functional area, which were identified using the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of Community Oriented Policing Services' (COPS Office) *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*, as well as by the subcommittees established for the 2016 DNC.<sup>8</sup> Observations are categorized as a best practice (BP) and/or lesson learned (LL). A best practice reflects the activities and actions that contributed to the success of the event, while a lesson learned identifies areas for improvement and highlights activities or actions that would have improved operations. In some cases, particular aspects of an activity or action were best practices and others were lessons learned. This information should provide useful guidance in planning future LSSEs.

The observations and discussions presented in this Quick Look will be expanded upon to revise and update the *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies (Primer)* document, presenting best practices and lessons learned from both the 2016 Democratic and Republican National Conventions.

## 2.1 Access Control: Screening and Physical Security

*This functional area is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the lives and property—as well as the protection of civil rights and liberties—of all delegates, VIPS, USSS protectees, and other attendees during the DNC.*

### **Observation 2.1.1 (BP): Early planning, regular meetings, and effective coordination led to the success of venue security.**

During the 2016 DNC, event venues were effectively secured, with no major incidents. This success can be attributed to the various planning strategies that took place. First, the Venue subcommittee began holding regular meetings with federal partners approximately 10 months prior to the DNC. This gave the subcommittee members ample time to establish relationships with one another and with key stakeholders, and to plan. The subcommittee members from local, state, and federal law enforcement also conducted site visits and walkthroughs of the major event venues, in order to plan for daily operations and special circumstances, and adapted plans in response to international terrorist attacks and intelligence. Ultimately, fencing, traditional jersey barriers and temporary five-foot high security fences were erected around the Wells Fargo Center and parking lots within the “secure zone,” and security checkpoints were placed in the most effective spots to allow those with the appropriate credentials access.

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<sup>8</sup> Edward Connors. *Planning And Managing Security For Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement*. March 2007. (U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC). <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=482649> (accessed February 28, 2017).



Effective coordination between local, state, and federal law enforcement during the event also ensured venue security. PPD and mutual aid agencies maintained an effective perimeter around the Wells Fargo Center and the surrounding parking lots throughout the event. When demonstrators attempted to gain entry to any restricted areas, they were quickly met by law enforcement.

**Observation 2.1.2 (BP): Venue security planning and execution for contingencies were comprehensive.**

Contingency plans for venue security were comprehensive. These plans included multiple options for ingress and egress of delivery/supply trucks and media, parking lots within the secure zone for the buses transporting delegates to and from the Wells Fargo Center, various locations for VIPs to enter and exit the Wells Fargo Center, and identification of which doors of the Wells Fargo Center would and would not be unlocked. The same held true for the Pennsylvania Convention Center, for which the USSS and PPD devised multiple plans to bring protectees in and out and to ensure that the building remained secure at all times.

**Observation 2.1.3 (BP): Secure zones were maintained by local law enforcement with arrest authority.**

The USSS controlled a higher-security zone around the primary event venue at the Wells Fargo Center. PPD provided the majority of personnel, supplemented by a handful of mutual aid agencies, to secure the outer perimeter area of the Wells Fargo Center, including some of the parking lots and side streets. While the USSS was responsible for the secure zone areas, the normal protocol is for uniformed law enforcement to provide security, because the USSS does not have arrest powers for state laws. For example, when seven protestors breached an outer perimeter fence near a subway station, approximately 100 USSS and local officers responded together, with PPD making the arrests and transporting the offenders to the Philadelphia Federal Detention Center.

The secondary event venue—the Pennsylvania Convention Center—was also a higher-security zone, but since it was not the official event venue, PPD led the protection effort, and USSS shared the personnel responsibility.

Together, PPD and USSS were effective in maintaining perimeter security throughout the event.

**Observation 2.1.4 (BP): Physical security was maintained without a physical show of force, including equipment and large numbers of officers.**

This was the first Democratic National Convention since civil disturbances and protests of law enforcement in Ferguson and other cities nationwide, and DNCC leaders were adamant about maximizing security while minimizing law enforcement presence. USSS and PPD officials successfully allocated resources and personnel to ensure the Wells Fargo Center and surrounding areas were kept secure without a physical show of force. Inside the Wells Fargo Center, uniformed officers were kept out of eyesight and only a handful of USSS personnel could be seen on each floor. Outside, PPD officers maintaining the perimeter and stationed in FDR Park wore their traditional uniforms—white or blue shirts and dark pants—with tactical response units stationed blocks away and out of sight. This paid dividends with demonstrators and attendees.

**Observation 2.1.5 (LL): Common screening protocols were unclear between USSS, local law enforcement, and DNCC personnel at perimeter security checkpoints.**

Local law enforcement agencies coordinated with USSS to maintain security around the perimeter of the secure zone that included the Wells Fargo Center and neighboring parking lots. During the DNC, a lack of common screening protocols, unfamiliarity of road restrictions and closures, and duplicative credentials led by personnel assigned to security checkpoints caused confusion and bottlenecks at security checkpoints. For example, on some occasions, personnel and vehicles (for example, public safety and EOC vehicles) were not recognized and stopped by DNCC personnel at checkpoints. Local law enforcement agencies directing traffic around the perimeter were confused regarding some of the traffic routes, which parking lots to direct different delivery and service vehicles to, and how to gain entry to the secure site. Additionally, the process of screening delegates prior to being allowed into the Wells Fargo Center and prior to getting on buses to be transported back to their hotels was unclear and burdensome. In some cases, delegates had to wait outside in the extreme heat for hours, waiting to be screened. Expedited screening protocols and additional USSS personnel to assist in the screening would have alleviated some of these issues.

## **2.2 Administrative and Logistics Support**

*This functional area is responsible for acquiring, staging and tracking all available and obtainable resources for the operations and care of public safety agencies affiliated with the 2016 DNC.*

**Observation 2.2.1 (BP/LL): Strategic Planning and real-time decision making resulted in the successful care of thousands of public safety personnel.**

During the DNC, the City of Philadelphia was experiencing a heat wave with triple-digit temperatures. With this in mind, the city paid extra attention to ensure access to mobile rest and rehabilitation (R&R) sites, as well as hydrating more than 6,000 public safety personnel using mobile rest and rehabilitation (R&R) sites and buildings around the city.

Strategic planning, a Forward Logistics Support Base, and adaptability during the DNC proved valuable for logistics. For example, the Forward Logistics Support Base—located in one of the parking lots directly outside of the secure zone by the Wells Fargo Center—was an effective staging location for pallets of water bottles, food services, and an air-conditioned trailer for public safety personnel.

Because of the extreme weather, it became apparent that the R&R sites throughout the City were not adequate for meeting the needs of officers in the field, particularly at FDR Park. As a result of collaboration between City agencies and ability to adapt, the EOC was able to set up a cooling tent with food and water for law enforcement in FDR Park and was able to quickly adjust operations to provide more mobile feeding and logistics services. Per diem was also provided to off-site personnel, including intelligence sources, who were unable to openly walk into R&R sites.

