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Acknowledgements

The Police Foundation and Vigilant Resources International (VRI) wish to acknowledge the tremendous amount of support, encouragement, sharing and guidance offered by members of the Commission and members of the community, including citizens, business and agency leaders and organizations. We particularly acknowledge Chief Bobby Cummings, his staff, and the men and women of Wilmington Police Department for their participation in and support of the Commission and study team. We want to thank many leaders and staff from Delaware state agencies including the Office of Attorney General Matt Denn and the Delaware Criminal Justice Council, the City Council and various City agencies and offices, and the leaders and staff of many community organizations who took time to share their stories with us or to allow us to meet within their facility. We must also thank the Delaware State Legislature and, in particular, the Wilmington delegation, which led efforts to pass House Resolution 2 which authorized the Commission.

We wish to acknowledge Governor Markell who, along with the Wilmington Delegation of the Delaware State Legislature championed the effort to support the citizens of Wilmington.

Last, but certainly not least, we offer our thanks for the support and guidance of the Commission Co-Chairs, The Honorable Lewis D. Schiliro, Secretary of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, and The Honorable Joseph Bryant, Jr., Director of Public Safety, New Castle County, Delaware and all of the Commission Members. The members of the Commission are:

- Chief Bobby Cummings of the Wilmington Police Department, appointed by Mayor Dennis P. Williams;
- State Prosecutor Kathy Jennings of the Attorney General’s Office, appointed by Attorney General Matt Denn;
- Governor Markell’s Deputy Chief of Staff Drew Fennell, representing the Office of the Governor;
- City resident Cassandra Marshall, representing the Wilmington community and currently President of the Quaker Hill Neighborhood Association;
- City resident Darryl Chambers, representing the Wilmington community, and currently a researcher at the University of Delaware’s Center for Drugs and Health Studies;
- Rick Gessner, Vice President and Delaware Market Liaison at Capital One, representing the Wilmington business community; and
- James Wright, a retired officer of the Wilmington Police Department.

Methodology & Limitations

Vigilant Resources International (VRI) and Police Foundation were given a broad set of issues to assess in approximately 50 days. The issues to be addressed were identified in House Resolution (H.R.) 2 and as described by a key sponsor of the legislation at the first Commission meeting, the short timeframe required by H.R. 2 was designed to address the violence issues before warm weather arrives in Wilmington, which often brings with it an increase in street crimes.
Both groups attended all of the Commission meetings to hear presentations and public comments first hand. VRI spent hundreds of hours with and in the Wilmington Police Department (WPD), talking with groups of line and management staff and engaging in numerous individual interviews of same and reviewing hundreds of pages of materials from WPD and other agencies. VRI staff attended multiple WPD roll calls and Targeted, Analytical, Policing System (T.A.P.S.) meetings and participated in many visits with other agencies in Wilmington, New Castle County and the State.

The Police Foundation coordinated with the Violence Reduction Network (VRN) and engaged Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe of Temple University in Philadelphia to conduct the crime analysis. Dr. Ratcliffe collected 5 years worth of crime incident and computer-aided dispatch records from the City and State and completed an analysis of crime using this data.

The Police Foundation conducted document reviews and interviews with political leaders, program directors, and budget staff to conduct the resource analysis, and hundreds of hours were spent in various areas of the City to collect the views of the community. In addition to larger gatherings organized by various groups, interviews were conducted with many individuals, including neighborhood association leaders, informal leaders from the community, and the faith community. An informal survey was administered in many of these settings and was shared through several of the community organizations, resulting in responses from 150 members of the community who offered to share their views on the crime issues, the Wilmington Police Department’s approach, and offering input into the solutions needed. We also conducted interviews with business leaders and documented the views of more than 275 community members who attended the Commission’s public meetings, many of whom addressed the Commission.

The Police Foundation’s best practices assessment was completed by first listening to the needs of the community and then completing a review of evidence-based and innovative programs in other jurisdictions, resulting in a description of these approaches to aid in their exploration and possible implementation.

While both organizations would have preferred the opportunity to develop and implement more scientific and thoughtful processes of survey and exploration and the opportunity to spend more time in the community meeting with additional individuals and youth, time did not permit this type of inquiry.

Additionally, as noted on several occasions throughout the process, while there is near unanimous agreement that studying the root causes of the issues affecting Wilmington should be a part of the larger solutions to address public safety and a variety of other issues, this process was designed as a short-term assessment to address the public safety threats and issues bringing victimization and loss of life and property to Wilmington each week. Mayor Williams has announced the formation of another Commission that will reportedly study these issues and make recommendations to address the root causes of crime and violence in Wilmington. We attempted to meet with Mayor Williams to hear more about the Commission he has announced and to gain his perspective on the issues we were tasked with addressing, however two meetings
with him were unfortunately cancelled by the Mayor upon our arrival in Wilmington or his office and ultimately, the study period ended before a third meeting could be scheduled.

Our reviews and conclusions were largely drawn from data and information provided to us by city officials and others in Wilmington. Time limitations prevented us from verifying the accuracy and completeness of information provided and unfortunately, there were many situations where the information we were provided from one source contradicted the information we were provided by another source, partially or completely. For this reason, we have attempted to note discrepancies, provide citations for sources, or to provide the information presented from both points of view or sources.

Further, in some places within our recommendations or discussion, we cite a best practice or potential resource that happens to be or rely on a proprietary approach, program, product or technology. Although we have allowed these references to remain as a pointer for the City, no endorsements are intended by these references whatsoever.

**Format of this Report:**
Because of the need to have simultaneous lines of inquiry completed by multiple parties, this report is organized in a way that summarizes the key recommendations and findings up front, while providing readers with access to the full reports for each major line of inquiry in the Appendices. This format allowed the report components to be written simultaneously by multiple staff, and thus allowing the project to be completed within the expedited timeframe. In the Findings and Recommendations section, readers will find a short synopsis of each major finding, along with recommendations and alternatives for addressing the issue(s).

* * * * *

Vigilant Resources International (VRI) is a company founded by former New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir. VRI provides consulting services to public safety organizations in the area of crime reduction, crime analysis, technology, and effective organization. Through teams of subject matter experts with many years of experience, it helps public safety agencies reengineer their activities to more effectively reduce crime, relate to their citizens and do so in a cost effective manner. VRI provides public safety agencies with advice on best practices to achieve results, and often will assist those agencies in implementing those recommendations. VRI has Offices in New York and the Baltimore/ Washington DC area.

The Police Foundation is the only nationally-known, non-profit, non-partisan, and non-membership-driven organization dedicated to improving America’s most noble profession – policing. The Police Foundation has been on the cutting edge of police innovation for 45 years since it was established by the Ford Foundation as a result of the President’s Commission on the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.

The Police Foundation, relying on its in-house staff, executive and research fellows and consultants, provides actionable technical assistance and conducts innovative research to accomplish its mission of improving policing through science and innovation. The Police Foundation is headquartered in Washington, D.C.
Overview of Commission

The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission was established by House Joint Resolution 2 of the 148th General Assembly (“HJR 2”). As set forth in HJR 2, the Commission was established “to conduct a rapid, intensive, and comprehensive examination of public safety strategies in the City of Wilmington.” The overall purposes of the Commission are:

- To examine which public safety strategies work and which strategies do not—not only within the City of Wilmington, but regionally and nationally as well;
- To better coordinate existing public safety strategies at the local, county, state, and federal levels; and
- To recommend effective, data-driven public safety policies that could be implemented immediately to mitigate Wilmington’s unacceptably high rate of violent crime.

Over the past two months, the Commission—through its outside consultants, The Police Foundation and Vigilant Resources International (VRI) (the “Consultants”)—conducted an in-depth analysis of crime data in the City of Wilmington (the “City”). In addition, the Consultants interviewed and listened to hundreds of people inside and outside law enforcement, including City residents, representatives of the business community, community leaders, current and former Wilmington Police Department (“WPD”) officers and executives, representatives of the City, New Castle County, and the State of Delaware, and others. During that same period, the Commission held 5 public meetings to discuss the foregoing issues, and to gather input regarding possible recommendations of the Commission and their potential impact. Those meetings, and the work of the Commission, were led by the Commission’s co-chairs, Lewis D. Schiliro, Secretary of the Delaware Department of Safety and Homeland Security, and Joseph Bryant Jr., Director of the New Castle County Department of Public Safety.

In accordance with HJR 2, topics considered by the Commission and its Consultants included, among other things:

- A review of the City of Wilmington’s and WPD’s existing operational and monetary resources, including resources provided by state, county, and federal agencies;
- A review of WPD’s existing organizational structure and deployment strategies; and
- Consideration of alternative public safety strategies, including (a) the development of policing districts or other geographic areas of accountability and (b) an examination of effective public safety strategies in other jurisdictions.

Under HJR 2, the Commission must submit a Report and Recommendations to the Governor and the General Assembly no later than March 31, 2015.
Executive Summary

The City of Wilmington is the largest and the most culturally and economically diverse city in Delaware. The ability of the City to grow and improve the lives of its residents depends on its ability effectively to provide public safety. The residents, employers, and civic and community leaders with whom we speak routinely cited public safety as a principal concern affecting their decisions about where to live, where to locate their business, and how to lead the City to a better future.

Like many cities, Wilmington experiences a significant amount of crime, including crimes of violence, drug crimes and nuisance crimes. However, many cities across the country have experienced significant reductions in crimes in all categories in recent years – often attributed to improved policing strategies.

Wilmington is not one of those cities. According to the FBI, Wilmington ranks third in violence among 450 cities of its size and sixth among all cities over 50,000. Crime in Wilmington – and particularly homicides – has reached record numbers in recent years. Over the past decade, the City of Wilmington has averaged 118 shooting victims per year, reaching a record high of 154 shootings victims in 2013. In 2014 alone, there were 127 shooting victims and 23 shooting deaths in the City.

The principal questions facing the Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission are why the City of Wilmington has not experienced the same crime reductions enjoyed by similarly situated municipalities across the country and what Wilmington can do about that. This report offers our examination of the strategies currently being employed by the City and the WPD, and our proposal of strategies that might be employed to better address the WPD’s core mission of creating a safer Wilmington.

Improving public safety in Wilmington is challenging, but it is certainly not impossible. Wilmington has three built-in advantages.

First and most significantly, Wilmington has a sufficiently large police force to bring appropriate resources to bear on this issue. While we make clear in this report that there are several areas of police work that deserve additional resources, and that a reorganization of some functions would assist the Department, the WPD begins this work with a force large enough to effectively patrol and fight crime in Wilmington.

Second, as the Crime Analysis and CAD Incident Analysis done by Temple University’s Jerry Ratcliffe, Ph.D. make clear, “[s]mall areas of the city account for a large proportion of the crime and community harm.” As a result, if appropriate strategies are brought to bear on those small areas, significant reductions in crime can be obtained.

Third, many people with whom we spoke in the WPD, from the leadership to rank-and-file officers, recognize that there is a need for and opportunity to change for the better. Significant cultural and organizational changes can be made only with buy-in from those tasked with the need to lead and implement those changes, and the recognition of the need for and inevitability of change was evident in many of the law enforcement professionals with whom we spoke.

Generally, we found that WPD has a respond-and-react orientation and structure that focuses on resolving calls for service rather than proactively implementing crime reduction strategies. Although WPD is sufficiently staffed, the department does not deploy sufficient officers in patrol and key investigatory functions. WPD is behind other law enforcement
agencies in its use of technology (some of which it already owns) to both analyze and predict crime, as well as to provide accountability of its officers as to whereabouts and activities. The WPD's investigatory units do not solve a sufficient number of crimes - particularly homicides - and can improve its investigatory functions and victims’ services. The Wilmington community appreciates the dedication and effort of the Department's officers, but some community relationships have become strained and can be improved.

All of the issues identified in this report are fixable, and none is exclusive to Wilmington. Many of the building blocks for reform are already in place - a city and community that recognizes the need for change, a WPD administration that is open to new strategies, and supportive local partners.

Our principal findings and recommendations are organized below:

**On the Front Line: Officers on the Street:**

The WPD has existing monetary and operational resources to adequately fight crime in the City. Wilmington spends more on its police and on police overtime than many other cities, according to law enforcement benchmarking data.

However, those numbers do not tell the whole story. The WPD is frequently below full strength because it does not plan for attrition by recruiting officers and holding regular police academy classes. The WPD also has a high number of excused absences, caused in part by use of accrued vacation or compensatory time. As a result, there are frequently far fewer officers on a shift than needed.

In addition, the current sector approach allows for unnecessary and unhelpful disconnects between officers and their command staff. The three-sector strategy being used by WPD is a viable way of organizing police efforts, but it has been implemented in such a way that lieutenants have been distanced from their officers and assigned sectors. Patrol officers and community policing officers in the same area report to different supervisors, and staffing of the Criminal Investigations Unit and the Vice Unit is inadequate.

Operation Disrupt, the WPD’s recent effort to reduce violence by flooding hot spots with a large number of officers, has shown that a visible police presence can impact crime. But Operation Disrupt is being implemented with overtime and the use of officers with other important responsibilities, for example community policing assignments as well as federal task forces, such as the DEA Task Force, the U.S. Marshals’ Warrant Task Force and the FBI Safe Streets Task Force.

We make a variety of recommendations focused on ensuring that WPD has a large enough and visible enough presence in the City. Those recommendations include implementing minimum staffing levels to ensure there are sufficient officers working per shift; planning for attrition and managing personnel to maintain appropriate officer strength; returning lieutenants to the platoon structure; creating a Community Stabilization Team that can work in emerging and chronic hotspots; and strengthening the Criminal Investigations Unit and Vice Unit.
Bringing Policing Back to Neighborhoods & Engaging With the Community:

The WPD provides a small number of “community policing officers” in neighborhoods across the City, but it lacks a community policing strategy that effectively engages the community, performs law enforcement functions, and locates officers in hotspots over sustained periods. The department frequently changes community policing assignments, and community policing officers lack empowerment to solve problems in the community.

Relatedly, feedback collected from the community suggests the WPD could enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the community. While the importance of the police is recognized in the community, many report that some in the WPD can be at times disrespectful, insensitive to the needs of crime victims, and apathetic to community problems, which serves as a disincentive for the community to offer its support and assistance to the WPD. WPD leadership has tried to build better community relations and emphasized community cooperation in solving crimes, but more can be done.

WPD’s approach to receiving complaints against officers is thought by the community to discourage complaint filing and is not as transparent as it could be. The approach requires citizens to appear in police headquarters during working hours on weekdays and once a complaint is filed, citizens report not hearing the status or outcome of the complaint process.

We recommend that the City implement a community policing strategy, better train assigned officers, focus on hot spots and other high crime areas, empower officers to partner with the community and fix neighborhood problems, and undertake other efforts and partnerships that build legitimacy for the department. WPD should also make it easier to file and get resolution of citizen complaints.

Remaining Accountable & Transparent to the Community:

We heard a variety of community complaints about not frequently seeing officers, or that officers congregate in particular areas, or that the community was not sure what officers were doing to reduce crime.

WPD does not have records tracking where officers are during their shifts. It is only now implementing GPS tracking within its Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. WPD does not have a desk sergeant who reports when officers are entering or leaving the department for duty on their tour. While on tour, officers rarely document contacts with suspects using Field Service Reports.

We recommend that WPD fully implement and utilize its new GPS capacity to ensure officer safety, accountability, and hotspots policing, assign a desk sergeant or otherwise track when officers are in the department and on the streets, and begin using mobile digital terminals to enter contacts with suspects.

Preventing & Solving Homicides & Shootings and Supporting Victims:

In 2014, 118 people were shot in the City of Wilmington, resulting in 23 of the 28 total homicides experienced that year. Of those 28 homicides, only four were “closed” or solved after an arrest was made. We heard conflicting reports of how WPD responds to those incidents – varying response times, varying investigative and violence reduction practices, varying
responders, and varying amounts of follow-up. Five homicide detectives handle 78 open homicide cases (of which 41 are defined as cold cases, usually unsolved for a year or more), while other shootings are separately investigated. These investigations and others are undertaken by detectives, but the process of assignment of detectives to the investigatory units lacks consistency.

We recommend a formalized initial response protocol for all shootings, with appropriate responders including management, investigators and patrol officers, and strategies to support victims and intervene to avoid retaliation. We recommend investigators meet with prosecutors and others within 48 hours of every homicide/shooting to ensure the investigation is proceeding appropriately, with regular follow-up.

We propose creation of a Homicide/Violent Crime Unit within the Criminal Investigations Division with sufficient staffing and resources to focus on all homicides, attempted homicides, aggravated assaults and shooting incidents. We believe this can be done within the current complement of current sworn officers. Detectives are key to this work, and we recommend development of a career path for detectives with an assignment structure that promotes those who demonstrate superior investigatory skills. We also recommend significantly enhancing the WPD’s response to crime victims.

We also found that shooting and firearms investigations are not sufficiently leveraging the tools available to solve open cases and prevent additional shootings, and we recommend standardization of practices and adoption of a protocol for forensic firearm investigations.

WPD has implemented several community-based violence prevention models in recent years, to mixed success, and without sustained implementation. Programs like Operation Safe Streets, Operation Night Light, and Cease Violence were implemented, but there have been varying degrees of continuity and connectedness to the work of the WPD. Cease Violence, for example, is currently being implemented with well-selected “violence interrupters,” but is being managed by the Wilmington Department of Parks and Recreation, an agency that is not accustomed to supporting a rapidly evolving 24x7 operation involving high-stakes negotiations. We recommend the City strengthen the existing Cease Violence program with administration in an agency that is aligned with the mission of preventing violence and possessing the resources needed to implement this public health approach as designed and proven effective.