**Observation 2.2.2 (BP): Collaboration among interagency partners was essential to providing public safety personnel with the resources and logistical support needed throughout the event.**

During the pre-event planning, the OEM identified City agencies (including PPD; PFD; the Office of Innovation and Technology; the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA); the Department of Parks and Recreation; and the Procurement, Risk Management, and Law Department) and organizations (including the business community and property owners) that would be involved in the planning stages and engaged them, regardless of the size of their role during the DNC. Particularly the Procurement, Risk Management, and Law Department and the Office of Innovation and Technology were able to determine what devices, facilities, equipment, supplies and services could be borrowed; what needed to be procured; and, to begin the process for procuring goods and services. Having a single office coordinate resource support operations, also saved money and duplicative purchasing, and ensured that departmental and City technological capabilities were taken into consideration when purchasing.

**Observation 2.2.3 (BP): Practicing logistics for operations on earlier events helped prepare personnel for the DNC.**

The City of Philadelphia has had numerous events that afforded all of the stakeholders involved in the DNC the opportunity to practice logistics, field-test plans, and identify best practices and lessons learned. In addition to regular sporting events and concerts at the Wells Fargo Center; parades, marches, and demonstrations; fireworks and other events associated with the historical background of Philadelphia; the annual Philadelphia Marathon; and, other events throughout Center City, the WMOF/PV in September 2015 served as an opportunity to prepare for one NSSE while hosting another. In fact, the City of Philadelphia was able to identify best practices and lessons learned from the WMOF/PV and apply them to the DNC.

**Observation 2.2.4 (BP): PPD recognized the importance of strategic staffing and primarily used its own officers during the event.**

PPD had over 6,000 law enforcement personnel assisting with security for the DNC, taking the lead for all public-facing law enforcement operations and duties. This number was chosen based on intelligence-gathering regarding the amount of officers used at previous similar events (including the 2000 RNC that was also hosted in Philadelphia), the expected number of demonstrators, and the political climate surrounding the presumptive nominee and law enforcement in general. PPD made the conscious decision to mostly use its own officers—and mutual aid from a handful of agencies in the region—for public-facing operations and duties to manage community perception by emphasizing positive interactions with demonstrators and as an accountability measure, controlling when arrests were made.

Additionally, using law enforcement officers primarily from the area prevented the City of Philadelphia from having to coordinate housing and transportation for visiting officers; time for outside officers to be briefed, trained, and issued equipment; and time for outside officers to be checked in and out.

**Observation 2.2.5 (LL): Allocating personnel should be fluid and scalable.**

Difficulty accurately predicting demonstrator turnout and the nature of security threats, needing to plan for worst-case scenarios, and Union requirements impacted PPD’s ability to allocate resources effectively during the DNC. While demonstrator turnout was not as high as expected, there were daily reports that the following day would bring more demonstrators, impeding PPD’s ability to reallocate personnel. Additionally, Union contract requirements regarding changing work hours and notification needed to do so, as well as accessibility of officers complicated the ability to adjust personnel. In some cases, officers worked 12–17 hour shifts on consecutive days while others were on scheduled vacation days. For future large-scale events, PPD has identified working on scheduling appropriately and having overlap between shifts for briefings with support agencies like PFD and OEM, a priority.

**Observation 2.2.6 (BP): Public safety operations were effectively coordinated.**

Each public safety agency established an effective operational command structure, and the executives of each agency effectively communicated amongst themselves. Successful collaboration between PPD, PFD, and OEM—all through the EOC and in the field—contributed to officer and public safety. The EOC had high ranking representatives from participating agencies acting as the primary specialists of knowledge and decision-making. When questions arose, the correct authority was available to respond in a timely manner.

## **2.3 Command and Control**

*This functional area is responsible for command and control operations employed during the 2016 DNC.*

**Observation 2.3.1 (BP): PPD established an effective operational command structure.**

Throughout the DNC operations, PPD maintained its traditional command structure and its strong relationship with other city, state, and federal public safety agencies. All command staff maintained strong relationships with one another and their counterparts in other agencies and provided seamless event coordination and maintenance of public safety throughout the process. Members of the PPD command staff were also allocated to, and stationed at, the different command and operations centers to facilitate decision-making, collaboration, and coordination. PPD officers were able to communicate with one another through a designated radio channel and radios were also purchased and borrowed to facilitate communication and collaboration with personnel from other jurisdictions.

The OEM also produced an Incident Action Plan (IAP) that consisted of a high-level Concept of Operations (CONOPs) which provided essential information to all entities supporting the DNC and included appendices that provided agency-specific operational plans; job aids and function-specific IAPs; reference materials; and, information about command and control, communications, policies and major lines of operation, support operations, and functional needs.

**Observation 2.3.2 (BP): Collaboration between city, state, federal, and non-government agencies provided public safety personnel with necessary resources and logistical support throughout the event.**

Collaboration between city, state and federal agencies was essential in providing first responders with the resources, support, and situational awareness they required over the course of the event. During the planning phase, the Logistics subcommittee identified organizations to support the DNC, such as the health department, property owners, and PFD and was able to leverage their resources and input during the DNC. PPD also worked closely with multiple vendors. Pre-existing relationships allowed vendors to remain accountable, and ensured they had adequate resources.

Effective coordination was evident through the partners' involvement and inclusion throughout the planning process and in the EOC during the event. Executive-level members of PFD, PPD, and OEM were also present at each of the daily press conferences and were able to share information and resources in the EOC.

**Observation 2.3.3 (BP): Assigning high-ranking individuals to command centers was instrumental in timely decision-making and ensuring effective coordination and communication.**

Rather than only having people at the EOC to monitor and then relay questions to the individual departments, executive-level members of PFD, PPD, and OEM were present at the EOC the entire time it was functional during the DNC. This allowed for the City's public safety agencies to communicate with one another as issues and challenges arose and to coordinate necessary operations and responses. When questions arose, the correct authority was available to respond in a timely and effective manner, instead of having to wait for other individuals from each agency to go through their chains of command to get answers. Even during off hours, personnel from each of these agencies had the authority to make most decisions, and had direct access to the higher-ups if needed.

**Observation 2.3.4 (BP): Interagency partners utilized a single event-management software system and a single transportation dashboard to maintain situational awareness.**

The EOC and local operation centers leveraged Knowledge Center (an incident management system software) for interagency situational awareness. Knowledge Center was used to collect and disseminate real-time information and situational awareness to all relevant stakeholders. Additionally, all of the information from the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) cameras, geographic information system (GIS) products such as CityView and Situational Awareness Portal, and regular briefings and situation and spot reports from the EOC were all fed into Knowledge Center. Since different levels of information could be seen by different individuals and stakeholders, information was categorized in the EOC as it arose and was automatically disseminated to pre-determined sets of people in the field and the rest of the City, so that they could see events that were currently happening, and allocate resources appropriately. The EOC was also able to track more than 470 events—including event name, location, organizer, permit status, and source, as well as whether

the events were marches/demonstrations, public safety benchmarks, DNCC events, Host Committee events, or non-sponsored events—throughout the City.

Across the hall from the EOC, the Transportation Cell had a customized dashboard that included information regarding where each DNC bus was, the traffic flow in and around Philadelphia, the number of available ambulances and their locations, and other pertinent Fire/EMS information. This information was also entered into Knowledge Center by a single individual, which further contributed to providing full situational awareness to all partners in the field.

By only using one event-management software system and one transportation dashboard, all parties involved were able to share and receive information in a unified way.

## 2.4 Credentialing

*This functional area is responsible for assisting with the application for, and distribution of, credentials for all law enforcement at the DNC.*

### **Observation 2.4.1 (LL): The credentialing processes could have been smoother with more coordination between all levels of security.**

During the planning process, USSS and the City of Philadelphia agreed to issue one set of credentials for all individuals and vehicles that needed to enter the secured zones of the Wells Fargo Center and the Philadelphia Convention Center. PPD personnel found the USSS credentialing system effective, but confusion was created by the dual credentialing process between the DNCC and USSS. According to City and USSS officials, the DNCC originally indicated that they would honor any credentials issued by the USSS. In the final days before the DNC however, this decision was changed and the DNCC indicated that its credentials would be required for any personnel entering the secure zones. Many essential staff were rerouted to different security checkpoints because credentials and place cards were not honored by DNCC. Additionally, DNCC staff only issued general daily credentials for public safety agencies each evening before and required agencies to have an individual pick them up in person. This created an additional burden for public safety agencies that needed to coordinate this on top of all of their other duties. Improvements could be made by the DNCC and host public safety agencies coordinating their credentialing requirements, and documenting them in writing, clearly communicating them earlier in the process to ensure uniform implementation.

## 2.5 Crowd Management

*This functional area is responsible for managing crowds while maintaining officer and public safety.*

### **Observation 2.5.1 (BP): The City of Philadelphia and Philadelphia Police Department emphasized positive relationships and maintaining public safety.**

Throughout the preparation and planning for the DNC, the City of Philadelphia and PPD focused on professional and polite interactions with attendees, demonstrators/marchers, and media as opposed to harsh crowd control. Before the DNC, the Mayor signed a bill introduced by the City Council to change the crimes generally associated with mass demonstrations from criminal

summary citations to lesser civil penalties and/or fines. Ordinances against camping in FDR Park were not enforced the week of the DNC, as long as the activities in the tents were legal. Both of these moves were intended to assure prospective attendees that this Convention would not be the same as the 2000 RNC hosted in Philadelphia. In addition, the City required that the Pennsylvania Army National Guard (PAARNG)—because they would be wearing their traditional military-style uniforms—be kept out of sight of those at FDR Park, the Wells Fargo Center, and Center City.

The PPD also emphasized taking a professional and positive approach in their attire and in interactions with demonstrators. PPD officers were instructed to wear their standard uniforms, rather than riot gear, and to refrain from making arrests unless absolutely necessary. Even in cases where demonstrators were purposely trying to get arrested, PPD officers worked to talk them out of climbing over fences, but calmly removed them when the demonstrators made it over anyway. During marches and demonstrations, PPD officers also walked with, and talked to, marchers about their experience in Philadelphia. Police facilitated positive interactions between PPD and demonstrators in FDR Park by providing water and cooling tents during the excessive heat and ushering them to safety during a severe thunderstorm.

All of this was done with the intent to focus on positive crowd maintenance and safety more than crowd control.

**Observation 2.5.2 (BP): Training helped to set expectations of officers and prepare them for their duties.**

PPD developed a training strategy that educated all officers in crowd maintenance and safety. An important element of this training was the importance of balancing demonstrators' First Amendment rights to free speech and to assemble peacefully, with law enforcement's need to protect persons and property from injury and damage. Critical training provided specific scenarios of people and crowds that officers would most likely encounter, potential behavior of specific protest groups and how PPD would respond to aggressive and violent crowd actions. PPD officers were trained through a variety of methods including classroom instruction, field exercises, and online trainings. Mutual aid officers were provided with online training and a brief check-in training when they arrived to ensure that they understood the message. This resulted in officers remaining positive and professional toward aggressive demonstrators and to understanding that these demonstrators would be the significant minority.

**Observation 2.5.3 (BP/LL): The Bicycle Unit provided effective crowd maintenance, but should not be utilized for rapid and tactical responses.**

Bicycle Unit officers were stationed throughout FDR Park and accompanied demonstrators on their marches in Center City and to FDR Park during the DNC. The officers on bicycles were seen as approachable and friendly. Especially in FDR Park, officers on bicycles were able to make rounds on a regular basis to ensure that demonstrators were safe; that they could identify where water bottles and cooling stations needed to be handed out; and, that residents could continue to use the park to run, bike, and skate. Bicycle Unit officers were also able to provide slightly more mobility than officers on foot, allowing them to provide assistance during

movement of parades and marches. In these regards, the Bicycle Unit was extremely positive and appreciated by demonstrators.

However, while they were extremely effective in providing a rapid and tactical—yet non-militaristic—approach to demonstrations, officers and their bicycles were also used as physical barricades for directing large crowds and patrolling the perimeters of venue sites. Bicycles also served as visual force multipliers, giving the impression of a much greater number of officers.

**Observation 2.5.4 (BP): Philadelphia Police Department command staff being on-scene proved valuable to diffusing potentially-aggressive demonstrators.**

PPD Commissioner Richard Ross and his command staff were able to foster and enhance personal relationships with key demonstrators and leaders of large groups, and were able to be on the ground interacting with demonstrators at various points during the DNC. Commissioner Ross and his command staff met with members of the key demonstration groups including the ACLU. This proved to be effective in defusing situations with potentially unruly demonstrators. The presence of PPD executives also contributed to the overall positive perception of PPD and its tactics.

**Observation 2.5.5 (BP): Providing concessions to demonstrators eased event tension.**

PPD staged cooling tents in FDR Park, and offered water drops to demonstrators, which were well received during the intense heat of the week. By proactively addressing the needs of demonstrators and engaging with them in a professional and polite way, many demonstrators were appreciative and even worked with PPD to identify demonstrators that were causing problems or were committing illegal acts.

**Observation 2.5.6 (BP/LL): Designating a free speech zone at FDR Park served as a useful tool for crowd maintenance and allowed PPD to better control demonstrators' activity.**

PPD and the City of Philadelphia—primarily through the Department of Parks and Recreation—worked with the DNCC to transform FDR Park into a free speech area and to create a specific speaker's platform in FDR Park. Though the stage was intended for demonstrators to use as a gathering space, it was hardly used during the DNC, because demonstrators were organized in groups throughout the park, or were up against the fence closest to the Wells Fargo Center.

Despite the fact that the camp sites violated city ordinances, the decision by PPD and the Philadelphia Department of Parks and Recreation to allow demonstrators to camp in FDR Park also provided PPD with the opportunity to engage and establish trusting relationships with demonstrators that they knew would be there for days. While this was a major success, the days that there were severe weather issues—extreme heat and thunderstorms—the tents and campers ended up causing additional public safety concerns. PPD had to escort them to places where they could be covered during the storms and could be cooled and hydrated during the heat.