**Using Data to Guide Strategy & Solve Problems:**

The WPD is largely reactive to crime, as opposed to proactive, and does not have systems in place to allow for an intelligence-led model of policing that attempts to predict and stop crime in place before it occurs. The WPD conducts T.A.P.S. (Targeted Analytical Policing Systems) meetings that are beginning to use the data visualization tool Crime View, but these meetings are largely informational and not promoting problem solving or accountability of senior leaders to reduce crime.

WPD’s crime analysis is currently limited to standard statistical analyses, and does not use the sophisticated analysis of crime patterns and high-risk offenders to guide deployment and crime prevention. Moreover, the analysis being done is not being shared sufficiently with supervisors or patrol officers. For example, information is often distributed by email, some of which may go unopened, and the roll call room does not include crime maps, most wanted list, or other information that could inform officers on patrol and in the community policing unit.
We recommend WPD adopt a data-driven approach to police strategies and deployment, including use of the CompStat management approach to ensure that all supervisors and officers have fully briefed on criminal activity and use that information to guide their deployment and investigatory resources. WPD already has much of the technology needed to undertake this work, but additional technology could be procured through grants. In addition, substantial additional training of crime analysis for both staff and most officers is recommended. We recommend establishment of a Real Time Crime Center approach, to conduct rapid crime analysis and share it more quickly with officers and investigators to prevent additional crimes.

**Leveraging Available Resources:**

No police organization exists in a vacuum, but all must leverage resources and information from partner law enforcement organizations, community groups, and other institutions. WPD’s most important partners are aligned and supporting agencies in the city and state, agencies its works with every day, including neighboring jurisdictions, and federal agencies and task forces. But, WPD has withdrawn from task forces and collaboration with partner agencies could be improved, including restoring assignments to the federal task forces.

The City’s principal camera coverage is provided by Downtown Visions on behalf of the City and the business community. While that system appears to work, the City has its 70 cameras being monitored by one staff person for each 8-hour shift, and are typically only monitored for portions of the day. We recommend the Attorney General and Department of Safety and Homeland Security work with the City to strengthen that system and add cameras in the most violence-prone areas as necessary.

**Strengthening the WPD:**

The WPD is organized beneath the Chief of Police in a manner supportive of its respond-and-react orientation. Generally, one inspector is responsible for patrol activities, with the other responsible for investigative efforts. Several administrative positions (e.g., PIO, computer maintenance, grant writing) are undertaken by sworn officers, when that work could be undertaken by civilians who have specialized expertise in these areas. WPD officers are not competitively compensated and do not receive training opportunities that might enhance their careers and capacity.

We recommend the creation of several positions that will support intelligence-led policing efforts, such as a Deputy Chief for Operations, focused on accountable, intelligence-led and data-driven policing, an additional crime analyst, and a Chief Information Officer to integrate and promote utilization of the vast amount of technology available to the department. We also recommend the creation of an Inspector to handle supporting services (e.g., Property, vehicle maintenance, school officers, evidence control) and having some jobs be undertaken by civilians when a sworn police officer is not required. We recommend a compensation study be undertaken and that officers receive additional training, with a particular focus on data-driven and problem-oriented policing.

We believe this report and its recommendations give the WPD a roadmap to become more effective in reducing violent crime and better serving the citizens of Wilmington. In fact, in
recent weeks as we have engaged and talked with Chief Cummings and the WPD staff, we have already seen steps taken to address several of the issues we asked about, demonstrating not only a willingness, but the capability to take swift action to improve public safety in Wilmington.

The City of Wilmington and WPD are capable of meeting the challenges ahead. Both VRI and the Police Foundation appreciate the support, encouragement and guidance offered by members of the Department, particularly Chief Bobby Cummings, who fully engaged in the review process, openly and candidly providing information in an effort to improve the Department. He is clearly dedicated to the community and to the rank and file officers and staff who courageously serve every day.

Importantly, we found that the men and women who serve in WPD, whether on the front lines or in managerial positions, are committed to ending violence in the City. We are grateful for their service and believe they can succeed.
ON THE FRONT LINE: OFFICERS ON THE STREET

Finding: On a per-capita basis, WPD would appear to have more than a sufficient number of officers to police the City. However, the City’s needs are great, and the numbers do not tell the whole story.

The WPD currently has an authorized strength of 320 sworn personnel and 64 civilian support staff to cover Wilmington’s 10.9 square miles with a population of approximately 71,000 residents. Currently, WPD has 286 officers.

Relative to population, the City of Wilmington has among the highest number of police officers per 1,000 residents of any city in the nation. Nationally, according to the FBI’s “Crime in the United States 2013” report, the average number of officers per 1,000 population for cities of 50,000 to 99,000 is 1.6 (1.9 for cities in the Northeast). Here is how Wilmington compares:

• At the WPD’s current strength of 286, Wilmington has 4.0 officers per 1,000 residents. By comparison, of the 405 cities nationwide having a population of 50,000-99,999, only 3 cities have an officer-per-population ratio of 3.6 per 1,000 residents or higher. In addition, for all cities having a population of 50,000 or more, only 13 out of 671 cities nationwide have an officer-per-population ratio of 3.6 or higher.

• At WPD’s authorized strength of 320 officers, the City would have 4.5 officers per 1,000 residents. At that level, according to the FBI report, out of 671 cities nationwide with a population of 50,000 or more, only 1 city would have a higher ratio of officers per 1,000 residents.

On a per-capita basis, Wilmington’s existing and authorized staffing levels would appear to be more than sufficient, at least in comparison to other cities. However, these figures do not necessarily tell the whole story. Based on our analysis of geography, workload, calls for service (CFS), and demands for non-criminal services, we do not believe this formula is an accurate way to determine adequate officer coverage for Wilmington—particularly in light of the City’s pervasively high crime rate. Different cities have different coverage needs, and some cities with high crime have more officers. Camden, New Jersey, for example, has 375 officers for a larger population of 87,000 but is only 8.82 square miles.

In order to achieve an effective deployment, we recommend that the WPD’s current complement of 286 sworn officers be increased to its authorized strength of 320, and be maintained at that level. Currently, there are 110 officers assigned to one of four platoons that are responsible for responding to calls for service 24 hours per day. As is explained in the next section, this number is too low and should increase to a recommended 124 or more. This increase in platoon size would be possible when the current Police Academy class graduates in May. At that time, however, attrition would immediately begin and currently there are not clear plans for when the next Police Academy class begin. The WPD should hire more regularly in order to maintain its deployable personnel at or near the authorized 320 sworn officer number.
Recommendation:

In order to maintain its deployable personnel at or near the authorized 320 sworn officer number, the City should plan ahead and hire more regularly. The City’s plan should utilize smaller Police Academy classes when needed to keep these staffing levels.
Finding: Due to leave and other excused absences, WPD’s on-duty staffing levels are at times insufficient. Minimum staffing levels should be maintained throughout each day.

In 2014, the WPD implemented an 11-hour rotation. Working an 11-hour rotation allows for a 6-1/2 hour training day once a month. Given that the WPD has in the recent past given limit training to its members, this increased availability in training time is to be welcomed. For this reason, and because other recommendations proposed in this Report are responsive to concerns about overtime and other issues, we do not recommend changing the 11 hour rotation at this time.

Under its existing deployment plan, WPD has 4 platoons (A,B,C,D) with 2 platoons working in any 24 hour period providing day and night coverage. Currently, the platoon sizes range from 26 to 29. Up to 6 officers may be on leave during each of the two tours, and some officers may not be present due to illness, emergency excusal, or commitments such as court testimony.

Although officers are assigned to two platoons, they have 4 different reporting times during a 24 hours period to ensure there is adequate coverage during the busiest hours (generally from about 2 p.m. until 11 p.m.) and also provide coverage from 3 a.m. to 6 a.m. when the fewest number of calls for service occur and when the least number of officers are working. While the deployment system is at first difficult to understand, it does achieve the Department goal of having the greatest number of officers working when the largest number of calls for service occur.

However, the current system does not provide for adequate staffing of each rotation because of the relatively small number of officers assigned to each platoon and the large number of excused absences that are allowed to occur. For example, the B platoon has only 26 officers, and six of them may be excused on any given day. Other emergencies or assignments can decrease the number present to 18 or fewer.

When the number of officers present drops as low as it has recently, it is difficult to effectively manage radio call response. The existing power tour of additional officers working from 2 p.m. to 1 a.m. assists to some degree during the busiest hours, but since it is comprised of officers from the day and night platoons, it too is affected by the excessive excusals. When we asked about minimum staffing levels and the use of overtime to supplement patrols, we received several answers indicating that the Department lacked clarity in this area. Still it was evident that a large amount of overtime is being used to sustain the present deployment.

In order to address this issue, additional officers should be assigned to each platoon and minimum staffing levels should be designated. Currently the WPD attempts to deploy one 2-person police car for each of its nine districts and additional one-person cars as resources allow. Based on historical call for service data, we recommend a minimum staffing level of 24 officers actually working on each platoon rotation. Such a deployment would allow nine two-person cars and six one-person cars to be deployed during the tour. Our analysis indicates this number of officers is adequate to answer calls for service even during busy tours. Further refinement of this model would be possible once a crime analysis function is developed, and would include better planned deployment of foot patrols.
To achieve this goal, we recommend that upon graduation of the current Police Academy class in May of this year each of the platoons should be increased to 31 officers. In addition, when at that staffing level excused absences should be limited so that no more than 7 officers are excused, even allowing for emergencies. We do note that there are other officers deployed during the day and evening who may also assist with calls when needed. These include the 12 officers assigned to canine units who are in marked police vehicles and 20 officers assigned among the Community Police Units including those assigned to the downtown area and Riverfront District. These officers do assist and should be used when needed. Importantly, this deployment plan would maintain officer assignments to community policing and foot patrols in the business district. As the recommended deployment approach begins to have impact, officers on patrol would be able to spend more time on proactive engagement citywide.

**Recommendations:**

The staffing levels in the 4 patrol platoons should be increased to 31 officers in each platoon upon graduation of the current Police Academy class in May 2014

The deployable patrol strength of each platoon should be kept at 24 or more officers.
**Finding: WPD should retain the 3-sector model of accountability, with captains responsible for sector crime and problem solving and lieutenants responsible for team-led, proactive enforcement and collaboration between and across sectors.**

In 2014, the WPD divided the City into 3 sectors (geographic areas) each of which is commanded by a captain. WPD adopted this model in an effort to bring greater focus, structure, and organizational accountability to policing efforts throughout the City. As part of this three-sector plan, the platoon lieutenants were removed from working the same hours as the platoon sergeants and officers. They effectively became sector administrators. As a result, the highest-ranking supervisors regularly working on each platoon are sergeants assigned to each sector, and his or her primary responsibility is to that sector. Because no platoon lieutenant is working, no one is responsible in real- or live-time to look at crime from a citywide perspective during the individual tour.

The 3-sector model is one of many viable ways for policing Wilmington and, given its recent implementation we recommend it be maintained at this time. At the same time, we believe lieutenants should be returned to the platoon model and work alongside their sergeants and officers. Additionally, we recommend that these lieutenants become less administrative and engage as leaders in proactive, team-led enforcement. With their ability to look at citywide needs, the platoon lieutenants would be able to address emerging issues by using existing patrols or by requesting specialized units. By using effective crime analysis and mapping, the lieutenants could work closely with the sector captains to be sure the 3 sectors do not become isolated geographic areas. In addition, the lieutenant would be the authorized officer for overtime approval. Over time, this citywide approach to patrol, along with larger platoons and fewer excusals, should reduce the amount of overtime needed to provide adequate patrol coverage.

We also note that the Community Policing officers do not currently report to the sector captains who are responsible for the area in which they work. This means the sector captains do not determine their hours or grant excusals. While we believe a Community Policing Unit should continue to exist for administrative and training purposes, the officers should report to the sector captain through the sergeants and lieutenants assigned to that sector.

Under the sector deployment plan, WPD documents indicate neighborhoods are the focus of attention. The sector captains are accountable to ensure the police and neighborhood residents work together to create safe and strong neighborhoods. The WPD has established the following metrics to assess progress: reduce crime rates, increase clearance rates, decrease physical and social disorder; increase cooperation and “willingness to intervene” in the neighborhood; improve police/community relationships; and move toward the “strong neighborhood” type of community policing. A number of these metrics are difficult to measure—and we were unable to find any current analysis that was attempting to do so. There was some basic crime data analysis provided, for example, the number of shootings in each sector. If the WPD is to continue to use these metrics for measuring success, they should define carefully what each one means and begin actively recording results on weekly, monthly and yearly basis. There are tools available to measure less tangible metrics, including the National Police Research Platform Public Satisfaction Survey, which is designed to capture the quality of police-citizen interactions.
Additionally, we did not find full collaboration among the sector captains and the investigatory and specialized units. There is a compartmentalizing of efforts in many cases that did not ensure that deployment efforts were being focused on the locations with the greatest violence within the City. The clear exception was Operation Disrupt where there is precise focus on hotspots.

**Recommendations:**

The current model that divides Wilmington into three sectors each commanded by a Captain is viable and should be maintained.

Lieutenants should be assigned to work the same days and hours as their platoons.

The efforts of lieutenants should be focused on ensuring proactive policing and conducting team-led enforcement.

Community Policing officers should be assigned under the command of the sector captains to allow for greater accountability.

A Community Policing Unit should continue to exist with one sergeant for citywide record keeping and training purposes. He should also be assigned to Sector 2, where the majority of Community Policing Officers are assigned.

Specific metrics for success in each sector should be defined and measured, including crime reduction among the major crime categories (murder, robbery, sexual assault, burglary, aggravated assault, etc.)

The WPD should strive to achieve greater coordination between its sector captains and other units. This increased coordination can be achieved by sector captains identifying specific hotspot locations and developing specific plans for enforcement in coordination with the captains in the Criminal investigations Division and the Drug, Organized Crime, and Vice Division.
Finding: Notwithstanding recent short-term successes, Operation Disrupt is not sustainable or recommended in its current form as a long-term strategy for preventing crime and engaging the community.

On January 26, 2015, the WPD initiated Operation Disrupt, which assigned 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 5 Sergeants, and 23 experienced officers from Investigative, Community Policing, and other units to patrol in areas with recent homicides and shootings. The initiative has been successful in the short term in reducing violent and other crime, as well as calls for service. However, it is not sustainable in the long term due to the logistical effect the deployment has on other aspects of the Department. Detectives are no longer participating in joint task forces, and WPD’s Community Policing Unit has been severely limited in performing its duties because of the deployment. In the short term, the overtime money obtained by Attorney General Denn—which provides funding for 1 sergeant and 5 officers 7 days a week from 6 p.m. to 2 a.m.—will assist in maintaining this effort.

What Operation Disrupt shows is that when officers are effectively deployed to violence prone hotspots, they can have an immediate impact on reducing violence. We have already noted that we recommend an increased assignment of 14 officers to patrol platoons upon the Police Academy class graduation. These new officers should be able to assist in continuing the focus on hotspot locations.

We also recommend the establishment of a Community Stabilization Team of 1 sergeant and 8 experienced officers. These officers would work during high-crime hours and should be deployed 5 days per week with 8-hour tours. Similar to Operation Disrupt, they would be responsible for responding to the hotspot areas, where they would take enforcement action against offenders committing quality of life offenses and major crimes. They should also interact with residents and business people in the locations to provide reassurance and explain the police efforts. Within the context of the larger intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing described later in this document, these teams would operate in a context that assures appropriate engagement with the community in addition to enforcement services.

At the same time, we note that both the Criminal Investigative Division and WPD’s drug unit (which is called the Vice Unit) require additional personnel. The needs of the Criminal Investigation Unit are more adequately discussed in a section that follows, however the 28 homicides and 118 shootings that occurred in 2014, for which there are very low clearance rates, points in part to the need for additional personnel. Equally, in a City with open-air drug markets, the current assignment of 1 lieutenant and 7 officers to drug enforcement is inadequate. We recommend the assignment of an additional 6 officers to each of these units.

To create these changes, all 34 graduating officers would be assigned to patrol for their training, and 20 experienced officers would be assigned to the units as indicated below:

- As per above, the new Community Stabilization Team should have 1 Sergeant and 8 experienced police officers. If current administrative positions are civilianized, this Team could be expanded.
• As discussed in a prior section, the 4 existing Uniformed Operations platoons should each be increased to 31 officers or 124 total. Currently there are currently 110 officers within platoons ranging from 26-29 officers assigned.

• An additional 6 officers should be assigned to the Criminal Investigation Division.

• An additional 6 officers should be assigned to narcotics enforcement.

• See the discussion and recommendations later in this report for an explanation of how WPD could approach staffing a to combat guns, violent crime and, in particular, homicide.

The WPD should also examine whether its existing deployment of civilians is appropriate and if some duties and responsibilities can be completed utilizing technology. For example, we have been told that each patrol officer fills out a daily activity sheet that is then given to a civilian for manual input into a computer. Officers should be able to input this information via Mobile Digital Terminals (MDTs) or computers in the WPD Headquarters, thereby freeing them for other assignments. We believe assignment of a civilian to the three-sector captains could assist in creating greater efficiency.

Recommendations:

Upon graduation of the Police Academy class, officers should be assigned as follows:

• 34 academy graduates to patrol platoons
• 8 experienced officers to a newly created Community Stabilization Unit
• 6 experienced officers to the Criminal Investigations Division
• 6 experienced officers to the Drug (Vice) Unit.