## 2.6 Dignitary/VIP Protection

*This functional area is responsible for the establishment of security procedures and plans for protective details, as well as coordinating the use of multi-agency resources to assist visitors of the 2016 DNC.*

### **Observation 2.6.1 (LL): Having a number of contingency plans regarding dignitaries and VIPs, and coordinating between multiple agencies is imperative.**

The Dignitary/VIP subcommittee should include representatives from each of the federal agencies that will have responsibilities for protecting at least one dignitary or VIP, and should begin planning as soon as possible. Critical to this planning process is the identification of contingencies and alternative plans that account for multiple routes to the Convention site and multiple times for departing and arriving, based on other potential VIPs and dignitaries. Coordination and communication from the DNCC to law enforcement agencies regarding which VIPs and dignitaries will be present and when they will present is also an important part of scheduling and coordinating resources to ensure the safety of all. During the DNC, a number of issues arose, which were not included in the subcommittee's operations plan, including individuals showing up in different places and wanting to go to different places, and multiple agencies blocking roads and highways to create paths for their dignitary/VIP but affecting another dignitary/VIP.

## 2.7 Financial/Grant Management

*This functional area is responsible for the distribution, management and review of funds used to support public safety efforts during the 2016 DNC.*

### **Observation 2.7.1 (LL): The use of federal funding was a significant factor in pre-event planning efforts, especially in purchasing equipment.**

Prior to the 2016 DNC, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) provided a timeline which outlined the grant award process and an overview of the federal funding process for such an event, which is referenced in the *Managing Large-Scale Security Events: A Planning Primer for Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. Although this timeline noted that there is a mandatory budget review and clearance process that is often the lengthiest segment of the grant award, the 2016 convention grants were also challenging, because of the requirements of Executive Order 13688, "Federal Support for Local Law Enforcement Equipment Acquisition." All budget items were processed according to the standard Federal approval guidelines. In addition, requested items that fell under Executive Order 13688 required the development of policies and procedures and training curricula that had to be approved by BJA prior to being purchased —the City of Philadelphia experienced some additional delays and concerns that were unaccounted for in their planning timeline.

Beginning on March 28, 2016, four weeks before the award was made, BJA and Philadelphia agencies began holding coordination calls, and continued to hold these calls regarding budgetary items regularly. However, officials in Philadelphia suggested they could have made better use of the coordinated calls to discuss issues and taken advantage of technical assistance opportunities offered by BJA.

Also, some of the special conditions required for the convention grants included requirements related to needing to have approval to purchase items before funds could be drawn down and needing to have a policy and training curriculum for all pieces of controlled equipment. While PPD officials were aware of these conditions from the beginning, they did not fully factor the time and personnel needed to develop the policies and trainings required to govern the use of certain equipment purchases, into their timeline. Additionally, the convention grants are provided as reimbursement grants and City agencies were unable to purchase items without prior approval—because the City would not advance funds for equipment to ensure that they would be reimbursed—occasional delays in the City’s procurement process occurred. PPD and OEM noted that the City’s procurement processes needed to start much earlier in the planning phase.<sup>9</sup>

In addition to the grant itself, procurement was complicated by the fact that timelines were not met by the DNCC, Host Committee, and City agencies and stakeholders. Many of these agencies and stakeholders did not realize that the deadlines they were given were in order to allow the Procurement, Risk Management, and Law Department to conduct its necessary procurement processes. With the DNCC, the inability for the City to get commitment from the DNCC that it would pay for certain items during the necessary timeframe created substantial delays in what could and could not be ordered. In fact, in some cases PPD faced challenges where pre-existing relationships with vendors were able to alleviate issues or expedite orders, but there were also instances where vendors could not meet accelerated timelines, resulting in orders being cancelled.

### **Observation 2.7.2 (LL): Tracking resources throughout procurement and use is critical for post-Convention reviews.**

Following the DNC, an audit of all the federal money spent by the City of Philadelphia on personnel, supplies, and other Convention expenditures was initiated by OIG.<sup>10</sup> Although most of the resource request forms from City agencies were collected by OEM for tracking purposes, City officials did note that there were many purchases that were either requested verbally or were made without the appropriate signatures. This made efficient tracking of all Convention-related expenditures from various City departments and agencies, and prevention of duplicative or conflicting orders difficult. OEM indicated that instituting a formal resource request protocol that requires all requests to be made in writing—regardless of who makes them—and then putting them on a single spreadsheet made available to all stakeholders. The spreadsheet will also help eliminate requests for similar resources and facilitate sharing between agencies during future large-scale events.

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<sup>9</sup> One of the critical lessons learned from the 2012 *Managing Large Scale Security Events* Primer was that host cities should seek an early ordinance from their governing body to allow for the funding and purchasing of equipment that require a long lead time. This could have allowed Philadelphia’s OEM greater flexibility in the identification and ordering of critical pieces of equipment. Had OEM and PPD used this strategy, they could have sought a special provision allowing the Mayor/City Manager to expedite the procurement process for special equipment setting a budget limit on expenditures that the Mayor/City Manager could approve without sending before the City Council for approval.

<sup>10</sup> As of the date of publication of this document, the OIG has not issued its report.

## 2.8 Fire and Public Health

*This functional area is responsible for providing fire and public health response in support of all events and/or incidents surrounding the 2016 DNC, while maintaining normal response requirements for the citizens of the City of Philadelphia.*

### **Observation 2.8.1 (BP): PFD effectively managed and coordinated fire and public health responses within and outside the secure perimeters.**

During the DNC, PFD provided personnel, vehicles and resources within and outside the secure perimeter. For example, Fire/EMS encountered one security issue at the Navy Yard, where two people claiming to be delegates, entered the security area. PFD responded quickly, and informed USSS agents.

### **Observation 2.8.2 (LL): PFD should have allocated more Fire Code officers inside the Wells Fargo Center during the DNC.**

Although PFD were flexible to modify their shifts with little warning (increased to 12-hour shifts), they did not have enough fire code officers to keep aisles clear and enforce all fire statutes. DNC volunteers were manning the aisles with no enforcement powers which provided no help in crowd regulation. The DNC noted that a stronger presence from the PFD Fire Code Unit would allow staff to address problems and better support all DNC staff. PFD noted that previously agreed policies devised in the planning phase, were not strictly followed during the event. Additionally, some of the temporary interior modifications deviated from original plans that were submitted and could have caused evacuation safety issues.

## 2.9 Intelligence/Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Surveillance

*This functional area is responsible for obtaining, assessing, and disseminating information about individuals and groups who might pose a threat to protectees and designated venues locations during the DNC 2016.*

### **Observation 2.9.1 (BP): A joint personnel and communications plan between intelligence teams and PPD improved response operations.**

Collaboration with intelligence personnel, in the form of fusion centers, allowed risks and threats to be assessed. Intelligence officers from PPD, PA State Police, FBI, DHS, USSS and regional representatives from Delaware, New Jersey, Maryland and Pennsylvania constituted fusion centers. They communicated regularly and ensured a common understanding of information at all times. Various intel teams were deployed outside the venues and in an undercover capacity. For example, PPD detectives were assigned to the Protective Intelligence Command Center to receive and pass information to other intel teams. The balance between who can feed information into a pool, and which agencies need access to that information, was met by PPD and all agencies. Criminal behavior was deterred and strategic arrests were made.

### **Observation 2.9.2 (BP): Intelligence sources deployed in the field provided invaluable information.**

Acquiring real-time information using text messages, cellular phones, push to talk radio transmissions, PennDOT and RTTC cameras proved to be an effective operational method. ArcGIS products<sup>11</sup> complimented EOC reports and provided a common operating picture, along with extensive monitoring of social media. Facebook, Twitter and Instagram allowed law enforcement to gather information, determine threats and monitor groups' activities. A number of measures were taken to limit sources' interactions with law enforcement, including briefing them off site, locating fusion centers off site, and providing a separate R&R site. The only area to enhance at future LSSEs, would be to embed intelligence sources in protest groups to gain immediate access to potential criminal behavior.

## **2.10 Interagency Communications and Technology**

*This functional area was responsible for establishing primary and backup communications capabilities that allow local, state, federal, and other agencies to effectively communicate with necessary individuals as required throughout the event.*

### **Observation 2.10.1 (BP): Information and technology was frequently shared between agencies to provide unified situational awareness.**

Information sharing between federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies before and during the DNC was seamless. Significant integration of technology between City agencies—including radios, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT) and Real-Time Crime Center (RTCC) cameras, geographic information system (GIS) products such as CityView and Situational Awareness Portal, and Knowledge Center—regular briefings in the EOC, and complementary situation and spot reports were used to develop a common operating picture throughout the event. Additionally, information was continuously shared between the EOC, the USSS Multi-Agency Communication Center (MACC), the Joint Information Center (JIC), the PPD Delaware Valley Intelligence Center (PPD-DVIC), and the DNCC Fusion Center.

## **2.11 Legal**

*This functional area is responsible for providing legal support to the other subcommittees and responding to the legal questions that arose, including questions of public disclosure and attempting to minimize risk in civil liberties litigation.*

### **Observation 2.11.1 (BP): PPD and the City held meetings with special interest groups to avoid officer litigation and demonstrator arrests.**

The City purchased \$5 million in liability insurance coverage to protect officers against potential lawsuits brought as a result of perceived use of excessive force during enforcement activities. In addition, the City de-criminalized a large number of nuisance crimes associated with protests, which directly affected the number of demonstrators arrested. Crimes included: disorderly

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<sup>11</sup> The Situational Awareness Portal was developed collaboratively by geo-spatial consultants GeographIT and EBA Engineering for the 2016 DNC. CityView mobile app is a suite of software that can be used on smartphones or tablets to share information and upload pictures of building and park inspections from the field.

conduct, public drunkenness, failure to disperse and blocking a highway or public passage. Due to these changes, PPD focused on de-escalation tactics and issuing civil citations in lieu of arrests. This allowed law enforcement to acknowledge the misbehavior, but separate it from more serious felonies. It also allowed officers to save resources and time, which arrest procedures would use. A major success from civil citations at the DNC, is that this was a remarkable difference to the 2000 Republican National Convention held in Pennsylvania, where 400 arrests were made. And the 2016 DNC where no local arrests were made.<sup>12</sup> This portrayed PPD positively among demonstrators and all post event media coverage was equally positive. Law enforcement was praised for their “hands off” approach and fostering community relationships during the event.

**Observation 2.11.2 (LL): City and department lawyers planned procurement in a timely manner.**

In the future, PPD and other LSSE departments should include the city and department lawyers as early as possible to help with procurement law, guidelines, risk management, checklists, information sharing and other legal advice during the process.

## **2.12 Non-Event Patrol**

*This functional area was responsible for maintaining current public safety response requirements for the citizens of the City of Philadelphia during the 2016 DNC.*

**Observation 2.12.1 (BP): Co-locating the EOC and the Traffic Operations Center created a common operating picture.**

During the DNC, the Philadelphia EOC and Transportation Cell were co-located, which was from a lesson learned from the Papal Visit in 2015. This proved to be a success as the departments were located next door to each other, within the same building, streamlining communication between both operation centers. Questions were easily answered, improving situational awareness about the city.

**Observation 2.12.2 (BP): OEM effectively utilized multiple types of data to enhance public safety and monitor resources in real-time.**

The incorporation of different types of data, such as PFD contacts, numbers of available ambulances versus total ambulances into the dashboard allowed first responder agencies in the EOC to allocate and adjust resources in real-time. This capability is significant, especially if a larger incident occurred at the DNC.

## **2.13 Arrestee Processing**

*This functional area was responsible for supporting mobile processing and booking capabilities for all law enforcement and the USSS during the 2016 DNC.*

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<sup>12</sup> Daniel Craig, “Zero arrests made by Philly police during DNC protests,” *Philly Voice*, July 30, 2016, <http://www.phillyvoice.com/zero-arrests-made-philly-police-during-dnc/> (accessed February 3, 2017).

**Observation 2.13.1 (BP): The City of Philadelphia intended for all arrests for crimes committed during the DNC to be made by PPD officers.**

The intention was for PPD to be the only state or local law enforcement agency with authority to conduct arrests and for individuals who were arrested to be brought to one of a series of processing facilities throughout the City. Extra personnel were on-hand throughout the entirety of the DNC, particularly during night shifts, to process prisoners.

## **2.14 Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Utilities**

*This functional area was responsible for developing and coordinating a critical infrastructure plan that would monitor and safeguard all computer systems, communication systems, energy systems, pipelines, railroads, and utility services.<sup>13</sup>*

**Observation 2.14.1 (BP): The City of Philadelphia incorporated critical infrastructure and utility partners into the planning for the DNC and into the EOC during the event.**

Prior to the DNC, the City of Philadelphia incorporated critical infrastructure and utility partners into the planning process. These partners were included in the EOC during the DNC and were standing by to address any critical issues that arose.

## **2.15 Public Information and Media Relations**

*This functional area is responsible for developing and coordinating operational strategies that enabled law enforcement media representatives to speak with the media and key stake holders, concerning the planning and implementation of the 2016 DNC.*

**Observation 2.15.1 (BP): The JIC and EOC effectively managed public information and media inquiries.**

A city JIC along with the EOC was activated prior to and throughout the event. Significant coordination between individual city department Public Information Officers (PIOs) and the JIC facilitated streamlined communications channel and ensured rapid response to media outlets. The community received a uniform public message at all times. By maintaining situational awareness of the event through gathering of facts, social media monitoring and real-time technologies, the JIC was successful in developing and disseminating information to the public.

PPD responded to local business real-time information/feedback that occurred twice daily via conference calls. This allowed the businesses and community to feel involved in hosting the DNC, and that their previous requests from the Papal Visit were considered. The JIC held daily press briefings which satisfied the media and lowered incoming information requests.

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<sup>13</sup> In preparation for hosting the WMOF/PV in September 2015, the City of Philadelphia and its partners conducted significant assessments of, and planning related to, critical infrastructure and utilities. These plans were adapted, where necessary, and implemented during the DNC.

Social media use by PPD was extremely valuable, providing an instant avenue for sharing information with the public.