The WPD should also examine whether its existing deployment of civilians is appropriate and if some duties and responsibilities can be completed utilizing technology.
Finding: The City spends more on police overtime than comparable cities, and consistently underestimates its overtime needs.

From FY2013 through FY2015, the Wilmington Police Department’s actual budget comprised, on average, 37.8% of the City’s total budget. As a point of comparison, for the 30 cities participating in the 2013 Benchmark City Survey, the average police department budget comprised 29% of the overall city budget.

One factor driving this trend is overtime. Within limits, overtime is an unavoidable cost of policing. However, the City spends more on police overtime than comparable cities and consistently underestimates its overtime needs. In FY2014, WPD’s overtime costs comprised approximately 5.1% of its overall personnel budget. By comparison, the average overtime costs of the 30 police agencies participating in the 2013 Benchmark City Survey was 3.5%. Stated differently, as a percentage of its overall personnel budget, WPD’s overtime costs are on average 46% higher than those of comparable cities.

In addition, although overtime assignments are primarily funded from the General Fund of the police budget, a substantial amount of overtime is also paid from grant funding. It is unclear if the grant-funded overtime is included in the City’s figures on overtime spending, but we suspect it is not. Thus, it is likely that overtime spending is substantially higher than the City’s figures reflect.

In recent years, the City has consistently underestimated its annual overtime budget needs. In FY2014, the Department’s overtime budget was $1.7 million, but its actual cost ($2.9 million) exceeded that figure by more than 75%. For FY2015, the City allocated $1.9 million for overtime. However, in large part due to “Operation Disrupt,” the City has already spent more than $2.6 million on police overtime as of March 25, with three months remaining in the fiscal year.

The impact of these overtime expenses may best be understood by calculating how many additional officers could be added if these costs were converted to new hires. Using a WPD patrol officer’s starting salary of $65,000 (including benefits), the conversion of the City’s approved FY15 overtime budget (approximately $1.9 million) would result in the hiring of 28 new patrol officers. Even more striking, the conversion of the City’s actual FY15 overtime costs as of March 25 ($2.6 million) would result in an additional 40 patrol officers. Alternatively, conversion of some or all of these overtime costs could also compensate for many of the recommendations in this report.

Based on interviews with WPD personnel, there appears to be a lack of urgency with respect to managing overtime. Paying overtime is viewed as a routine solution to real or perceived personnel shortages. In most police departments, overtime is approved by first-line supervisors (i.e., sergeants). Our review revealed that in the WPD, lieutenants are tasked with approving overtime—oftentimes without knowledge of whether the overtime is justified because these lieutenants are not involved in enforcement supervision in the field. More importantly, we were

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1 More information about the Benchmark City Survey, which is administered by the Overland Park, KS Police Department, can be found at [www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/](http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/).
advised that supervisors are not provided with adequate record keeping and analysis of overtime usage—a key tool that could be used to monitor overtime worked by officers.

Supervision is the first line of defense against overtime abuses. However, factual information about overtime is required by supervisors to assist in controlling the usage of overtime. Because overtime represents police work performed at premium rates (i.e., time and a half plus shift differential), WPD should conduct a thorough analysis of overtime expenditures to ensure that overtime is being used effectively, efficiently, and responsibly. The analysis should be conducted in a way that assesses both individual officer use and unit use, as a means to identify patterns of overtime spending. For example, large, undetected overtime earnings by individuals or units may indicate supervision deficiencies, including potential overtime abuses.

Recommendation: WPD should analyze overtime expenditures, with a view toward ensuring better data about overtime use and closer supervision of the resource.
Finding: Community policing should be restored and effectively implemented in Wilmington.

The Wilmington Police Department lacks a community policing strategy that provides a roadmap to effectively engage the community while performing law enforcement functions, and that puts community oriented policing officers into hotspots over sustained periods of time. The Department’s current approach of providing a small number of designated “community policing officers,” assigned with community input, is well regarded and should be expanded into hotspot areas consistent with community policing. But, this limited practice does not allow for a wider adoption of community policing and engagement strategies department wide.

The assessment team was able to identify that the Department’s designation of community policing officers is undermined by frequent changes in assignment and by an apparent lack of empowerment of these officers to solve problems in the community, as noted in the community’s input as they talked about officers who recognize problems, but must make phone calls and sometimes wait days or weeks for a response or approval to move forward in addressing the problem. While strong community policing orientation, capabilities and tactics currently exist in pockets of the Wilmington police department, leadership should examine these successful strategies and develop a Department-wide strategy for community policing and implement these practices city-wide, to increase the Department’s interactions with the community. This wholesale change in how the police engage with the community at all levels of the Department is essential to be effective in providing police services and ensuring community safety over the long term.

By developing a Department-wide transition to a community policing focus, the Wilmington Police Department should be more effective in reducing crime in hotspots. Establishing new community policing practices would result in a combination of strong enforcement (place-based, offender-based) with problem solving approaches (through WPD and partner agencies), which represents a community policing best practice. The community may observe changes in their neighborhoods, through problem solving endeavors that result in tactical police operations that address improved street lighting, improved video surveillance (CCTV), addressing public order offenses such as loitering, code inspections, and cleaning up abandoned properties. More engagement would be experienced by the community as officers engage and mentor youth, providing referrals to opportunities such as jobs, recreation, tutoring, as well connections to social services and resources.

Recommendation(s):

Review recruit and in-service training to determine how best it prepares officers to implement community-policing principles within their patrol area and provide necessary training to all officers, supervisors and civilians.
Develop and implement a community policing strategy that incorporates community oriented policing throughout the Department and effectively enables every officer on patrol and other units with public contact to provide community-policing services.

Empower community-policing officers to solve community problems by providing the appropriate authorities, tools, and resources to get the job done, as described by the community during Commission meetings.

Increase designation and assignment of community policing officers into hot spots and other high crime areas

Develop policing strategies that focus on place- and offender-based enforcement. As implemented, these strategies should focus on respectful engagement and joint problem solving with members of the community.

As part of the place-based strategies, Wilmington Police Department should be as surgical as possible in the community problem solving efforts, focused on ‘block level’ partnerships involving both adults and youth in the community.

Conduct a community asset assessment to identify social services agencies and organizations that can provide community services within hot spots and other high-crime areas, both at the agency or executive level and at the front line levels.

Develop partnerships with community providers in the hot spot areas.

Implement the Police-Citizen Satisfaction Survey of the National Police Research Platform, University of Illinois at Chicago, which measures citizen satisfaction with police performance, a critical issue for gaining the community’s support and trust. This would allow Wilmington’s results to be benchmarked against as many as 60 other agencies in the U.S.

**Best Practice(s):**

Hot Spots Policing in Lowell, Massachusetts (Found “Effective” by CrimeSolutions.gov)

Spokane, Washington Police Department’s Neighborhood Policing Plan

Cambridge, Massachusetts Smart Policing Initiative

Minneapolis, Minnesota Hot Spots Policing Experiment (Found “Effective” by CrimeSolutions.gov)

Stockton, California’s Operation Peacekeeper (Found “Effective” by CrimeSolutions.gov)

Gang Resistance Education And Training (G.R.E.A.T.) Program – demonstrated to improve youth attitudes towards law enforcement and short-term improvement in gang resistance skills.
Finding: Community and organizational fairness are necessary for engaging the community and maintaining a cohesive and engaged workforce in the WPD.

Feedback collected from the community (see Appendices) and from organizations and agencies in the City suggests that the Department could enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the community, leaving them less likely to want to support the Department’s efforts. Feedback from the rank and file officers within the Wilmington Police Department also suggests that organizational legitimacy within the Department could also be enhanced. Specifically, community interviews, focus groups and surveys found that, despite the recognition of a need for police in the community and an expressed appreciation for the job they do, many in the community report the belief that some police are disrespectful towards the community, lack sensitivity, and show apathy towards the community’s problems. This is evidenced by allegations of disrespectful treatment, insensitive comments regarding crime victims or incidents and similar concerns as documented in the community input section of this report. As a result, the community – both citizens and organizational leaders – have reported a lack of confidence and trust in the police, which has impacted the ability of the police to engage the community.

According to the Campbell Collaborative, an international research network, “Research shows that citizens are more likely to comply and cooperate with police and obey the law when they view the police as legitimate. The most common pathway that the police use to increase citizen perceptions of legitimacy is through the use of procedural justice. Procedural justice, as described in the literature, comprises four essential components. These components are citizen participation in the proceedings prior to an authority reaching a decision (or voice), perceived neutrality of the authority in making the decision, whether or not the authority showed dignity and respect toward citizens throughout the interaction, and whether or not the authority conveyed trustworthy motives.” Chief Cummings in interviews with the assessment team has repeatedly pointed to his commitment to having police department personnel engage and build trust with residents, business owners, and other community stakeholders in Wilmington. However, in its current construct, it will be difficult to effectively engage the community and build trust.

Similarly, feedback gleaned from focus group sessions and meetings with Department personnel suggests that fairness and procedural justice is lacking within the Department, causing morale, attrition and other issues within the workforce. The Ethics Resource Center, in a document it authored concerning procedural fairness and legitimacy in the workplace regarding reporting of unethical behavior and workplace rule violations, found that a procedurally just process – defined as fair decision-making process and respectful treatment of employees and their concerns – substantially increases the chances that employees accept outcomes of decisions and workplace processes, whether or not their feedback was acted on.

From the observations made by the assessment team, there is a tremendous need for the leadership at the Wilmington Police Department to consider both the need for legitimacy and procedural fairness within the Department and how that is translated to the community.
Recommendation(s):

The Department should systematically review its policies, procedures and protocols after training is completed to ensure that these documents are consistent with community oriented policing, procedural justice, and legitimacy.

The Department should implement the National Police Research Platform’s Public Satisfaction Survey, which measures citizen satisfaction and procedural fairness within police performance. This would allow Wilmington’s results to be benchmarked against as many as 60 other agencies in the U.S. that have used this tool.

WPD should consider leveraging the Blue Courage Training program for the entire WPD. Initial engagement through the Blue Courage Executive Overview, designed to give insight on topics such as the Nobility of Policing, Respect, and Critical Thinking/Effective Decision Making, is recommended. The Bureau of Justice Assistance, DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the National Law Enforcement Officers’ Memorial and the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST) are partnering with Blue Courage as it is delivered around the U.S.

Best Practice(s):

Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods Policing Strategy

Washington Metropolitan Police Department
Finding: The Wilmington Police Department process for receiving complaints from the community does not sufficiently promote accountability and should be more transparent.

Feedback from the community indicates that citizens are discouraged from making complaints against the WPD and its officers as a result of the complaint submission process that requires citizens to appear in WPD’s headquarters during weekdays between the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m., where they are greeted by a WPD supervisor. Community feedback suggests that the would-be complainants often encounter the officers that they are there to file a complaint against and in many cases, the supervisor that meets with them asks questions in a way that appears to discourage the citizen from filing complaints. According to the WPD’s website, it only received 49 citizen complaints in 2013, which appears low compared to knowledge of other agencies’ processes. A report provided on the same website indicates that of the 49 received, 32 were substantiated (i.e., sufficient proof to confirm the allegation) and 6 were unsubstantiated. The remaining 11 complaints are unaccounted for in the WPD’s report. No information is provided for any complaints, internal or external, regarding the disciplinary process. The community provided further feedback that once a complaint is filed, they are not informed of the outcome of the process, which creates concerns in the community that the complaints are not investigated and there is no accountability.

Agency and officer accountability in the complaint process is a critical for community trust and legitimacy. The process of filing a complaint should be made accessible without having to appear in WPD headquarters during times when most citizens are working. Care should be taken to ensure that complainants do not feel dissuaded by the process (particularly the interview) and should not have to encounter the officer(s) that are the subject of the complaint, to avoid an appearance of attempts to intimidate complainants. Once a complaint is filed, the complainants should be notified via a method of their preference (mail, call, electronic, follow-up meeting) and should be provided with an outcome of the process, i.e., “founded” vs. “not-founded.” Ideally, complainants should be afforded an opportunity to discuss the result and to request a second-level review of the finding by a higher-level official.

Recommendation(s):

**WPD should consider allowing complaints to be filed online or at a location outside of WPD headquarters, such as the Downtown Safety Office at 217 Market Street or another location, and the available days/times for doing so should include evening and/or weekend hours.**

**WPD should take steps to ensure that the interview process does not result in citizens feeling intimidated or “talked out of” filing a complaint.**

**WPD should provide complainants with the opportunity to choose a preferred method of follow-up and learning the outcome of the complaint, such as letter, e-mail/text, or call.**

**Best Practice(s):**

**Camden County Police Department’s online complaint initiation process (in process)**
REMAINING ACCOUNTABLE TO THE CITIZENS

Finding: Additional steps should be taken to ensure accountability in patrol operations.

As part of our efforts to examine patrol accountability, we participated in “ride alongs” and interviewed officers and supervisors. We were aware of community complaints that residents do not frequently see officers; that officers congregate in certain locations; and that community members were not sure what steps the officers were taking to reduce violence in the city.

We were not able to dispel these concerns. Records do not exist that show where officers are specifically located while they are on duty. This is problematic. To have an effective deployment strategy, you need to know where your officers are. Knowing the location of officers on duty is a fundamental part of ensuring officer safety and accountability. Additionally, as the best practice portion of this report identifies, effectively reducing crime through hotspot policing is enhanced by ensuring officers are spending the necessary amount of time in the hotspots multiple times each shift.

We understand the Department now has the technology to determine officers’ locations in real time, and to create records of that information. They should begin to do so immediately.

The most viable method we identify to ensure accountability regarding officers’ locations is through the new Computer Assisted Dispatch (CAD) software installed this month and the new GPS capacity which we are told is available in its police cars. These systems should allow for better tracking of officers’ locations while they are on duty, as well as better deployment of officers into hotspots by ensuring the officers are in the hotspots multiple times each shift.

We also believe sector captains have a responsibility to ensure accountability from their subordinates and to focus on violence reduction through constant instruction to supervisors and officers, the monitoring of the police radio, and their unannounced presence at incidents and on patrol. The captains assure us they are aware of this responsibility and actively take part in these activities. We also believe at least 1 of the 3 sector captains should work an evening tour to ensure crime conditions are addressed citywide and that officers are held to the high standard of accountability. All captains should also perform unannounced tours in the late evening and early morning hours. Currently, one captain does have a 24-hour duty each day, where they work 8 hours often in the evening and are on call from home. The unannounced tours would be in addition to those duties.

As we noted in an earlier section, one challenge to accountability is that lieutenants currently do not work the same tours as their platoons and are increasingly involved in administrative matters. Sergeants then are chiefly responsible for accountability. We found there is at least some “sector integrity,” in that both officers and supervisors believe in the importance of officers being responsible for calls for service in their designated area of patrol and that each works to ensure this occurs. We were less sure regarding the degree that officers stay in their area of assignment when not on call. Here, too, no electronic records were available to assist us.
We found it unusual that there was not a desk sergeant to whom officers report when entering and leaving the Department during the tour of duty. Officers do electronically clock in and out when they arrive and leave work, but they are not required to do so when entering and leaving the stationhouse during the tour. It is not clear that the present electronic login system, Kronos, would allow for such multiple time recordings. As such, sergeants on patrol must keep track of who is in the stationhouse, which is not realistic unless officers indicate to the radio dispatcher that they are leaving patrol.

We believe the booking sergeant area could be reconfigured to create a desk officer area where officers would have to check in when entering and leaving the building. The booking sergeant and officers should also have their hours and schedule changed to match that of the platoons and become a more integral part of them.

One additional area of accountability that causes concern is that officers appear not to be documenting contacts with suspects in the field through the creation of Field Service Reports that can be entered through the Mobile Digital Terminals. In 2014, according to the DELJIS system, only 126 such reports were submitted. Supervisors should ensure that these reports are being prepared.

Recommendations:

The full capacity of the new CAD system and GPS technology should be utilized to map the position of each police car and track their movement and time at locations. Patrol supervisors should be able to view this mapping on their MDT and screens should also be available for viewing by the booking/desk officer and in the respective offices of chief through platoon lieutenants. An alert should occur at the communications section if a police car has not moved in 30 minutes and the patrol sergeant should be immediately notified.

Sector captains should make clear that units are to maximize time on patrol and avoid administrative or other tasks that unnecessarily take them out of sector. The officers’ efforts should be specifically focused and directed toward violence reduction rather than response to past crimes.

The WPD should establish a confidential schedule of unannounced tours worked by its 7 captains that focus on the late evening/midnight tour.

The 3 sector captains should also schedule their tours to ensure at least one is working during the high activity hours in the evening and ensures that any serious conditions that develop regardless of sector boundary are addressed.

Patrol members should be required to report to a supervisor when entering and exiting the stationhouse during the tour. We recommend the booking sergeant area be reconfigured to create a desk officer position and that the booking sergeant maintains an interrupted patrol log noting the reason and time of arrival and departure of officers and supervisors into the stationhouse once the tour has commenced. To increase accountability, the booking sergeants and officers should also be placed in the platoon schedule.
Sergeants entering the stationhouse during the tour should also make an entry concerning their time of entry and leaving and the reason for being in the building.

Captain and lieutenants should regularly inspect the interrupted patrol log, question the desk sergeant regarding officers being in the stationhouse, and inspect the inside of the stationhouse particularly on the midnight tours to ensure no unauthorized officers are present.

Officers should whenever possible complete paperwork in the field utilizing their Mobile Digital Terminals and only leave the field with their supervisor’s approval and upon notifying the radio dispatcher.

Supervisors should ensure officers prepare Field Service Reports when suspects are stopped. Both monitoring the police radio and reviewing dispatched calls for suspicious persons should assist in evaluating the compliance rate.
PREVENTING & SOLVING HOMICIDES & SHOOTINGS AND PROVIDING SUPPORT TO VICTIMS

Finding: To improve investigative success and to better support crime victims and the community, the WPD should create a homicide/shooting incident response plan that addresses scene response, the initial 48-hours of the investigation, and victim support.

In 2014, there were 28 homicides, including 23 by shooting, and 118 people shot in Wilmington. Although the WPD responds to this large number of incidents, it does not have a formalized initial response protocol.

In our discussions with WPD and community members, we heard conflicting accounts concerning the response to homicides and shootings. There was general agreement that there is not a standardized response protocol and that a team of investigators does not respond to all incidents. In the case of a person shot, sergeants may be the highest-ranking officers at the scene. The response time to incidents can vary significantly because investigators respond from home to incidents that occur during early morning hours. Community members complain of officers and investigators acting in an indifferent manner or laughing at the incidents. There were also complaints of investigators not returning victim family calls on case status.

We believe a central component in increasing the successful apprehension of offenders for these crimes is moving responsibility upward within the WPD to maximize the attention and resources that can be brought to focus on each case. The Investigative Inspector should respond to all homicides to take command including those that occur during non-working hours. A captain should respond and take command at every shooting regardless of the degree of injury. Among the captain’s duties would be coordinating with the State Prosecutor to ensure every appropriate step is taken to ensure a successful prosecution upon apprehension of the offender. As is currently policy, an investigative supervisor should respond to lead the investigation at all shootings. We recommend checklists also be used to ensure all available steps are considered and, if appropriate, used in solving homicides and shootings.

Although statistics were not available, we were told that retaliation is common after shootings in Wilmington. The responding captain should consider a wide range of options to prevent any additional violence. These would include placing a Staffed Mobile Command Post or similar vehicle at the scene of the shooting. After conferral with the on-scene investigative supervisor, the captain should make a determination how long to maintain the staffed vehicle at the location (e.g., 24 hours, 3 days, etc.). Consideration should also be given to deploying pole cameras to shooting and violence prone locations as part of intelligence gathering, in an attempt to locate wanted individuals, and to prevent further violence.

Within 48 hours of each unsolved homicide/shooting, the Investigative Operations Inspector and Uniformed Operations Inspector should jointly chair a meeting with subordinates, other involved law enforcement, and the State Prosecutor’s Office. The meeting should focus on ensuring that adequate resources are being dedicated to the case and that all investigative leads and appropriate proactive policing tactics to solve the case are being used. The meetings should also be used to
determine if best practices were followed in responding to the incident and to determine how the WPD’s response plan can be improved. These meeting’s agenda should include a review of other recent homicides and shootings that remain open after 14 days. The Chief and Deputy Chief Operations may wish to attend these meeting, when available.

In addition to the 48-hour meetings, monthly meetings should be held by the investigative inspector and captain with the Attorney General and his staff to review cases, discuss suspects and prosecutions of cases, and identify steps to be taken to move toward arrest and prosecution. At these meetings, a comprehensive review of the existing 42 homicide cold cases should be conducted to determine if additional leads may be available for follow up. Consideration should be given to using retired homicide detectives and the resources of Department of Justice Violence Reduction Network for this evaluation. Supervisors from the proposed Homicide and Violent Crime Unit (HVCU) should meet regularly with their counterparts at NCCPD and DSP to discuss linkages on open violent crime investigations, joint suspects, trends and patterns, and to ensure deconfliction.

Recommendations:

The WPD should implement a homicide/shooting response plan that requires the response of high-ranking members of the Department to take command and ensure every possible step is being taken to apprehend the offender and prevent additional shootings or retaliation.

The WPD should conduct meetings chaired by the two Investigative and Operational Inspectors within 48 hours of a shooting to ensure maximum follow up. The meetings should include representatives from all involved law enforcement agencies and the State Attorney’s office.

The Investigative Captain and supervisors should meet monthly with the Attorney General to review active and cold cases and determine steps to move forward.
Finding: WPD’s homicide unit is not sufficiently staffed, is stove-piped in its investigations, and requires improved investigative approaches and scope to improve the clearance rate.

In 2014, there were 28 homicides with four closed or solved after an arrest was made, which equates to a 14.3% closure (or solved) rate, well below the national average of 64.1%. Currently, there are 78 open homicide cases assigned to the five detectives in the homicide unit, which includes 41 that are considered a “cold case” (defined by WPD as an unsolved case for a year or more, no further leads and initial investigating officer reassigned). While the establishment of this unit is based on the premise that greater focus can be brought to each case, it also separates homicide investigations from other shootings and violent crimes that could have become a homicide had the victim’s life not been saved. The current number of cases compared to the number of investigators exceeds recommended levels and could therefore impact the ability of the detectives to close cases quickly. Additionally, no homicide or shooting incident protocol exists that spells out who must respond to a homicide or violent crime scene from CID, the command staff, and from patrol, and both VRI and the Police Foundation, independently and jointly, heard many community concerns about how homicide/shooting crime scenes and victim support is handled. Appropriate and timely services to crime victims is essential.

We found no evidence of use of investigative checklists and noted that not all of those assigned to the homicide unit, while all are professional investigators, have the extensive investigative experience or recent training that may be necessary to ensure optimal functioning of the unit. Last, sharing of criminal intelligence and coordination with other agencies at the City, county, state and federal level could be improved.

In order to effectively and comprehensively address the interrelatedness of these violent crimes, the WPD should create a Homicide and Violent Crime Unit (HVCU), within the Criminal Investigations Division by reassigning existing personnel.

This unit would be comprised of one lieutenant with investigative experience, 2 sergeants (each leading a platoon), and 17 detectives including the 5 detectives currently in the homicide unit. The additional 12 detectives would be assigned from the current major crimes and other investigative units. The HVCU would have a total of 17 detectives and handle the following cases: homicides, attempted homicides, aggravated assaults, shooting incidents with a victim and armed robberies. In the deployment section, we recommend the assignment of an additional 6 officers to the Criminal Investigations Division to assist in other investigations. This staffing configuration would provide for unity of command and provide for a team response to homicide and other violent crime scenes involving firearms.

The HVCU would allow for connectivity between all violence crimes, especially those with a firearm. The increased size would allow better coverage during the prime crime hours, allow for HVCU to be on call during off hours, and allow for a multiple person response to homicides and other serious crimes.

The WPD should also consider requesting the assignment of two trained investigators from the State Police and two from the New Castle County Police Department to assist in addressing open homicides and shootings, in addition to the two ATF agents assigned. Given the
disproportionate number of homicides and shootings in the City (51.5% of the State’s 2012 homicides occurred in the City, according to a state report), these assignments would be an appropriate use of State and County resources. They would also allow for sharing of ideas, intelligence, and methodologies for solving crimes that occurred in the City, as well as the County and within the State Police jurisdiction.

We also recommend a thorough review of detective assignments, caseloads, case-closures and overall effectiveness of each unit and member be initiated to ensure detectives are assigned appropriately, in adequate numbers, and that they are result oriented in their investigation.

The WPD should also develop a career path process for detectives. The current process that allows detectives to shift in and out of the investigative units is counterproductive. The process of assignment to investigative units is not understood by members of the department and lacks consistency. Detectives in the Criminal Investigations Division who demonstrate superior skills investigating routine cases should be elevated to the elite HVCU when vacancies occur. Additionally, supervisory personnel in all ranks in the Criminal Investigations Division should be required to have a solid investigatory background that qualifies them to direct and sustain major investigations.

The WPD Detective Units also needs a more current and sophisticated automated Case Management System to track cases, leads, suspects, etc. The homicide unit personnel require additional training in case management and investigations. The U.S. Department of Justice Violence Reduction Network is providing assistance and may be able to assist with the case management system and continue providing technical assistance in homicide investigations.

Recommendations:

Note: Recommendations provided below should be implemented along with the homicide response plan recommendations provided elsewhere, to ensure appropriate victim response and to effectively respond to crimes involving firearms.

The WPD should create a Homicide/Violent Crime Unit as described above that would allow for a comprehensive approach to investigating violent crime in the City.

The Inspector Investigative Operations should arrange for the HVCU Detective Commanders to meet with the State Prosecutor a minimum of once a month to review pending cases, investigative leads, forensic results, and additional investigate steps needed for successful prosecution on cases pending trial.

The Inspector for Investigative Operations should lead a process to review the 43 cases with a “cold case” status to determine if they can be returned to active case status and assigned to investigators in the HVCU along with reviewing the definition of “cold case”.

CID, including the proposed HVCU, needs an automated case management system to track case, lead, suspect, person of interest, etc.
The unit (and the Forensic Crime Unit) needs training in a variety of areas, such as case management, technological tools, evidence control and ballistics. WPD may also consider sending one or more evidence technicians to the U.S. DOJ-funded National Forensics Academy for intensive training and certification.

The WPD should continue to utilize the services the Violence Reduction Network and consider utilizing experienced retired homicide detectives to assist with cold case reviews.

The WPD should also consider requesting the assignment of two trained investigators from the State Police and two from the New Castle County Police Department to assist in addressing open homicides and shootings.

The WPD should establish a career path for assignment to detective duties.

The WPD should ensure all supervisors in Investigative Operations have an investigatory background.
Finding: The WPD should significantly enhance its use of firearms investigative and intelligence tools and ballistics technology in investigating and preventing violent crime.

WPD, through patrol, the Safe Streets Unit and other units, seized 277 crime guns last year. However, we were not able to learn if a seized or recovered firearm protocol exists within the WPD or if any information is collected on the type of guns recovered, where they came from, or how they were acquired. Our review found that while the WPD takes some steps to leverage ballistics evidence, the timeliness of such use and the full array of firearms investigative and intelligence resources is not being utilized in ways that can solve open cases and prevent additional shootings by identifying and incapacitating shooters. We could not identify any protocols for responding to gunshot detections or calls from citizens that require, for example, the attempted collection of ballistic evidence when no victim is found or to process recovered evidence in any meaningful timeframe. We were advised that the WPD Forensic Crime Unit does respond to most incidents involving shots fired if there is evidence at the scene. However, if the only evidence at the scene is shell casings and there is no victim present, the uniformed patrol officers are responsible for recovering the shell casings. WPD patrol officers do not have training on how to do this, nor do they have the appropriate protective gloves and evidence containers to secure the materials. Further, it is our understanding that ballistics best practices are not consistently used at this point in the process.

By statute, the State of New Jersey requires all law enforcement to conduct a series of evidentiary procedures within 24 hours of a shooting incident. As a result, significant improvements in investigative outcomes and the ability to disrupt violence has been improved. According to the New Jersey State Police:

“Through the Rapid Assessment in NIBIN protocol (RAIN), the New Jersey State Police Ballistics Unit has created the capability to assess each case for evidence suitable for NIBIN entry and insure the timely submission into NIBIN. Since its beginning in April 2014, the RAIN protocol has realized its goal of a 24 hour turnaround time for priority cases and has yielded a significant amount of positive NIBIN correlations that have resulted in leads and arrests for investigators. Building upon the success of the RAIN protocol, the Forensic Investigations Bureau has implemented a Crime Gun Protocol, which provides for a thorough forensic examination of every crime gun before the gun is test-fired for NIBIN entry. The objective of the Crime Gun Protocol is to provide timely, actionable, leads to investigators while supporting aggressive enforcement and prosecution of gun crimes in New Jersey. Public Law 2013, Chapter 162 requires police agencies to submit gun crime information into systems such as NIBIN, CJIS, and E-Trace in a timely manner. This protocol allows the New Jersey State Police to comply with the statute, in both practice and spirit, while maintaining the highest standards of forensic analysis.”

The New Jersey statute requires that each recovered firearm (including a shell casing) shall be subjected to consistent set of procedures within 24 hours of recovery. These procedures include multiple methods of inspecting/testing the firearm or shell casing for additional trace evidence, checking relevant databases for information about the firearm, submitting information to tracing and ballistics imaging systems and sharing information quickly with investigators that can be
used to identify the shooter and prevent additional shootings. This protocol leverages state of the art technology from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and other agencies.

**Recommendation:**

The State of Delaware should consider replicating the New Jersey statute.

The Wilmington Police Department and New Castle County Police Department and other agencies in the immediate area should work with the Delaware State Police to create a similar protocol, which should be immediately implemented and monitored monthly through discussions between the leadership of both agencies.

WPD should consider participating in ATF’s Collective Data Sharing initiative. Doing so would allow the WPD to access crime gun trace information as a result of other Delaware law enforcement agency traces of crime guns, which may assist in identifying crime gun sources.

No-cost training and technical assistance from partner agencies such as ATF and forensics providers such as Forensics Technologies, Inc. (produces IBIS technology) should be leveraged to improve ballistics capabilities.
Finding: Improved response to and support of crime victims is needed.

On several occasions during Commission meetings and in community input sessions, crime victims and their family members raised concerns about the responsiveness of the Wilmington Police Department to their inquiries and needs. It was alleged on multiple occasions that victims call the Department to determine the status of the investigation and never receive a call or wait weeks for a call back. It was also apparent during these discussions that misinformation is a consistent problem, as evidenced by concerns about competing stories of the presence or lack of video evidence and whether or not a case that has been open for less than two months had been labeled a “cold case” by the Department. Through discussions, we learned that WPD provides victim services for cases prior to an arrest being made and the State Prosecutor’s Office provides victim services for cases after an arrest has been made. We also received input that the Department’s victim services professionals do a good job serving victims, but not all of the calls come directly to them. When they do, the professionals cannot always get the details they need from the Department.

It is imperative that crime victims are given priority response by the investigating agency, both at the crime scene and during the investigative and adjudication process. Providing the services and supports needed, either directly or through partner organizations in the community, is important for humanitarian reasons but also impacts the community’s perception of the police (as can be seen from the comments and input from the community) and can have a direct impact on the solvability of the case. According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), “responding effectively and appropriately to all victims is not only the right thing to do for victims, their families and communities, but it is also in law enforcement’s best interest. It contributes to:

- **Increased Case Clearance Rates.** Victims who are treated with sensitivity and respect are more likely to participate in the investigation of crimes and are more willing to report future crimes. This support can increase the likelihood that offenders are arrested and successfully prosecuted.

- **Decrease in Crime.** When victims are treated with empathy and respect, they are more receptive to receiving crime prevention tips that may minimize their potential risk of re-victimization.

- **Improved Efficiency.** One component of providing an enhanced response to victims is establishing more effective collaboration between law enforcement and victim service providers and advocates. These partnerships can increase victims’ access to support and compensation, thereby freeing officers to focus on investigating crimes.
• **Heightened Job Satisfaction.** By building relationships with the community, a law enforcement agency can improve its reputation with stakeholders, thus heightening job satisfaction.”

In addition to ensuring that its own resources are available to crime victims and their families, the Wilmington Police Department should strengthen partnerships with community organizations that can provide supplemental services to victims that may not be readily available through the City.

**Recommendation(s):**

*The following recommendations are made in appreciation of the Brooks and Sellers Families and all other crime victims in Wilmington:*

The Wilmington Police Department should conduct an assessment of its victim services strategies, to include investigations, to ensure that there are no barriers to communications with victims and family members and that proper protocols for prioritizing such communications are in place and followed.

The Wilmington Police Department should conduct an assessment of victim/witness risk assessments to ensure the existing process considers each case comprehensively.

Establish a protocol (SOP) requiring phone calls from victims and/or family members be returned within 24 hours by a victim services professional or investigator, if requested.

Establish a protocol (SOP) requiring phone calls from survivors of homicide victims be returned immediately by a victim services professional or investigator.

The Wilmington Police Department’s victim services professionals should be available to respond to crime scenes as necessary and leverage the assistance of community victim services organizations as needed.

The Wilmington Police Department should request and receive training and technical assistance from DOJ’s Office for Victims of Crime through the Violence Reduction Network (VRN), which can provide assistance in improving response to crime victims.

**Best Practice(s):**

**Cleveland, Ohio Violent Loss Response Team (VLRT)**

According to its website, the FrontLine Service organization operates the Violent Loss Response Team in partnership with the Cleveland Police Department. VLRT seeks to provide comprehensive, practical, as well as emotional, supportive services to family members of homicide victims. It is recognized that these family members are in severe crisis from the moment they are notified of their loved one’s death and therefore immediate intervention and assistance is warranted. The nature of the families’ crisis often leaves them feeling overwhelmed and at times immobilized. VLRT provides compassionate care, practical planning and service coordination coupled with clinical intervention related to trauma and loss.
Boston Police Department Victim-Witness Resource Officers
(http://bpdnews.com/homicide-unit/)

According to the website, the Victim-Witness Service component of the Boston PD Homicide Unit advocates for loved ones of victims during the stages of grief and recovery. The purpose of Victim-Witness Resource Officers is to maintain positive communication between detectives and these survivors through meetings, forums, initiatives, and other community events. Advocates work with investigators to help grieving families by connecting families to funeral and burial resources and making referrals to public and non-profit counseling and trauma services.
Finding: The City should be consistent in implementing, with fidelity, proven community-based violence reduction strategies.