**Observation 2.15.2 (BP): A public engagement campaign successfully educated the media and public on the 2016 DNC events.**

In early 2016, the city of Philadelphia began a public engagement campaign by conducting meetings and providing resources for the community. The Philadelphia 2016 Host Committee for the Democratic National Convention launched a DNC website to provide useful information on transportation, hotels, security, the availability of FDR park for demonstrators, and other event related activities.<sup>14</sup>

**Observation 2.15.3 (LL): The Transportation Cell and EOC could have communicated traffic/road issues more broadly and effectively.**

Traffic issues and road closures were one of the largest issues during the operations of the event. Once problems were encountered, such as extended demonstrations and slow-moving traffic, PPD should have communicated better with community members which could have helped alleviate additional traffic problems. In the future, PPD could use its social media accounts as a single source information source, that taxis, Uber drivers, and all members of the public could rely on.

## **2.16 Explosive Device Response and Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) Response**

*In Philadelphia, explosive device and HAZMAT are separate entities charged with preparing and responding to, assessing, and rendering safe and suspicious items, improvised explosive devices, and hazardous materials in such a way as to safeguard life and property and restore the situation to normal as soon as possible after an incident.*

**Observation 2.16.1 (BP): Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (JHATs) were deployed to rapidly assess chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats.**

PPD deployed several Joint Hazard Assessment Teams (JHATs) inside and outside the Wells Fargo Center, as well as the surrounding areas and hotels. The JHATs consisted of PPD Counter-Terrorism Operations, PFD, and FBI members to provide rapid assessment capabilities for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats during the DNC.

In the event of a CBRN event, larger response packages were staged at the Navy Yard and PPD Counter Terrorism Operations Headquarters. The larger teams included traditional HAZMAT and decontamination resources supplemented by Department of Energy, National Guard Civil Support Team, and FBI Hazardous Evidence Response Team personnel.

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<sup>14</sup> “Philadelphia 2016,” <http://www.phldnc.com/about/> (accessed February 3, 2017).

**Observation 2.16.2 (BP): Explosive Device Response teams were deployed and ready to rapidly respond to, mitigate, and resolve explosive-related incidents.**

PPD Explosive Device Response teams used a special model that merges accurate initial call-taking and the immediate dispatching of all suspicious item(s) or person(s) locations to multiple deployed teams of bomb technicians who operated throughout the Wells Fargo Center area and the rest of the city. While utilizing unconventional rapid-reaction methodologies, these teams were available to instantly respond to, mitigate, and resolve all suspect and actual explosive-related incidents, many times in a matter of minutes.

**Observation 2.16.3 (BP): Pre-event explosive threat trainings allowed for much better assessment processes.**

PPD Bomb Squad personnel conducted multiple current trend explosive threat trainings conducted for PPD patrol officers and detectives, SEPTA, PFD firefighters and EMTs, Secret Service, Federal Protective Service, and other personnel. These trainings allowed for a much better assessment process related to individual determinations of unattended and/or potentially suspicious items.

## **2.17 Training**

*This functional area is responsible for providing and coordinating training requests in preparation for the 2016 DNC.*

**Observation 2.17.1 (BP): All PPD command and supervisory personnel engaged in multiple tabletop exercises involving multiple scenarios.**

All PPD command and supervisory personnel engaged in several tabletop exercises involving multiple scenarios including mass arrest, civil disturbances, explosions and terrorist attacks, and managing traffic events.

**Observation 2.17.2 (BP): The City of Philadelphia incorporated best practices and lessons learned from conducting after action assessments of previous large-scale events into training for the DNC.**

The City of Philadelphia and PPD were able to incorporate best practices and lessons learned from conducting after action assessments of previous large-scale events including the WMOF/PV. The City drafted an official after-action assessment from the WMOF/PV and distributed it to all of the parties involved in that process as well as the DNC. The improvements focused on having the right personnel and resources in the right places in order to facilitate streamlined decision-making; enhancing coordination and communication between agencies and between the City and the public; and in aligning planning, goals and objectives, and resources with one another.

## **2.18 Transportation and Traffic**

*This functional area is responsible for coordinating motorcade and vehicle security for the safe transportation of delegates, governmental protectees, congressional members and demonstrators.*



**Observation 2.18.1 (BP/LL): PPD implemented multiple contingency traffic plans for the DNC and considered all car/bus services.**

Early in the planning process, PPD's Traffic Unit commanders partnered with the Engineering Division of the Philadelphia Streets Department, the DNC Transportation Coordinator, the contracted bus company, and the USSS to devise multiple traffic plans for the event. Decisions regarding how to control traffic and expected movement of delegates, with considerable attention to bus movement, were factored into the traffic plans. Traffic officers, particularly around the Wells Fargo Center, had multiple ways to direct buses to and from the event and the routes were practiced by bus drivers numerous times before the beginning of the DNC. Having multiple potential routes to direct bus drivers proved to be extremely useful, for the most part, as the majority of the buses were able to leave the secured zone around the Wells Fargo Center within minutes and without causing interruptions to the rest of the flow of traffic. However, at the same time it caused confusion because some bus drivers were unsure of which route to take during the event.

In addition, a major gap in traffic plans that should be considered for future NSSEs, was the planning of car services such as Uber and Lyft. Uber was only approved to operate at the DNC approximately one week prior to the event, leaving insufficient time to accommodate Uber, receive the necessary vehicle placards, and adjust to a large-scale event. Without the necessary placards to access the taxi parking lot, drivers had to be questioned by lot attendants, thus creating long queues that essentially closed one of the primary thoroughfares near the Wells Fargo Center. Additionally, there were confused passengers unable to find their car and drivers blocking multiple lanes while trying to locate their passengers. A possible way to alleviate this would be to assign individual car services a planned pick-up/drop-off location outside the outer perimeter, so that drivers don't have to obtain special placards or cause backups by being questioned and can easily locate their passengers.

In general, the multiple traffic plans were extremely successful, but there were some sources of confusion and challenges that impacted the overall flow of traffic, particularly around the Wells Fargo Center and Center City hotels.

**Observation 2.18.2 (LL): Contracted drivers did not maintain consistent communication with the Transportation Cell and deviated from the practiced routes, which impacted overall traffic and transportation coordination.**

Prior to the DNC, drivers assigned by the bus company practiced multiple routes that would be available and were instructed to maintain consistent communication with their representative in the Transportation Cell regarding issues such as cars blocking the drop-off and pickup areas, cars too close to corners, and construction zones that would impact their ability to make their loops effectively. However, during the DNC, drivers did not maintain this communication and alleviated their issues by double-parking and deviating from their assigned routes. Particularly as buses double-parked outside Center City hotels, while delegates were being screened before being allowed to board, traffic backed up and further strained the pre-existing gridlock. Additionally, the deviations from practiced routes were not necessarily faster, leaving delegates and other attendees waiting in the Wells Fargo Center parking lot for long periods of time and creating additional traffic problems in places of the city that were not prepared to handle the

buses. Since the bus company did not have additional resources to help speed the process to move people, and could not establish contact with some of the bus drivers, there was no way to alleviate the transportation issues that were caused. Future ideas would be to require two-way communication on a regular basis, especially prior to deviating from pre-approved plans or routes and to designate a uniform Traffic Lead who could address these potential issues in concert with the lead traffic law enforcement agency, to ensure that decisions don't impact other elements of the traffic plan.