Our review found that Wilmington has a history of seeking out proven models of community-based violence prevention and failing to follow through on effective implementation. Examples include those cited by the community and by public safety and criminal justice agencies, such as Boston’s Ceasefire (called Operation Night Light in Wilmington) implemented in the mid-’90s; the Drug Market Intervention Model; and more recently Cure Violence, a public-health based approach demonstrated to reduce violence in other cities, when the model is implemented with fidelity (as intended). Other models exist in the community that should also be explored for greater support, such as Operation Peacekeeper and the Community Development-Community Policing (CD-CP) approach that Chief Cummings has indicated is currently being implemented by the Department.

A specific example is Cease Violence (known nationally as Cure Violence), a model being implemented by the City’s Department of Parks and Recreation. According to the Mayor’s Office, the program was never intended to remain at Parks and Recreation, but resides there currently and has for several months. We contacted the national Cure Violence office at the University of Illinois at Chicago to seek their input on Wilmington’s implementation of the model, in light of the fact that so much of what we hear is related to retaliatory violence, which the Cure Violence model is exceptionally good at interrupting. We wanted to know why it was not having a greater impact here. We examined the Wilmington Cease Violence program’s Facebook page, met with program staff, discussed the program with the University of Delaware and reviewed news coverage of the program. It appears to us, based on this review, that the program has hired strong candidates as “interrupters” but the program is not sufficiently supported in terms of intervention operations. These efforts require intensive management and oversight of the problem-solving process and the ability to leverage resources from other agencies in the City. This requires strong and committed leadership to violence reduction. In light of this, we believe that the Parks and Recreation Department is not the best-suited organization to support this intervention in the City.

Recommendations:

The City should move the Cease Violence model administration to an agency within the City with a mission that is directly aligned with public safety and is capable of leveraging criminal justice, economic and social resources.

Cease Violence program administration should be strengthened to support the violence interruption process, including daily staffing meetings and 24/7 support for interrupters who may need to engage other agency resources to prevent violence. Although intensive in time and focus, this is essential in order to prevent violence that will not wait until the next business day.

The City should engage with the University of Illinois Cure Violence Program staff. The staff has agreed to come to Wilmington for a sustained period of intensive technical support to ensure the program is operating as intended.
USING DATA TO GUIDE STRATEGY & SOLVE PROBLEMS BY ENGAGING THE COMMUNITY

Finding: The WPD Targeted Analytical Policing Systems (T.A.P.S.) meetings should be more focused on ensuring effective sharing, coordination, and accountability in crime reduction efforts.

The WPD utilizes T.A.P.S. meetings as part of its efforts in understanding and addressing crime conditions. We were able to attend several of these meetings and observed that the Department is beginning to use Crime View and other technology in its mapping and crime analytics. While there were limited times when the meetings were used as an opportunity for questions and holding commanders accountable, the meetings were largely used to provide information concerning recent shootings or crimes, as opposed to discussing response strategies and ensuring accountability for reducing crime and preventing further instances.

To ensure greater accountability and constant focus on violence reduction, the WPD should adopt a CompStat management approach into its T.A.P.S. meetings. The CompStat management approach seeks to utilize real-time crime analytics to help ensure effective tactics and strategies are being used to address crime. Commanders, detectives, narcotics, and other supervisors give joint presentations during which they are expected to exhibit a comprehensive understanding of crime conditions within their area of responsibility. They are required to present the plans they have implement; discuss the tactics being used and how those tactics have been successful or are being revised; and exhibit seamless coordination with their partners in other units in their knowledge and anti-crime efforts. The Department’s executive staff then ask probing questions, offer thoughts on existing efforts, make recommendations, and demand accountability for follow through.

CompStat helps ensure the collection and analysis of accurate and timely intelligence; prompt implementation of effective strategies and tactics; the breaking down of bureaucratic silos; the constant sharing of information; and relentless follow-up. There are numerous police departments on the east coast that have adopted CompStat into their management system. Members of the WPD’s ranking staff may wish to visit several of them to glean the best elements from each. CompStat meetings are also effective for coordinating among law enforcement agencies

Recommendations:

The WPD should create a T.A.P.S./CompStat meeting as part of its management system.

WPD executives may wish to visit several other departments using such a model to ensure best current practices are included in development of T.A.P.S./CompStat.
Monthly T.A.P.S./CompStat meetings should be held in partnership with the New Castle County Police Department to address emerging issues, trends and patterns, that cross geographic boundaries and to establish a joint plan to address the issues.
Finding: WPD should establish a true crime analysis function and make use of crime analysis.

Crime analysis in the Wilmington Police Department for purposes of informing Department strategy and patrol resource allocation is generally limited to standard statistical analysis of incidents/arrests, computer-aided dispatch counts, comparison of the number of crimes committed over a certain time period and basic visualization processes. Other analysis is developed in support of investigations and intelligence functions. The hardware and software infrastructure does not allow the staff to make use of more sophisticated tools, such as geospatial analytic tools that can handle large volumes of computer aided dispatch and Law Enforcement Investigative Support System (LEISS) data to inform patrol operations. While implementing MapView is a positive step, the system provides limited capabilities compared to what an analyst would need.

Our crime analysis report clearly identifies that crime and disorder problems are concentrated in five areas at certain times and that the criminogenic nature of these areas differ in types of crime and problems, which permits a very focused and tailored response by not only the Police Department, but other agencies in the community as well. To adequately support hot spots-based deployments relying on problem-oriented policing approaches, analysts would need to consistently and proactively analyze crime patterns involving offenders, places, and the circumstances that bring them together in order to best guide deployment and enforcement and prevention strategies.

The nature and scope of public safety responsibilities that the Wilmington Police Department carries today is substantially beyond the level of analysis currently being conducted. The level of leadership and management support and consumption of crime analysis by the same is also inconsistent with the level needed. Unfortunately, the Department does not currently have the information technology infrastructure (hardware & software) or the crime analysis capacity (expertise & staffing) to move its crime analysis capability substantially forward as needed to ensure public safety and efficient and best use of resources. A proposal is currently pending with U.S. DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) that would provide resources to enhance the technology capacity of the Police Department and add an additional crime analyst, if funded.

VRI’s findings describe how the Department’s policing strategies and resource allocation is undermined by a lack of such analysis and the report in the appendix titled Analysis of Crime and CAD Data 2010-2014, prepared by Temple University at the request of the Police Foundation, is illustrative of the crime analysis needed in Wilmington on a regular basis.

Recommendation(s):

Weekly crime analysis outputs should include social network analysis as well as hot spots analysis and other techniques to identify chronic, high-rate offenders and the networks they operate within, in order to prioritize patrol and investigative efforts.

A partnership with a criminologist or academic institution with experience in supporting the practical analysis of crime, offender and place-based policing, and developing crime
reduction strategies should be developed to permit the regular infusion of such experience and learning while the crime analysis capacity of the Department is being enhanced.

Crime analysis should be conducted in ways that permit it to be used in informing prevention activities and strategies, guiding mid-level operational decisions, and conducting analysis and benchmarking of the Department’s progress and outcomes at preventing and reducing crime.

Mid-level management and senior leaders should receive training in data interpretation and its use in the development and implementation (leading) crime reduction strategies.

Best Practice(s):

Embedded criminologists or criminologist partnerships such as those that exist in Philadelphia and formerly in Boston and Redlands, CA.
Finding: WPD lacks focused crime analytics that provide real time crime analysis and intelligence that can be used to make rapid, data-driven changes to deployment or tactics.

Interviews with supervisors and officers throughout the ranks revealed that there is a current lack of analytics available to them that would allow for pinpoint focus in deployment and adaption of tactics or interventions. For example, the following questions could not be answered:

- What hour of the day are the most shootings?
- What locations have had multiple shootings?
- What are the age breakdowns of people shot?
- And how many people and who are the people who have been shot more than once in the last 5 years?

While numerous members of the WPD had insights regarding these kinds of questions, their knowledge is based on their experience and is not data driven.

Through its own technology and other governmental resources, WPD has access to several high-quality databases and analytical programs that can support basic to intermediate analysis. These include:

- COGNOS
- Crime View
- CAD’s system

COGNOS and Crime View are analytical software programs with mapping ability that identify crime locations, trends and patterns. They can be used to link crimes, determine offender characteristics, and study victimization.

Computer Assisted Dispatch (CAD) system is used to assign police vehicles to calls for service. It records extensive information including the type of call (e.g., disorderly group, burglary etc.); the time officers are sent to those calls and their disposition (e.g., unfounded, arrest, etc.). The software allows for extensive analysis including identifying repeated unnecessary calls for service and locations most prone to violence.

In addition to these systems, the WPD has access to other sources of intelligence through its partnerships with other federal, state and local agencies. Among the many qualities of these software programs are the abilities to streamline paperwork; identify hotspot areas, including by hour and day of week; identify trends and patterns; identify possible suspects; determine likelihood of recidivism, and assist in evaluate effectiveness of deployments. Overall, they provide the technology required to answer the type of questions that should be answered to allow for effective analysis and deployment decisions. As its ability to take advantage of the systems it currently possesses increases, WPD should be able to use more sophisticated analytics such social network analysis, space and time analysis, and other new means of solving and preventing crime.

There is one crime analyst and one intelligence analyst working in separate units that systematically work with these databases. They will be discussed in a section to follow, but the
immediate challenge that should be addressed is that most supervisors do not have access to or know how to effectively utilize the existing quality systems to gain useful crime analysis data. They are not able to perform basic queries that would assist them in viewing crime maps, for example.

Recommendation:

The WPD should complete the comprehensive training of all supervisors in the use of the existing analytical software programs within 60 days.

WPD supervisors should have to exhibit proficiency with these systems to ensure they are able to use them in their daily performance.

After completion of supervisor training, the WPD should train all officers in Crime View and other crime analysis software they already possess. Due to the complexity of some of the topics, the training should involve multiple sessions.
Finding: Crime analysis is not consistently shared with patrol officers, including community policing officers.

Visual display of crime information is critical for officer safety and departmental effectiveness. Packages of information concerning crime analytics are provided by the Department’s crime analyst for distribution at T.A.P.S. meetings and maps with crime information are presented at those meetings, but there appears to be limited distribution of important information beyond those meetings. There is some distribution of information through e-mail, which we are told in many cases remain unopened.

The most distinct example of where this information should be placed is in the roll call room where officers begin their tour. Currently there are not maps posted displaying the locations and times of recent shootings, robberies, burglaries, etc., nor information on patterns and trends. Also absent are photographs of the most wanted individuals, individuals known to carry guns, parolees or others who officers should be able to identify. Currently supervisors at roll calls give limited briefings concerning crime, which may in part result from their own limited understanding of conditions.

WPD personnel also indicate that the type of information discussed above is not currently provided to officers on patrol via the police car’s Mobile Digital Terminals (MDT) but the capacity to do so does exist. The Department could continue to use e-mail to provide certain crime information, but tracking technology needs to be used to ensure the e-mails are being opened. We are told that the New Castle County Police Department utilizes a portal system to expedite the exchange of internal information and finds it effective. Beyond internal communication, the crime analysis needs to be more systematically shared with area police departments, and other law enforcement partners.

Recommendation

The WPD should immediately create a crime information board in the roll call room for the posting of important data. Among the items on the board should be:

- Maps with crime locations broken down by hour and day;
- Information on current hotspots, trends or patterns;
- Photographs of 25 most wanted individuals;
- Photographs of known offenders (burglary, robbery, etc.);
- Photographs of individuals known to carry a gun;
- Photographs of individuals on parole/probations;
- Safety warning for officers concerning any threats

The Information Board should be updated weekly or sooner if patterns change or additional information needs to be immediately provided.

The Information Board should initially be created using display boards or cases to expedite its creation, but should over time move into largely electronic format.
WPD should ensure that supervisors who turn out platoons of officers are thoroughly aware of the most current crime information and trends and provide thorough briefings concerning them to the officers.

WPD should also create brief packages of intelligence information including crime maps and photographs of wanted individuals that would be sent to officers via their MDTs.

WPD should utilize a receipt system to allow tracking of Department emails to ensure all personnel are reviewing their content.

The WPD should examine the portal system utilized by the New Castle County Police Department for internal information exchange to determine if it is appropriate for use by the WPD.

The information provided to officers should also be provided electronically to the State Police, New Castle County Police Department and other partner law enforcement agencies.
Finding: The WPD’s crime and intelligence analysis capabilities are, at present, extremely limited.

The WPD relies on one civilian crime analyst. He performs a variety of functions, maintaining information both through computer analysis and manual record keeping. The analyst makes weekly presentations regarding recent crime at the Department’s T.A.P.S. meeting. The level of analysis presented is limited, but the crime analyst attended additional training this month and is working to increase the analysis being performed. There are a number of certifications, trainings and professional organizations available to increase the capacity of the crime analyst function.

A second resource in the Department is one detective assigned to intelligence analysis who divides his time between WPD headquarters and the Attorney General’s office, where he works with a part-time civilian analyst from the State. He engages in analytics to identify violent individuals, and those in crews and gangs who may be involved in illegal activities. His analysis is highly sought after by those involved in investigations. He also provides e-mails throughout the WPD providing safety warnings including photographs of select suspects or potential violent individuals.

To improve on this approach, and create a department focused on intelligence-led policing, the WPD should establish a Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) that would provide instant information to WPD personnel regarding emerging crime trends and patterns, victimization, recidivism, release of offenders, and other critical information for crime reduction. The unit should also map arrests, calls for service, narcotics locations, and quality of life enforcement to ensure enforcement is occurring in the violence prone areas. The RTCC should be a proactive intelligence-based unit that provides information to be immediately acted upon. The newly created Chief Information Officer recommended elsewhere in this document should be integrally involved in the creation of this center. A fully functional RTCC led by a CIO as described below would take time to assemble, but an embryonic unit could be put together almost immediately.

The RTCC would be comprised of a Crime Analytics Section and an Investigations Section. The Crime Analytics Section would provide mapping, data analysis, hotspot identification, and linkage analysis. The Investigations Section of the RTCC would provide immediate support to detectives in solving cases through the use of law enforcement and public databases. The Investigation Section would also work to identify gang and crew members engaged in criminal activity and provide actionable intelligence to enforcement personnel. The RTCC should be situated organizationally under the proposed Deputy Chief of Operations and be fully responsive to the needs of both the Uniformed Operations and Investigative Operations.

The recommended staffing of the RTCC includes one existing investigative detective, one existing civilian crime analyst, one existing technology analyst and one new Intelligence analyst, who will also coordinate with the Delaware Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC). The City of Wilmington has already applied for funding for a similar position. In addition, DIAC may have assets to contribute, as the New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center does in Newark and Camden. The RTCC members should be cross trained to perform each other’s functions. The identified individuals already existing within the WPD are fulfilling some of the required functions and could be trained in the other areas with the assistance of the Delaware
Information and Analysis Center (DIAC) and other local analysis centers. As the RTCC develops, consideration should be given to placing an analyst in the DIAC for further training.

The RTCC personnel should coordinate regularly in the exchange of information with their counterparts in the New Castle County Police, the Delaware State Police, and the Federal law enforcement partners.

The RTCC should work to link the viewing capabilities of Downtown Visions to the RTCC and expand them beyond the one screen currently available for viewing within the Communications Center.

**Recommendations:**

The WPD should establish a Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) for the comprehensive analysis and dissemination of information.

The RTCC should be comprised of a Crime Analytics Section and an Investigations Section.

The WPD staff of the RTCC should include one existing Investigative Detective, one existing civilian Crime Analyst, one existing Technology Analyst and one new Intelligence Analyst.

The RTCC should coordinate the exchange of information with other law enforcement agencies.

The RTCC should work to link the viewing capabilities of Downtown Visions and other camera systems to the RTCC.
LEVERAGING AVAILABLE RESOURCES

Finding: The WPD should return personnel to joint federal task forces and engage in greater coordination to ensure its members are assigned to Wilmington cases.

The WPD until recently participated in a number of joint Federal Task Forces, including with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Two members of the ATF are currently assigned to the WPD Homicide Squad. When Operation Disrupt was begun by the WPD in February of this year, police department personnel were removed from these task forces and assigned to patrol duty. While Operation Disrupt is reducing violence, it is not a sustainable strategy in current form. In the deployment section of this document we make recommendations concerning assignment of officers to platoons and for the creation of a Community Stabilization Team to perform a function similar to Operation Disrupt.

We have heard complaints from within the WPD that officers assigned to joint task forces do not regularly work on cases affecting Wilmington. WPD personnel should be returned to these task forces and the Chief of the WPD should meet quarterly with his federal counterparts to review existing cases, define needs, and ensure his officers are specifically working on cases that will assist Wilmington in reducing violence.

In maximizing the resources of federal law enforcement, we recommend that the WPD request the assistance of the U.S. Marshals Service in establishing a Wilmington dedicated Task Force. The WPD should provide space as needed to allow the Task Force to function directly out of WPD headquarters.

Recommendations:

The WPD should reassign officers to joint federal/WPD task forces.

The Chief of the WPD should coordinate with federal counterparts to ensure officers’ efforts are focused on Wilmington cases that will assist in reducing violence.

The WPD should request the creation of a U.S. Marshals Service Task Force dedicated exclusively to Wilmington.
Finding: Wilmington’s security cameras appear underutilized and undersupported
(Note: A more detailed summary regarding the use of video cameras may be found in the appendix of this document.)

Wilmington’s CCTV or camera system is operated by Downtown Visions, the non-profit organization that runs Wilmington’s Business Improvement District and its for-profit sister organization, Clean & Safe Services. According to Downtown Visions, a total of 95 cameras located throughout the city are monitored, 25 that are owned and supported by the Business Improvement District and 70 owned and supported by the City. We found little evidence to support the claims that the cameras don’t work. In fact, Downtown Visions allowed us to review its status reports in two different weeks. These reports are completed multiple times each week to assess camera functioning. According to those records, at least 92% of the cameras in the system were functioning.

We did, however, find many reasons to suggest that the system is not properly supported or used. As one organization noted, the cameras are largely unused and this became evident during our review. For example, not all of the cameras are monitored daily and the City’s 70 cameras are monitored by one staff person per 8-hour shift, a ratio that is likely insufficient without technological support. We also heard feedback that investigators may not make best use of available video to solve crimes. Last, we learned that an effort is currently underway and being led by Attorney General Matt Denn and the State Department of Safety and Homeland Security (DSHS) to assess and strengthen the Wilmington CCTV system, including the consideration of adding additional cameras into the City. Because this effort appears to be a thoughtful and strategic approach consistent with our recommendations, we recommend support of the initiative. A full explanation of our findings can be found in the appendix.

Recommendation(s):

These recommendations are made in appreciation of the Goins family and all crime victims in the City of Wilmington.

The Wilmington Police Department should develop a protocol that describes how the CCTV system will be used within the agency, setting expectations and standards for interaction with Downtown Visions, and requiring consultation with Downtown Visions regarding investigations.

The City should increase funding to Downtown Visions to add two additional staff and requiring that the City’s 70 neighborhood cameras be monitored seven days per week and at least 16 hours each day.

The Wilmington Police Department should place a “light-duty” officer within the Downtown Visions camera control room to serve as the liaison between Downtown Visions and the Department’s Dispatch Center while cameras are monitored.

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2 An outside consultant’s report from February 2015 provided to us by the Attorney General’s office suggests that Downtown Visions owned and managed 32 of these cameras and the City owned and managed 63. We were not able to reconcile the different understandings conclusively.
Consider broader transparency including potential crowdsourced video monitoring with partner organizations or potentially more broadly, and providing open data to allow anyone to map the locations of the cameras for crime deterrence purposes.

Enhance transparency to address the community’s belief that the cameras don’t work, sharing data publicly about the number of cameras not working on a weekly basis.

Data should be maintained within the CAD system to track calls or referrals from Downtown Visions to the Wilmington Police Department regarding incidents. This data should be reviewed monthly by the Police Department leadership in consultation with Downtown Visions leadership and frequently shared with City Council and the community to ensure referrals are acted on appropriately.

Before adding new cameras, conduct an analysis of the camera system to examine factors such as camera placement, hotspot coverage, camera monitoring, control room setup/operations, use of the video, and technical capabilities before adding new cameras.

Best Practice:

City of Baltimore Citiwatch Services (Mayor’s Office of Information Technology)
Finding: The WPD engages in extensive warrant enforcement but needs coordinate and sharpen its focus on violent offenders.

An important aspect of enforcement efforts to address violence and hotspot areas is the arrest of individuals wanted on warrants. Last year, the WPD apprehended over 2,000 individuals on warrants. When we asked how this was achieved, we were told that it largely relied on officers’ individual initiative. When we inquired about team-led enforcement that prioritized and served warrants, we were also told this was not regularly done.

As of March 10, 2014, there were 141 WPD felony warrants in DELJIS and another 36 felony warrants out of the Superior Court for Wilmington. There are also 354 misdemeanor warrants from Wilmington in DELJIS, a Delaware State tracking program. Other documents we reviewed indicate larger numbers of various warrants.

We believe lieutenants should coordinate the prioritization of warrants and ensure patrol sergeants lead weekly operations to serve felony and other serious warrants. Supervisors should ensure that warrant checks are conducted whenever an individual is stopped for investigation or summons. WPD should analyze the misdemeanor warrant cases using the criminal history background of the offender to ascertain if their past criminal history would indicate a propensity for violence even though the charge they are wanted for is not a crime of violence. Those with a violent history should receive priority for investigation and warrant execution. A list with photographs of the 25 most violent offenders should be created and updated monthly. A prior existing program that freed officers for additional patrol duties by allowing them to surrender individuals arrested on warrants to the booking officer for processing should be reinstated.

Recommendation:

The Department should continue its warrant enforcement efforts, but engage in greater focus through prioritization of warrants concerning the most violent wanted individuals and those who frequent or live in hotspot locations.

Lieutenants should ensure sergeants weekly engage in team-led warrant enforcement.

The WPD should establish a list with photographs of the 25 most violent wanted offenders and focus on their apprehension.

A prior existing program that allowed officers to surrender arrestees from warrants to the booking officers for processing should be reinstated.
Finding: Leveraging technology and strategically procuring additional equipment can serve as a force-multiplier for the WPD.

WPD should conduct a comprehensive review and audit of its equipment to determine its resources. Knowledge and training on available equipment can be an advantage to assist in the reduction of violence and the promotion officer safety.

One significant deficiency that was identified was a lack of Automated License Plate Recognition Systems (ALPRS). LPRs are a proven and efficient tool to enable patrol officers to identify vehicles that are the subject of traffic or criminal related warrants. The WPD should obtain a minimum of 12 LPRs to deploy in sector cars, 4 per sector. The State of Delaware may be able to assist in the acquisition of the LPRs through highway safety or other block grants. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) provides policy and procedure information for APLRS in their publication titled: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems available on line at IACPtechnology.org.

Equipment is available through the Regional Information Sharing Program and will lend equipment to police departments. There is also money through HIDTA and the Governor’s Highway Safety program that the WPD should avail itself of.

Recommendation:

The WPD should work with the State of Delaware to obtain Automated License Plate Recognition Systems (ALPRS).
STRENGTHENING THE WPD

Finding: WPD lacks a Deputy Chief for Operations whose primary function is to ensure that enforcement operations across all sectors is intelligence-led, data-driven and appropriately staffed.

Currently the WPD is largely reactive as opposed to proactive and does not have systems in place to allow for an intelligence led-model of policing that attempts to predict and stop crime before it occurs. There is a significant amount of excellent police work that occurs within the organization, as seen in the over 4,100 arrests and over 2,000 individuals returned on warrants in 2014. There needs to be a significant increase in cooperation and intelligence sharing among the patrol and investigatory units in the department. The current 2014 clearance rate of 15% of homicides is indicative of how important the need for intelligence sharing is among divisions.

The WPD should review available data constantly to engage in predictive policing and deploy its resources based on the most current trends and patterns. Moreover, as discussed in the crime analytics section, the WPD should train and ensure that all supervisors and officers have the ability to access and understand current crime analysis data. As Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe’s analysis, which can be found in the appendix to this document, indicates a large amount of the City’s crime occurs in a few specific areas he identifies as hotspots. Based on the ongoing analysis, the WPD should take proactive steps to address conditions at hotspots before crime occurs, including addressing narcotics and quality of life conditions, enforcing curfews, serving warrants, and deploying officers on foot to their areas to stabilize area particularly after shootings or narcotics arrests.

We note the current Chief of the WPD understands the significance of this issue and is taking steps to create a more comprehensive response to violence within the City. In order to fully implement and manage a comprehensive strategy, we believe the Chief of Police should appoint a Deputy Chief Operations as second-in-command whose sole responsibility is crime and violence reduction. While some may suggest that this is the role of the Chief of Police, the large number of responsibilities of any Chief of Police limits his or her ability to bring full focus to the mission of crime reduction. The appointment of a Deputy Chief Operations would provide a strategist and police manager who could ensure the development of an intelligence-based policing model that focuses on hotspots and patterns of crime. The Deputy Chief Operations should ensure comprehensive intelligence development, sharing of information, proactive coordinated policing, follow up, and full accountability. The Deputy Chief Operations would also be responsible for development of the current Target Analytical Policing System (T.A.P.S.) into T.A.P.S./CompStat model of management accountability. This T.A.P.S./CompStat model ensures greater coordination and accountability among Supervisors and is discussed in a different section. Candidates outside the Department who possess strong management and crime analytical skills should be considered for this position.
Recommendations

Enforcement efforts should focus on hotspots and crime patterns.

The Department should appoint a Deputy Chief Operations who would serve as the Department’s chief crime strategist and be responsible for crime control initiatives throughout the Department, including developing the existing Target Analytical Policing System (T.A.P.S.) program into a T.A.P.S./CompStat accountability and management system.
Finding: Low salaries and less favorable benefits are making it more difficult for WPD to attract recruits and retain officers.

In preceding sections, we discussed our conclusion that WPD’s excessive and unplanned overtime spending has jeopardized a rational budgeting process and eliminating opportunities to fund needed increases in capacity and in other areas. This need for overtime is influenced by a number of factors, including the current deployment strategy, attrition, and hiring challenges.

WPD advises that its normal attrition rate averages 12 officers per year. However, the Department also has 51 officers eligible for retirement. The large scale loss of officers through either retirement or other attrition has the potential to have a dramatic impact on deployment and policing.

In assessing the issue of attrition, we learned that the WPD’s starting annual base salary is among the 5 lowest paying in the region. Specifically, the Department’s $42,000 starting annual base salary is approximately $7,000 less than its county neighbors and almost $12,000 less than the state’s. In addition, WPD does not offer the same benefits as several other agencies, such as take home cars. We also learned that no labor contract has been approved since 2010.

The issue of “under-compensation” can generally be extrapolated beyond entry-level recruits and patrol officers to other ranks within the Department. It also creates and exacerbates conditions favorable to lateral moves. In that regard, the WPD advised the predominant reason cited in exit interviews for leaving the Department was for better salary and benefits.

Recommendation:

The City should work with the Fraternal Order of Police in an effort to make its salary and benefits package more competitive with police departments in surrounding communities.
Finding: WPD should develop a strategic communications approach that ensure that the community and stakeholders are informed of the successes of WPD in improving public safety and engaging the community.

A consistent point made across community and business interviews was that most are unaware of the details regarding WPD strategies or what the WPD is doing to address crime and violence. When asked to describe the substance of communications from the WPD, most pointed to notices in social media and press accounts of more crime or arrests, which some noted simply reminds them that a major crime had occurred. Many in the business community noted that the perception of Wilmington’s crime and violence is often driven by what is read in the news and in social media accounts, which is not always factual and often becomes embellished as the story is told and retold through word of mouth within local companies. A review of the Department’s social media accounts shows some attempts to post positive information, however these stories are often overshadowed and inconsistent. Additionally, a review of recent media reports and WPD communications regarding requests for the public’s assistance in relation to criminal activity found that it is not easy or intuitive for the public to submit anonymous tip information to WPD investigators. In multiple stories, a web address was provided that took citizens to a webpage for a company that is apparently providing anonymous tip collection services for the WPD, potentially discouraging information sharing. Other stories only listed a phone number to call.

It is imperative that the communications role and function be seen as requiring proactive engagement with the community and communicating the work of the WPD through various channels, including in-person, the media, and electronic means such as social media. No longer can agencies rely on the news media to find good news about law enforcement and to share it effectively – positive content and messaging must be proactively and regularly created by the WPD and shared with the community, including business partners who are willing to assist in messaging the positive work of the WPD. Communicating in this way can also encourage the community to become more involved in supporting the work of the WPD to improve the community and can begin to erode the effects of street-level “stop snitching” campaigns.

Encouraging the public to provide anonymous tip information can be done very effectively with various solutions that make it easy, intuitive, and quick to anonymously provide information. In addition to providing these tools to the public, agency marketing of the resource and strong assurances of anonymity are critical. The Atlantic City, NJ Police Department more than doubled the tips they receive from 2013 to 2014 by using such a system and the Yonkers, NY Police Department experienced a 40% increase in the first two years of its use of such a system.

Recommendation(s):

Hire a non-sworn Communications Director/PIO with the training and skills needed to effectively communicate the positive efforts of the WPD and the community

Engage a law enforcement communications consultant to assist in immediately improving WPD communications with the public and media.
Best Practice:

Prince George’s County, Maryland Police Department

Boston Police Department

Yonkers, New York Police Department “Tip411 Program” - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zUzpbbeSTo and tip411.com

Master Cpl. Anthony Harris’ Outreach Efforts as noted in delawareonline.com week of 3/23
Finding: WPD has as many as 9 officers currently assigned to administrative positions that could be fulfilled by civilians or officers in light-duty status.

To address concerns regarding the belief that an excessive number of officers might be assigned to the WPD headquarters performing administrative of other non-enforcement duties we examined the organization and asked various members of the Department about such assignments. As is common in many Departments officers are deployed to administrative tasks when they are injured or temporarily not able to perform full patrol duties. Overall we identified fewer than ten officers assigned to administrative duties and we recommend each position be reviewed to determine if the position can be civilianized.

The increased presence of lieutenants in the station that occurred when their role was changed to focus more administrative duties may have led to a perception that many officers were solely involved in administration of the department. In our recommendations in an earlier section of this report, we address the role of lieutenants and believe that tying their role more closely to patrol leadership would change this perception.

Recommendation:

The WPD should consider civilianization of a number of positions in the Department including Public Information Officer, and officers assigned to the Computerized Assisted Dispatch system, computer maintenance, asset forfeiture, grant writing, accreditation, court liaison, planning, and evidence control. We note that the assignment of these officers to patrol could in part reduce the expenditure of overtime and contribute to paying for civilian salaries.
Finding: The creation of select staff positions within the WPD would allow for greater structural alignment and increase focus on violence reduction.

WPD is commanded by a Chief of Police with two high ranking direct-reports by Inspectors, one of whom supervises Uniformed Operations and the other who supervises all Investigative Operations. A Public Information Officer and a small staff also report directly to the Chief.

In order to increase efficiency within the Department and allow for greater focus on violence reduction, we recommend the creation of the following positions.

Deputy Chief Operations

The Deputy Chief Operations would be the second in command in the WPD and would be the Department’s Chief crime strategies and be responsible for implementation of all crime and violence reduction strategies. He or she would chair the Department’s T.A.P.S./CompStat meetings and ensure coordination and accountability throughout the WPD in the area of crime reduction initiatives.

Chief Information Officer (CIO)

In our review of staffing, organizational structure, and Department needs, it is clear that among the greatest challenges to the WPD is the integration of the vast amount of technology available that could assist the Department in both its crime reduction efforts and in increasing accountability and administrative efficiency. Currently the Department has one civilian, a retired Sergeant, who is responsible for the vast majority of its technology needs and challenges. He performs a wide variety of tasks from running cable and setting up computers to making queries within the CADS and other computer systems.

Our interviews indicate that many different understandings exist regarding the quality, availability, and adequacy of technology in the WPD. Negative comments we heard include the quality of Kronos, the time management system used by the WPD. We have also been told that a civilian is assigned to input hundreds of documents by hand, including daily activity sheets of patrol officers. It is not possible to work through each of these issues in the brief time allotted for this consultation. Pending the appointment of a Chief Information Officer, we recommend immediate establishment of a working committee for technology. The committee should be comprised of sworn officers and civilians, including those with and without expertise in technology. Its members should identify all areas where technology or training regarding it can be improved, particularly in those cases where the process can be quickly implemented.

Many others throughout the Department have knowledge and skills related to specific systems. To the organizations benefit, the Chief himself has significant technological knowledge, which he shares. However, the Department lacks a Chief Information Officer whose sole focus is the identification, procurement, installation, and maintenance of the best available technology that would support the Department’s vision for crime reduction. A CIO would also have a major role in working with the Training Unit to ensure comprehensive ongoing training concerning available technology that can assist in crime reduction and investigations.
Creation of an Inspector for Support Services

In continuing our review we examined the role and organizational reporting structure to the two existing Inspector positions. We note that each of the existing Inspectors has responsibility for managing resources that do not align with his primary role. The role of the Uniformed Operations Inspector should be focused on patrol operations to reduce violence and crime. Currently the Uniformed Operations Inspector is additionally responsible for such support functions as running radio communications, the property unit, and vehicle maintenance. The Uniformed Operations Inspector supervises three Captains (who supervise patrol) and three lieutenants who oversee the special operations (e.g., emergency services unit, K-9 unit, school officers); prisoner booking; and special services (e.g., communications, evidence control, and vehicle maintenance).

The Investigative Inspector supervises four captains who oversee: Criminal Investigations; Drugs, Organized Crime and Vice; Professional Standards; and Human Resources.

We believe the Investigative Inspector’s efforts should be focused on solving past crimes and disrupting illegal drug sales and violence through investigations. Currently he is also responsible for human resources, including training, budget, and planning, and accreditation, as well as professional standards throughout the organization. A more thorough discussion of professional standards can be found elsewhere in this report.

In examining the structure, we also note that Professional Standards has two units under it that it might be required to investigate. Professional Standards also reports to one of the Inspectors who has numerous units reporting to him that at times require investigation.

Recommendations:

A Deputy Chief Operations position should be created.

A civilian Chief Information Officer position should be established within the Department. The salary should be adequate to ensure the hiring of highly skilled individuals. In recognition of the importance of technology to the reduction of crime throughout Wilmington, the Chief Information Officer should report directly to the Chief.

A Support Services Inspector should be created, who would assume responsibility for many of the functions not directly related to Patrol Operations or Criminal Investigations.

The Professional Standards Unit should report directly to the Chief of Police to avoid inherent conflicts of interest and ensure integrity issues are reported to and addressed at the highest level of the organization.