**Observation 2.18.3 (LL): Rolling detours were not as effective as intended in minimizing traffic delays and easing burdens on public transportation.**

During the DNC, rolling closures were used to control the traffic, motorcades and delegate buses, and marches because permanently closing the length of the marches—from City Hall to the Wells Fargo Center—would have caused too large of a negative impact to the public and SEPTA.<sup>15</sup> While the intent was to keep as many city streets open for as long as possible, extreme heat, simultaneous events, and flexibility impacted the effectiveness of the rolling closures.

Extreme heat slowed marchers down more than initially planned, leading to some demonstrations taking twice as long as their permit indicated, which resulted in multiple demonstrations occurring on different parts of Broad Street simultaneously. Additionally, for the safety of all demonstrators, law enforcement erred on the side of caution in ensuring that there were roads in different directions available should the demonstrations move from their pre-approved routes. Unfortunately, the delays had significant implications for traffic, particularly in Center City.

While SEPTA had adjusted its bus schedules to account for the planned rolling detours, the delays caused significant challenges for riders and impacted the availability of buses. Community members, local businesses, Uber and taxi drivers also expressed frustration over the lack of communication regarding traffic patterns and when routes would be opened. Rolling closures were also used during the transportation of dignitary escorts, and some of the coordination issues between federal agencies responsible for dignitary escorts created confusion and delays in the rolling closures as well.

An improvement for a future event would be to have real-time traffic updates, by PennDOT or the Transportation Cell.

**Observation 2.18.4 (LL): Coordination between law enforcement agencies and the DNCC was lacking during the transportation of VIPs and dignitary escorts did not follow instructions, adding to the traffic challenges.**

Communication and coordination challenges between law enforcement and the DNCC led to traffic issues around the Wells Fargo Center. While coordination efforts between PPD and USSS regarding transportation and traffic were in place from the first planning meetings, the plans had to be changed when the DNCC ultimately provided its final maps and perimeter designs. Once

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<sup>15</sup> A rolling detour is a method to temporarily control traffic. Pacing vehicles to create a gap, so that activities can be performed.

these were finally provided to law enforcement, delegate bus routes and VIP motorcade routes were changed multiple times in an attempt to accommodate all parties involved.

Additionally, traffic challenges were caused by VIP and dignitary escorts from different agencies. In some cases, escorts parked their vehicles in multiple lanes of traffic in Center City, adding to a city that was already dealing with the gridlock caused by extra vehicles and pedestrians as a result of the DNC. In other cases, individual dignitary escorts ignored law enforcement's directions, and dismissed pre-approved parking pick-up/drop-off locations around the Wells Fargo Center. Plans were not followed to take dignitaries to the back of the stadium, resulting in backlog elsewhere and eliminating alternative routes. Run throughs with all of the primary escort agencies could have alleviated some of these challenges.

During traffic operation at the event, a lack of coordination between the DNCC, multiple federal agencies and local/state law enforcement resulted in unnecessary road closures and traffic delays further contributing to the existing traffic problems.

## Conclusion

The City of Philadelphia emphasized positive community relations in every aspect of DNC operations. One month before the event, the Mayor signed a bill introduced by the City Council to change the crimes generally associated with mass demonstrations from criminal summary citations to lesser civil penalties and/or fines. In addition, ordinances against camping in Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) Park were not enforced the week of the DNC. The Philadelphia Police Department (PPD) emphasized taking a "soft" approach in their attire and in their interactions with demonstrators. Even when severe thunderstorms struck, PPD escorted demonstrators in FDR Park to safety and erected a tent with air conditioning and cool water for demonstrators suffering from heat exhaustion.

Having hosted a pair of NSSEs prior to the DNC, PPD and the City of Philadelphia understood the magnitude of the event, the potential for violent demonstrations, the difficult and challenging local and national environment, and the high risk to officer safety. In reviewing the law enforcement response in previous similar large-scale security events, it became clear that protection of the First Amendment and an overall philosophy of crowd engagement and maintenance instead of control and dispersal had to be used to ensure the safety of attendees, demonstrators, and officers.

During the DNC, the City of Philadelphia was able to continue its best practices and implemented lessons learned from the WMOF/PV. The improvements focused on having the right personnel and resources in the right places in order to facilitate streamlined decision-making; enhancing coordination and communication between agencies and between the City and the public; and in aligning planning, goals and objectives, and resources with one another.

The 2016 DNC was also being hosted in the midst of a unique environment that officials had to consider while planning and delivering a secure political convention. Along with the RNC in Cleveland, the DNC was part of the first pair of major-political party nominating conventions

held with national attention focused on law enforcement tactics, community relations and policy legitimacy.

The DNC was held during an unprecedented time in the history of policing. The City of Philadelphia and PPD responded to challenges of transparency, fairness, constitutional policing and officer safety in a thoughtful and balanced manner. The delegates, demonstrators, and visitors were able to have their voices heard and accomplish their duties while being safe and secure. While there were lessons learned about the importance of planning and procuring resources earlier, the City and its partners prioritized community policing and public safety and overall, the City of Philadelphia, the PPD, and their public safety partners planned and executed an effective and efficient DNC security operation.

## Appendix A: List of Acronyms

BJA	Bureau of Justice Assistance
BP	Best Practice
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DNC	Democratic National Convention
DNCC	Democratic National Convention Committee
DNCHC	DNC Host Committee
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
ESC	Executive Steering Committee
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GIS	Geographic Information System
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
IAP	Incident Action Plan
JIC	Joint Information Center
LL	Lesson Learned
LSSE	Large Scale Security Event
MACC	Multi-Agency Communication Center
NSSE	National Special Security Event
NTTAC	National Training and Technical Assistance Center
OEM	Philadelphia Office of Emergency Management
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
PAARNG	Pennsylvania Army National Guard
PennDOT	Pennsylvania Department of Transportation
PF	Police Foundation
PFD	Philadelphia Fire Department
PIO	Public Information Officer
PPD	Philadelphia Police Department
PPD-DVIC	Philadelphia Police Department – Delaware Valley Intelligence Center
R&R	Rest and Rehabilitation
RNC	Republican National Convention
RTCC	Real-Time Crime Center
USSS	U.S. Secret Service
WMOF/PV	World Meeting of Families/Papal Visit

## **Appendix B: U.S. Secret Service NSSE Subcommittees**

The list below identifies the 24 planning subcommittees, in alphabetical order, that were established for the 2016 Democratic National Convention.