As part of moving the Profession Standards Division directly under the Chief, we would also recommend moving the Court Liaison Officer and the Extra Job Coordinator, currently under Professional Standards, to Support Services. By moving these two units, Professional Standards avoids any conflict of interest when an audit or investigation of these two subunits is required.
The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

Crime Analysis & CAD Incident Analysis, Wilmington, DE (2010-14)
Crime analysis and CAD incident analysis, Wilmington, DE (2010-14)

Prepared for the Police Foundation
March 2015
Crime analysis and CAD incident analysis, Wilmington, DE (2010-14)

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The information provided in this report is compiled from data provided to the analysis team by third parties at DELJIS or the Wilmington Police Department. The people named above, on behalf of the Center for Security and Crime Science, the Department of Criminal Justice, and Temple University, have made extensive efforts in this report to convey our interpretation of this received information as clearly and accurately as possible. However, neither the individuals nor the University can assume any legal responsibility for the information contained herein, which is provided "as is" with no warranties of any kind. Furthermore, the aforementioned people and entities are not responsible for any omissions or errors of information from the third parties, any errors or misinterpretation as a result of any stages of analysis, intermediate or otherwise, or any liability stemming from any community or police department strategies determined after reading this analysis. The reader acknowledges that many crime analysis techniques involve data abstraction and/or aggregation, the geocoding of incident data introduces error and imprecision, and the need for succinctness in a final product necessitates the omission of some information that might in hindsight appear relevant. Recommendations are made (as requested) but the reader should recognize that they are made without the time to develop a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the nature of each crime hotspot, and without the ability to better understand the data, the community, the city, or the police department. Given the time constraints placed on this analysis, the authors advise that recommendations are made in good faith but the authors reserve the right to change the data interpretation and recommendations if other information comes to light subsequent to report submission.

Version 2.1
March 2015
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Two data sources are used in this report, each telling a different part of the story. LEISS is the statewide repository system for recording all formal crime information, including victim and suspect data. We examine these incident data first. The second data source is the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data set retained and managed by the Wilmington Police Department (WPD). This data source is less reliable regarding crime; however, it does include information about where the WPD are called to problems related to disorder, drugs, quality of life, traffic activity, and community maintenance, and medical assistance to the public (these categories are explained later). The CAD data also show where proactive investigative work of the police department occurs. These include pedestrian field interviews and searches, and suspicious vehicle stops. For all data sources, we examine five years of each data source (2010 to 2014).

Small areas of the city account for a large proportion of all the crime and community harm. To demonstrate the contribution of specific places, the following map shows a count of five years of violent incidents in 500 foot square boxes. Highlighted in the map are all cells with more than 20 violent crimes over five years. These 36 cells comprise only 3.5% of the area of the city, yet they contain nearly 25% of the city’s violence.
We measure harm by weighing crime by the community harm the crime contributes. This is achieved using median sentencing guidelines as a weight so that violent predatory crime counts more to the analysis of harm than drug sales, which in turn count more than trespass and minor theft, and so on (more details in the notes at the end of this report). When every offense incident is included and weighted, the weighted hotspot map distribution is shown below.

All incidents with gravity weighting, 2010-2014

If we narrow down the harm calculation to all incidents of a more serious nature, the map doesn’t really change that much. These incidents include all violent crimes, robberies, burglaries, drug incidents and vehicles crimes. We can also examine them at a slightly different hotspot resolution below. This shows that the specific hotspots that create so much of the community harm suffered by the people of Wilmington are highly concentrated in a few very harmful places. This map – and a zoomed map of the same harm picture – are shown next.
It is clear that although there are sporadic crime problems in different parts of the city, there are roughly five areas which dominate the crime problem for the city (proposed target areas based on these five areas are shown after the recommendations). These are relatively concise (in the maps here we have excluded events at the public safety building on Walnut Street so that we are examining only the harm suffered by the community directly).

The hotspot to the NE along Market Street is a hotspot for robbery and violence, but not for drug incidents or burglary. The central hotspot around Washington is also a violence and robbery area, but also a drug market with a lot of disorder and other drains on police resources. The hotspot to the west around Clayton and 4th Street has lower levels of violence, but does attract a lot of disorder and burglary, as well as functioning as a drug market.
Temporal patterns indicate there is little morning activity, and all these hotspots appear to (in aggregate) be active from noon onwards, with peak activities in the late afternoon and early evening hours. The following daily/hourly chart relates to violent street crime, but essentially epitomized the general pattern for the data set: concentrated crime in the late afternoon and evening, with little to differentiate days of the week. Red indicates greater crime intensity.

The five main harm hotspot areas recommended for concentrated efforts are shown after the recommendations.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The crime analysis suggests the following recommendations (but see title page for caveats):

1. Involved agencies to recognize that crime and disorder problems are concentrated in about five areas at certain times, and permit a concentration of effort in these areas.

2. Involved agencies recognize that the criminogenic nature of the five areas differs in types of crime and problem, and a tailored response for each will be necessary.

3. WPD concentrate patrol resources in these hot areas and hot times to achieve any short-term crime reduction benefits, and gain community and criminal intelligence to inform long-term efforts; however, WPD should also recognize these are only stop-gap measures.

4. WPD reinstate the community policing unit in these long-term crime problem areas to work on long-term crime prevention solutions that will in time free up police patrol resources.

5. Involved agencies (especially at the state and federal levels) collaborate to identify in which of the five areas their unique ability to target serious, recidivist offenders would be best to maximize the return on that investigative investment.

6. Additional crime analysis resources be made available to assist the city with more insightful analysis than is currently available within the WPD. These resources should concentrate on spatial and temporal analysis, long-term assistance to crime prevention efforts, informed mid-level decision-making, and the integration of criminal intelligence into the overall analytical effort.

7. Mid-level and senior police command training in data interpretation and the development and leadership of crime reduction strategies should be instigated so that analytical improvements are not wasted.
POTENTIAL GEOGRAPHIC TARGET AREAS

The five areas identified below are the main areas that persevere through many of the analyses shown in this report. In other words, they are not only violent crime areas, but also places with burglary, drug dealing, disorder and other community harms. Please note that the areas are identified without knowledge of the specific streets and whether these boundaries would coalesce with local neighborhood or police administrative boundaries.
LEISS INCIDENT ANALYSIS

Analysis notes
LEISS system data were provided by DELJIS for this project. Data were provided in five yearly Excel spreadsheets for 2010 to 2014 inclusive. When appended, this resulted in 81,754 incidents; however, 12,119 cases had duplicate complaint numbers. When these were adjusted and removed as necessary, the data set reduced to 69,663 individual cases. We were unable to geocode 2,943 cases resulting in a 95.7 percent geocoding success rate. A geocoding failure rate of less than 4 percent was deemed acceptable for purposes and within the constraint of this project’s limited timeline. For more information on geocoding hit rates see Ratcliffe, J. H. (2004). Geocoding crime and a first estimate of an acceptable minimum hit rate. International Journal of Geographical Information Science, 18(1), 61-73.

Weekly hour-by-hour charts are shown in the data below, color coded by incident likelihood. Blue cells indicate a relatively low frequency of incidents, white indicate a moderate crime rate, and red areas indicate the greatest volume of criminal activity. Numbers in cells relate to a rounded sum indicating likelihood of the offense happening in the time period, based on an aoristic analysis. For more information on aoristic analysis see Ratcliffe, J. H. (2002). Aoristic signatures and the temporal analysis of high volume crime patterns. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 18(1), 23-43.

Three locations were excluded from the analysis, depending on the map type. For most of the maps, the location of 300 Walnut Street was excluded due to the significant number of incidents reported at the Public Safety Building. These incidents would have swamped the display and provide no indication of community crime and disorder problems. For the medical map, we excluded two locations that would have also dominated the display; the correctional institution and the hospital.

Repeat victimization and near repeat victimization
Repeat victimization occurs when a location or address (here defined as the same x and y coordinate) suffers a repeat of the same type of crime shortly after an initial incident. A common example is that of a residence that is the victim of a burglary within a few weeks of an initial burglary, likely caused by the same offender returning for goods not carried away first time, or with the hope that the victims have replaced sought-after items. Near repeat victimization is a phenomenon observed in many crime series, where the risk of increased victimization not only affects the site that was the source of the first crime, but also locations nearby for a short period of time.

Repeat and near repeat analysis is designed to identify the places that are at an increased risk of victimization. This can be useful to plan patrol strategies or the attendance of crime prevention personnel. In the analyses that follow, we employed the Near Repeat Calculator (full citation: Ratcliffe, JH, Near Repeat Calculator [version 1.3] Temple University, Philadelphia, PA and the National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC. August 2009). Note that one constraint of WPD data is a tendency for
officers to report crimes occurring in the street with a house number of xx99. This has the result of over-estimating the repeat victimization frequency. For this reason, we exclude addresses with a house number ending in 99.

**Violent street crime**

LEISS data clearly show that violent street crime is concentrated in a couple of highly focused areas.

Space-time analysis of violent street crime indicates a clear pattern of activity in the latter part of the day, starting around noon and peaking during the evening hours. This is shown in the graph where blue cells show low offense activity for a particular day/hour combination, white indicates a moderate amount of crime, and red indicates the greatest volume of criminal activity.
Violent street crime repeat victimization

Based on analysis of more than 2,700 violent street crimes over five years in Wilmington, the risk of another offense at the same location doubles (100% increased risk) over the next 14 days. The blocks where these locations are found are in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Address block</th>
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<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>300 N WALNUT ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>1800 PROSPECT RD, WILMINGTON, DE, 19805</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>700 N CLAYTON ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19805</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1300 N UNION ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>2700 N MARKET ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>400 E 12TH ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Homicides and shootings

When the homicides and shootings are isolated from the crime CAD calls, we can see particular hotspots are apparent in the City of Wilmington (see next page).
Shootings and homicides, 2010-2014

Shootings and homicides, 2010-2014 (central area)
Robbery

The violent street crime problem identified in the previous section is largely driven by robberies, as can be seen here.

The temporal pattern by hour of the day and day of the week shows the overall trend is between about midday and 11pm, with a peak in the early evening hours after schools let out and before 10pm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hour</th>
<th>00-01</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Drugs

Drug arrests are more spatially distributed than violent street crime, and it is worth noting that one of the robbery/violent street crime areas from the previous analysis does not make it into the highest mapped drug incident class: Not all drug markets in Wilmington are equally violent.

The temporal pattern is however very similar to the violence and robbery analysis.
Burglary

Burglary is concentrated in the west of the city, in the area around Lancaster Avenue and W Fourth Street, and along North Franklin Street. Some of these burglaries may be related to the drug market operating in the area.

Space-time analysis of the patterns of burglary from Wilmington across three years (2012-14) shows that there is little burglary activity in the early hours of the morning (shown in blue in the following graphic), with most burglary activity occurring during the daytime and early evening. There is no particular weekend pattern.
Burglary repeat victimization

Running the near-repeat calculator on 3,478 burglary incidents identified a significant repeat victimization pattern; however, it also identified a significant near-repeat pattern up to 400ft and 3 days of the initial burglary incident. The chance of another burglary in this space-time vicinity is 51% greater than if there were no near-repeat pattern. The pattern is also significant for up to 400ft and 7 days. This finding suggests that there is a value in making homeowners and renters in the same block as a new burglary aware that there is an increased risk to their home over the next week or so. Preventing this near repeat victimization could help reduce the burglary problem in the city.

Since there was a statistically significant repeat victimization pattern detected up to 14 days after the initial incident, a list of addresses that experienced more than ten burglaries between 2010 and 2014 was generated (this list excludes addresses that end in “99”). For this report only the block is shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Address block</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>700 W 34TH ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>800 W 4TH ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>300 S HARRISON ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>500 W 14TH ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>500 S WALNUT ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>300 N WALNUT ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>500 N KING ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAD DATA ANALYSIS

The maps and charts that follow show that crime and disorder calls for service are highly concentrated into a few small hotspot areas, and that the time period for these incidents is in the late afternoon and early evening. The areas immediately around the intersections at Clayton and 4th Street, and 4th Street and North Adams Street, are particularly prevalent in the CAD data. The drug incident map highlights a completely different location - Jensen Drive. This differs significantly from the drug crime map earlier in this report, and is likely explained by a couple of factors related to particular conditions in that area that are less prevalent in 2015.

Analysis notes
Wilmington CAD data for 2010 to 2014 (inclusive) were provided by the IT manager at Wilmington PD, Mr. John Martin. In total there were 528,073 records, though it was noted that 12,655 did not have an incident number assigned by the Wilmington PD system. These represented 2.40% of the data set. Removing them left 515,418 CAD incidents for analysis. Of these, 20,938 (4.06%) did not have latitude or longitude in the GRS 1980 (spheroid) geographical location format. This gives us a geocoding hit rate of approximately 96% from the records with an incident number, and 93.6% of all records.

In the analysis that follows we show maps comprising the geocoded CAD records that fall in the City of Wilmington (489,019), and present analysis of temporal charts using the full data set (515,418). Crime and call hotspots are indicated with a kernel density estimation technique applied using the ERSI ArcGIS program. For convenience, we use the default analytical parameters to generate the kernel density estimation. We generate information for calls for service related to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Example call descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Assault, burglary, homicide, robbery, shooting, shoplifting, and theft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder</td>
<td>Drunkenness, fights, criminal mischief, noise violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life</td>
<td>Prostitution, solicitation, truancy, loitering, and harassment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td>Accidents, DUI, moving and parking violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Possession, distribution, manufacturing, and trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community maintenance</td>
<td>Fires, alarms, missing persons, recovered vehicles, and lost property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>Suspicious persons, fugitives, suspicious vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical assistance</td>
<td>Causalities, overdoses, suicides, medical transportation requests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crime

The crime category consists of calls for service related to crimes, including assault, burglary, homicide, rape, robbery, shooting, shoplifting, and theft. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with a concise and substantial hotspot centered on the intersections of W 4th Street and N Adams Street.

Over the last five years, the number of crime-related CAD calls has been gently decreasing, though this decrease is masked by significant seasonality. Crime-related CAD calls can be seen to have a significant rise during the summer months.
The temporal pattern of incidents is also determined by time of day. Looking across five years of data, we can see that the early morning hours see little activity; however, CAD incidents related to crime peak in the hours immediately around school closing.

**Disorder**

The disorder category consists of calls for service related to disorder, including drunkenness, fights, criminal mischief, noise violations, and persons with a weapon. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with the largest hotspot centered on the intersections of Clayton Street and 4th Street.
Over the last five years, the number of disorder-related CAD calls has been gently decreasing, though this decrease is masked by significant seasonality. Disorder-related CAD calls can be seen to have a significant rise during the summer months.

The temporal pattern of disorder incidents is also determined by time of day. Looking across five years of data, we can see that the early morning hours see little activity; however, CAD incidents related to disorder gradually increase during the afternoon then peak between 9 PM and 11 PM.
Quality of life

The quality of life category consists of calls for service related to quality of life, including prostitution, solicitation, truancy, loitering, and harassment. There are a number of moderate hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with an acute hotspot centered on the intersection of Clayton Street and 4th Street.
Over the last five years, the number of quality of life-related CAD calls has been gently decreasing, though this decrease is masked by significant seasonality. Similar to crime and disorder CAD calls, quality of life-related CAD calls can be seen to have a significant rise during the summer months.

**Quality of life CAD calls, monthly, 2010-2014**

The temporal pattern of quality of life incidents is also determined by time of day. Looking across five years of data, we can see that the early morning hours see little activity; however, CAD incidents related to quality of life gradually increase during the afternoon then peak between 6 PM and 9 PM.

**Quality of life CAD calls, hourly, 2010-2014**

**Traffic**

The traffic category consists of calls for service related to traffic, including accidents, driving under the influence, traffic violations and parking violations. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with a concise hotspot centered on the intersection of Lancaster Avenue and S Jackson Street. There is also a hot line running along 4th Street between Lincoln Street and Washington Street.
Over the last five years, the number of traffic-related CAD calls has been declining. Unlike the seasonality witnessed in crime, disorder, and quality of life CAD incidents, traffic CAD calls do not follow seasonal trends.

Excluding the early morning hours, the temporal pattern of traffic incidents is spread fairly evenly throughout the day. Traffic CAD calls spike during the morning rush and peak as people are returning home from work.
Drugs

The drugs category consists of calls for service related to drugs, including possession, distribution, manufacturing, and trafficking. There are three primary hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD drug-related incidents over five years, with a concise hotspot centered on Jensen Drive. We have been told that the drug problem in this area around the Riverside housing project has been slowly declining over the last five years. The recent closing of the Mother Club of the Thunder Guards Motor Cycle Club is likely not reflected in this data so some caution in the interpretation of this map is advised. Please also note that there is a difference between this map and the drug-related crime data from the LEISS data set.
Over the last five years, the number of drug-related CAD calls has been declining, especially after mid-year 2011. Similar to other CAD calls, drug-related CAD calls increase during the summer months.

**Drug CAD calls, monthly, 2010-2014**

The temporal pattern of drug incidents is also determined by time of day. Looking across five years of data, we can see that the early morning hours see little activity; however, CAD incidents related to drugs peak in the hours immediately around school closing.
Community maintenance

The community maintenance category consists of calls for service related to community maintenance, including fires, alarms, missing persons, recovered vehicles, and lost property. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with the two largest hotspots centered on the intersections of N Market Street and W 7th Street and also around Washington Street and W 6th Street.

Over the last five years, the number of community maintenance-related CAD calls has been gently decreasing. There is modest seasonality, although it is not as significant as other types of CAD calls.
Community maintenance-related CAD calls can be seen to have a slight rise during the summer months, with a spike in July each year.

**Community maintenance CAD calls, monthly, 2010-2014**

The temporal pattern of community maintenance incidents remains rather static throughout the day. There is a lower amount of community maintenance CAD calls in the early morning hours; however, beginning at 8 AM the number of community maintenance CAD calls remain relatively steady throughout the rest of the day.