1. Airport
2. Airspace Security
3. Civil Disturbance
4. Consequence Management
5. Counter Surveillance
6. Credentialing
7. Crisis Management
8. Critical Infrastructure Protection
9. Crowd Management
10. Dignitary/VIP Protection
11. Explosive Device Response
12. Fire/Life Safety/Hazardous Materials
13. Health/Medical
14. Intelligence/Counterterrorism
15. Interagency Communications
16. Legal/Civil Liberties
17. Logistics/Asset Identification
18. Public Affairs
19. Staffing and Housing
20. Tactical
21. Technology
22. Training
23. Transportation/Traffic
24. Venue Security

## Appendix C: PPD Training

- CBRNE Detection & Response
- MFF for Demonstrations
  - Bike Training
  - Commander Training
- Explosives & Remediation
  - Terror Ops in Urban Environment (ISREAL)
  - FBI VBIED Response
  - Advanced HME Course
  - Canine Explosive Detection
    - HME Detection with BDU
- SWAT
  - Joint SWAT/CAT Training
  - MACTAC
- JHAT Response Training
  - CTO, DOD, DOE, FBI, PFD
- Aviation
  - Hoist & Short Haul
  - Large Scale Aerial Rad. Measuring Exercise
  - NVG Training/Cert
  - SWAT Deployment using Taylor Mounts
- Marine
  - Tactical Boat Operations with USCG
- Mounted Patrol
  - Joint Training with PSP
  - Civil Unrest
  - Crowd Management
- Traffic
  - On/Off Road Motorcycle Training
- Device Defeat Training (Sleeping Dragon)
  - CTO/TOW Squad
- Highway Patrol
  - Northwestern HD MC Instructor Cert.
- MIRT
- Prevention & Detection of Terrorism
  - Open to Patrol by CTO
- Hostage Negotiation Training
- Dignitary Protection Training
- C.L.E.A.R. System Training
- Scheduled DNC & Non-DNC Related Exercises
  - Active Shooter
  - Mass Casualty (CBRNE)
  - Civil Disturbance
  - Weather Emergency

## Appendix D: Police Foundation Team Bios

**Chief Hassan Aden (Ret.), *Police Foundation Senior Advisor on Policing***, served as the Philadelphia/DNC Team Lead. Chief Aden has over 28 years of law enforcement executive leadership and service. He previously served as the Director of Research and Programs at the International Association of Chiefs of Police, overseeing a large portfolio of operational programs and research projects aimed at advancing police services, promoting enhanced administrative, technical, and operational police practices and policies. Chief Aden continues to serve on numerous national advisory groups including the National Academies of Science's Proactive Policing Committee, Department of Justice-sponsored groups, and others. Chief Aden's police experience includes serving as the Chief of Police with the Greenville (NC) Police Department. He has extensive experience in the administrative, investigative and operational aspects of policing, and has demonstrable success in working with questions such as crime control policies, community engagement, and strategic planning. Prior to his appointment as Chief of Police for the Greenville (NC) Police Department, he served in the Alexandria (VA) Police Department for 26 years, rising to the rank of Deputy Chief. He is a graduate of American University's School of Public Affairs, earning a Master of Public Administration degree.

**Chief Jane Castor (Ret.), *Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert***, served on the Philadelphia Detail to develop the revised Planning Primer and "quick look" document. Chief Castor joined the Tampa Police Department in 1983 and in 2009 became the first woman to be named chief of the Tampa Police Department (TPD). Over the course of her career, Chief Castor built a reputation for working side by side with residents, community leaders, business owners and neighboring law enforcement agencies to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in Tampa. Those community partnerships are the foundation of TPD's dynamic crime reduction strategy, "Focus on Four." The department has smoothly handled many large-scale, national and international events under her command, including Super Bowl XLIII and the 2012 Republican National Convention. Chief Castor developed a progressive policing strategy that avoided the classic confrontations associated with political conventions. Chief Castor testified on the topic of officer safety before President Obama's Task Force on 21st Century Policing in February 2015 and serves on the board of the Major City Chiefs Association and on Harvard's Executive Session on Policing and Public Safety. She was named Woman Law Enforcement Executive of the Year in 2009 by the National Association of Women in Law Enforcement. A Tampa native, Chief Castor received a Bachelor of Science degree in Criminology from the University of Tampa. She received Master of Public Administration from Troy State University and is a graduate of the FBI National Academy.

**Deputy Commissioner Nola Joyce (Ret.), *Law Enforcement Subject Matter Expert***, served on the Philadelphia Detail to develop the revised Planning Primer and "quick look" document. Ms. Joyce has 25 years of public sector experience, serving as the Deputy Commissioner for the Philadelphia Police Department, the Chief Administrative Officer for the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. and the Deputy Director of Research and Development for the Chicago Police Department. Ms. Joyce serves in a number of positions focused on improving the quality of policing. She was appointed to the National Academy of Science's panel on Modernizing the Nation's Criminal Statistics and has been invited to testify in front of President Obama's Task Force on 21<sup>st</sup> Century Policing. In Philadelphia, Ms. Joyce helped manage and direct changes in policies, processes, and procedures for Commissioner Charles H. Ramsey. She



directed the department's support services, including training, personnel, technology, administration, policy, research and planning, analysis and mapping, grants, and strategic planning. With the Metropolitan Police Department in Washington, D.C. from 1998 to 2007, she guided the expansion of the community-policing model, the alignment of the budget with strategic initiatives, and the implementation of significant changes in the department's organizational structure. In her six years as the Deputy Director of the Research and Development Division for the Chicago Police Department, Ms. Joyce helped develop and implement the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), one of the most studied community policing initiatives in the country and a nationally recognized community policing model. Ms. Joyce has three Masters degrees and is currently a doctoral degree candidate in criminal justice at Temple University. Her degrees are in Homeland Defense and Security from the Naval Postgraduate School, in Urban Affairs and Public Policy from Southern Illinois University, and in Sociology, with a specialization in research methodology and statistics, from Southern Illinois University.

**Ben Gorban, *Policy Analyst***, provided on- and off-site input and project support as well as document writing, review, and editing. Mr. Gorban is a policy analyst with more than eight years of experience supporting law enforcement-related projects including the provision of technical assistance and policy analysis support on projects related to countering violent extremism, community policing, and the role of social media in law enforcement. Mr. Gorban's areas of expertise include policy analysis, resource and strategy development, and communications and information dissemination. He has served as a writer on multiple published reports and articles, including the COPS Office funded [\*Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis\*](#); and [\*Managing the Response to a Mobile Mass Shooting\*](#) and [\*Lessons Learned from the Police Response to the San Bernardino and Orlando Terrorist Attacks\*](#). He received his MS in Justice, Law, and Society from American University in 2011 and his BA in both Philosophy and Justice, Law, and Society from American University in 2009.

**Jennifer Zeunik, *Director of Programs***, provided project oversight for all work completed and ensured that all deliverables are completed on time and within budget. Ms. Zeunik has twenty years of public sector and nonprofit project management experience, working closely with all levels of government, currently playing a pivotal role in the Police Foundation's training and technical assistance projects, including Critical Incident Reviews. In her previous role as a law enforcement consultant, Ms. Zeunik provided strategic management expertise to international, federal, state, and local criminal justice clients. Her work focused on justice policy research, business development activities, program management, strategic planning, training and technical assistance management, and development of strategic communications. She has served as a writer on numerous published reports, including the COPS funded Police Foundation [\*Community Policing & Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Guidelines to Enhance Community Trust\*](#); [\*Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis\*](#); [\*Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of the St. Louis County Police Department\*](#) and the International Association of Chiefs of Police ([\*IACP National Policy Summit Report on Community Police Relations: Advancing a Culture of Cohesion and Community Trust\*](#)). Ms. Zeunik holds a Bachelors Degree in Psychology and Criminology from Florida State University, and a Masters of Public Administration from the University of Georgia, School of Public and International Affairs.