**Community maintenance CAD calls, hourly, 2010-2014**

**Investigations**

The investigations category consists of calls for service related to investigations, including suspicious persons, suspicious vehicles, and known fugitives. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen
in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with the largest hotspot centered on the intersection of Clayton Street and 4th Street.

**All investigation incidents, 2010-2014**

Over the last five years, the number of investigation-related CAD calls fluctuate. Beginning in 2012 and lasting through 2013, the number of investigation-related CAD calls decline; however, there is a significant increase in investigation-related CAD calls in 2014. In general, investigation-related CAD calls increase during the summer months; however, this trend is not visible in 2014. This is due to a large increase in investigation CAD calls during the winter season of 2013-2014.

**Investigation CAD calls, monthly, 2010-2014**
Excluding the early morning hours, the temporal pattern of investigation-related CAD calls is spread fairly evenly throughout the day. Investigation CAD calls peak during the late morning hours, then hold steady during the afternoon and evening.

**Investigation CAD calls, hourly, 2010-2014**

**Medical**

The medical category consists of calls for service related to medical care, including casualties, overdoses, suicides, and medical transport cases. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with two hotspots located near the intersection of 4th Street and Walnut Street. Note that the map excludes the hospital and correctional institution, as these locations would otherwise dominate the display.
From January 2010 through February 2014, there was a slight decline in the number of medical-related CAD calls. Starting in March 2014 and continuing through December 2014, there has been an increase in the number of medical-related CAD calls to the police.

**Medical CAD calls, monthly, 2010-2014**

Similar to the other CAD call temporal patterns, there are fewer medical CAD calls in the early morning hours. However, the difference between early morning medical CAD calls and “traditional” hours are not as extreme as the other CAD call categories. Beginning at 9 AM and lasting until 11PM there is a steady number of medical-related CAD calls.
Medical CAD calls, hourly, 2010-2014
TIME PER CALL TYPE

We calculated the time spent on each call by subtracting the call creation time from the call completed time, where available from the CAD records. Because of possible outliers that might skew the data analysis (such as some calls closed immediately for administrative reasons or other calls that are not closed out for days), we examine the data using a trimmed mean. For example, a 5% trimmed mean ignores the lowest 5% and the highest 5% of calls in each category, and calculates the mean for the middle 90%.

In the tables below, we show the analysis based on data from five years (2010-2014), with a 5 percent trimmed mean. Call trimmed means over 100 minutes are rounded to down to their integer value. Calls are shown with their exact call type as shown in the CAD log.

Top ten calls by the number of calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call type</th>
<th>Number of calls</th>
<th>Mean time on call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TS (traffic stop)</td>
<td>73139</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dis Group</td>
<td>33357</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dis per</td>
<td>27381</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (pedestrian stop)</td>
<td>24608</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarm Burg</td>
<td>18565</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>14969</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>14671</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Unk</td>
<td>13059</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW (park and walk)</td>
<td>12826</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking Violatio</td>
<td>10935</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top ten calls by the time on the call

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call type</th>
<th>Number of calls</th>
<th>Mean time on call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon other</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH (chase)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Inv</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resisting Arr</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabbing</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Offns</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When we examine where officers spend their on-call time – based on calls from the public\(^1\) - we can see that many of the crime hotspots identified earlier in this report are locations where officers spend a great deal of their on-call time. The map below shows all 2014 CAD calls that predominantly were initiated by the public weighted by the amount of time on the call.

\(^1\) This therefore excludes all calls predominantly initiated by the police department ("ctype" = 'CH' OR "ctype" = 'Conf Investigation' OR "ctype" = 'Custody' OR "ctype" = 'PS' OR "ctype" = 'PW' OR "ctype" = 'Resisting Arr' OR "ctype" = 'Traffic Violation' OR "ctype" = 'TS' OR "ctype" = 'Warrant service')
### Where officers spend time on public calls for service

![Map showing call frequency](image)

### All calls in alphabetical order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call type</th>
<th>Number of calls</th>
<th>Mean time on call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>911D Cellular</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>911D Land Line</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>19.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abandoned</td>
<td>2811</td>
<td>18.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abuse/Neglect</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acc Depart</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>142</td>
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<td>Acc HR PD</td>
<td>7027</td>
<td>87.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acc HR PI</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acc PD</td>
<td>10088</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acc PI</td>
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<td>Acc Unk</td>
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<td>Alarm Bank</td>
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<td>Alarm Burg</td>
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<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Alarm Fire</td>
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<td>29.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alarm Holdup</td>
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<td>Alarm Panic</td>
<td>1928</td>
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<td>Alarm Veh</td>
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<td>Amb Assist</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Animal</td>
<td>4114</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Assault</td>
<td>8578</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Assault w/ Wpn</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist DFS Emerg</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>98.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asst other Agcy</td>
<td>3095</td>
<td>45.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B of P</td>
<td>4302</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bomb threat</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>7479</td>
<td>95.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>CH</td>
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<td>207</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
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<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carjacking</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>141</td>
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<td>Casualty</td>
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<td>48.4</td>
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<td>Chem Haz Mat</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Child Locked</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Off</td>
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<td>105</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Matter</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>46.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comm Serv</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conf Investigati</td>
<td>1239</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
<td>Court viol</td>
<td>1841</td>
<td>99.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crim impers</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>83.2</td>
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<td>Crim misch</td>
<td>7960</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custody</td>
<td>1309</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>167.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUI</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>85.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Inv</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diff Breathing</td>
<td>7168</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dis Group</td>
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## Notes

### Acknowledgements

We would like to recognize and thank the following people for assistance with data provision, data explanations, and some interpretation of the resultant analysis. Any errors of data interpretation remain that of the authors (with the caveats explained in the title page).

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- Lynn Gedney, DELJIS
- Lt. William D. Crotty, DIAC, Delaware State Police
- John Martin, IT, Wilmington Police Department
- Doug Iardella, Public Safety Liaison for the City of Wilmington
- John Skinner, VPN lead for Wilmington, BJA

### Harm weighting

The harm weighting was achieved by applying the median recommended sentence in months from the Offense Gravity Score, as determined by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. Example indications of their relative offense gravity are shown in the table below. More details of how this technique is applied is available from report authors Jerry Ratcliffe and Amber Perenzin.

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<td>Veh stolen</td>
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<td>Warrant service</td>
<td>Comm. maintenance</td>
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<td>Weapon other</td>
<td>Investigations</td>
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<td>Welfare check</td>
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**Cover photo**

The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

A Review of Operational and Monetary Resources
Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission:
Review of Resources

Introduction

Delaware House Joint Resolution No. 2 authorizes the Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission ("the Commission") to consider "A review of existing operational and monetary resources provided by state, county, and federal agencies, with a view toward ensuring such resources are sufficient, well-coordinated, and effective."

This report provides a review of the Wilmington Police Department’s (WPD) Budget for Fiscal Years 2013 to 2015 and resource allocation, certain funding resources (e.g. grants), and a discussion of federal, state, and county operational resources (e.g., task forces, supplemental patrols, etc.) that were able to be identified within the assessment period.

The review of monetary resources primarily focuses on existing operational/financial resources within the Department’s budget that supports police officer staffing.

The review of operational resources provided by federal, state, and county agencies is primarily focused on priority services such as supplemental patrols/enforcement and other resources that support the public safety process. As with all municipalities within the State of Delaware, Wilmington is heavily dependent on state and county services in areas such as education and social services, for example. While these services and resources are undoubtedly linked to community well being, and ultimately to safety, this review was limited to those resources that directly contribute to primary police operations.

Methodology

Interviews were conducted with the City Council, members of the City Finance Department, and WPD’s Human Resource Division. Data was also requested and obtained from the Delaware Criminal Justice Council. Documents produced as a result of these interviews and requests were reviewed and analyzed in order to complete this analysis. The assessment of operational resources contributed by federal, state, and county agencies was conducted through interviews with dozens of members of WPD, other city, county, and state agencies and with selected federal officials and agencies. Additional information was gleaned from Vigilant Resources Inc.’s (VRI’s) in-depth interviews with WPD officers and officials and from materials associated with the Bureau of Justice Assistance Violence Reduction Network initiative (VRN)\

1The VRN, funded by the Department of Justice, is a national comprehensive approach to reduce violent crime in communities. VRN provides intensive training and technical assistance for anti-violence strategies to combat violent crime.
Limitations
The most significant limitation encountered in this analysis was time. In order to assess resource gaps, key resource and/or operational needs need to be identified first, allowing the team to then assess whether resources are available. Due to the limited time to complete the assessment (approximately 50 calendar days), we were able to identify only the most obvious resource and operational needs, such as staffing, technology, and crime analysis, but were not able to perform the depth of analysis preferred, in order to identify where the resources to address these needs could or should come from. Similarly, while we obtained a list of current grants from the WPD and learned about federal and state contributions to the City’s efforts through interviews, document reviews, and news article reviews, it is much more time consuming; and therefore difficult, in a short period of time, to identify possible funding sources and operational assistance that the WPD could leverage but may not be taking advantage of. Despite these limitations, we believe the analysis provided will be useful in assessing resource challenges and opportunities at a high level.

Personnel Budget
The WPD’s actual budget for the years 2013 to 2015 on average, comprises 37.8% of the City’s total budget. The Department has an authorized strength of 320 sworn (289 actual sworn) and 62 non-sworn positions. Table 1 presents the City and WPD budget for fiscal years 2013 to 2015. The Department’s overall $56.6 million Fiscal 2014 budget reflected a $2.5 million, or 4.6 percent increase when compared to its Fiscal 2013 total budget. However, the planned Fiscal 2015 WPD budget allocation of $54.2 million represents a 4.3 percent decrease as compared to the Fiscal 2014 amount, leaving the Fiscal 2015 budget at essentially the same level as it was in Fiscal 2013 and reducing the Department’s budget as a percent of the City’s overall budget by 3% from what it was in Fiscal 2014. However, as overtime funding is added to the WPD’s budget during the course of Fiscal 2015, it is possible that actual Fiscal 2015 spending will, by the conclusion of the fiscal year, increase these figures as it likely has in prior years as well. Thus, the figures below are starting point budgets and do not represent actual spending by the conclusion of the fiscal year.

In summary, according to the information we received, and not considering overtime funding that may have been or may be provided during the year, the WPD’s budget was reduced in Fiscal 2015, while the City’s overall budget increased. The Fiscal 2013 to 2015 budgets support an authorized strength of 382 full-time equivalent staff personnel.

2Source: General Ledger Reports-111 Report Provided by City Council Staff (via email 3/25/15)
### Table 1. Wilmington City and Police Department Budget FY2013-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2013 (Actual)</th>
<th>FY2014 (Actual)</th>
<th>FY 2015 (Approved budget)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Budget</td>
<td>$144,003,729.00</td>
<td>$146,026,679.00</td>
<td>$150,039,645.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPD Budget</td>
<td>$54,146,646.00</td>
<td>$56,657,818.00</td>
<td>$54,220,953.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPD Budget % of City Budget</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Budget figures represent actual budgets and do not factor in any budget amendments made during the course of the year.

Using the Benchmark City Survey for 2013 (administered by the Overland Park, Kansas Police Department\(^3\)), the average police department budget represented 29% of the City Budget for the 30 agencies across the U.S. participating in the benchmarking survey. This provides somewhat useful point of comparison for the City of Wilmington’s expenditures on police services.

**Police Overtime**

Among the most critical issues related to the staffing budget in the WPD are the officer attrition and vacancy rates, and their subsequent impact on the Department’s overtime budget.

Vacancy rates and attrition have had an adverse impact on the WPD and its deployment of resources. With an attrition rate of almost 1 officer per month\(^4\), the WPD is not able to maintain their authorized strength numbers. Also impacting staffing at the WPD the lack of a general Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) for city employees and operating without a renewed labor contract since 2010. Understaffing (i.e., operating below the authorized level as a result of lagged hiring) is a persistent problem for the Department, which is made worse by attrition. Vacancies, attrition and other internal issues likely encourage officers to look elsewhere for employment, in addition to economic issues, i.e., officers choosing to separate from the department (either prior to or at retirement eligibility) to seek more lucrative job opportunities.

The Police Foundation (with support from the Delaware Criminal Justice Council) was able to collect data from regional law enforcement agencies to better understand hiring and compensation in the immediate Wilmington regions. We

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\(^3\) More about the Benchmark City Survey can be found at ([www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/](http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/))

\(^4\) According to WPD personnel
examined salary scales from neighboring departments that would potentially attract WPD officers interested in lateral opportunities and within a reasonable commuting distance from the City of Wilmington (generally considered 30 miles). Our examination yielded that the WPD starting salary is $42,000, ranking in the top five of lowest paying agencies among regional competitors and below the starting salaries of 12 other agencies contacted, including New Castle County and the Delaware State Police. In addition, both of the latter agencies offer the benefit of take home cars, whereas WPD does not. (See: “Attachment: Agencies in the Region – Quick Facts”). The issue of ‘under compensation’ can generally be extrapolated beyond entry-level recruits and patrol officers to other ranks within the Department, creating and exacerbating conditions favorable to lateral moves, as well as having a significant negative impact on recruiting new officers to the WPD.

In light of the vacancy rates and the WPD’s projected attrition, the Fiscal 2015 budget includes funding for a WPD academy class of 30 recruits at a reported cost of $325,000 to support the goal of reaching the WPD authorized strength level of 320.

The current police strength of 289 officers, coupled with other factors such as paid time off (e.g., sick, annual leave), deployment approach and other factors has forced the Department to use overtime in order to maintain staffing levels across tours and to conduct any “surge” type efforts, such as Operation Disrupt. When paid overtime, officers receive 1.5 times their normal pay, plus an 11 percent shift differential for overtime. These overtime assignments are primarily funded from the General Fund of the police budget, although our analysis revealed that a substantial amount of overtime is also paid from federal and state grants. It is unclear to us if the grant-funded overtime is included in the City’s figures on overtime spending, but we suspect it is not including and therefore overtime spending is substantially higher than the City’s figures reflect.

Based on our review of the Fiscal 2013 to 2015 budgets, WPD seems to consistently underestimate its annual overtime budget needs. The approved overtime allocations have increased in the last three years. Table 2 shows the difference between actual overtime spending and the approved overtime budget between FY 2013 and FY 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015 (To Date)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approved OT Budget</strong></td>
<td>$1,639,800</td>
<td>$1,657,200</td>
<td>$1,876,813</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Actual OT Cost</strong></td>
<td>$2,086,390</td>
<td>$2,910,054</td>
<td>$2,629,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dollar Increase</strong></td>
<td>$446,590</td>
<td>$1,252,854</td>
<td>$753,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Change (+/-)</strong></td>
<td>+ 27.2</td>
<td>+75.6</td>
<td>+40.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Overtime figures above does not reflect Special Events OT and Court OT; FY 2015 Actual as of 3/24/15.
Actual overtime totaled $2.9 million in Fiscal 2014 and, as of March 25, 2015, the actual amount of overtime has reached $2.6 million at a little over the halfway mark of the fiscal year. The significant increase in the Fiscal 2015 actual overtime expenditures are attributed to "Operation Disrupt", a three-phased public safety initiative targeting the recent violence in the City of Wilmington and was announced by the Mayor on January 26, 2015. This initiative includes a partnership with the WPD, New Castle County Police Department, and other law enforcement agencies that are focusing on gun violence and other major crimes.

To provide a better interpretation of the impact of the costs of overtime, we examined the FY 2015 costs (approved and actual) of overtime to determine how many additional officers could be added to increase the sworn strength of the Department if those costs were converted to represent new hires. Using a starting salary of $65,000 (including benefits) for a patrol officer, the conversion of the approved FY 2015 overtime budget would result in the hiring of 28 new patrol officers to the WPD. Even more striking, the conversion of actual overtime costs in FY 2015 (as of 3/25/2015) would result in an additional 40 new patrol officers. The conversion could also compensate for many of the recommendations provided to the Commission or building a state of the art crime analysis capability, improved victim services, or investments in community services.

**Findings and Recommendations**

In general, overtime, within limits, is an unavoidable cost of policing. As such, overtime costs cannot be eliminated altogether, regardless of the number of officers that are employed, because of shift extensions, court appearances, special and unpredicted events, meetings/trainings, and contract requirements. However, concerns about overtime usage should be addressed with managerial efforts focusing on controlling overtime. The National Institute of Justice published a Research in Brief in 1998 called "Police Overtime: An Examination of Key Issues." While written more than 15 years ago, the Report’s discussion of management’s role in overseeing overtime is still quite relevant and worthy of examination by WPD leadership and managers.

The Department’s history of using overtime in order to maintain minimum patrol staffing levels indicates significant deployment or staffing issues, as well as lack of overtime monitoring by supervisors. In Fiscal 2014, the WPD’s overtime costs were approximately 5.1% of the WPD’s personnel budget. Referring again to the Benchmark City Survey for 2013, the average overtime cost of the 30 agencies who responded, overtime represents 3.5% of their Departmental personnel budgets. Our analysis of overtime expenditures indicates that over a 2-year period (FY 2013-2014) the Department’s overtime expenditures grew substantially, with the highest percentage growth between the approved budget and actual expenditures occurring in FY 2014. Given the amount of actual overtime expended so far in FY 2015, overtime spending will continue to be a significant issue and resource strain for the WPD.
Knowing where, when, and under what circumstances overtime was incurred is essential for police managers to justify its payment, and perhaps more important, to find ways to reduce the need for overtime expenditures. Supervision of overtime is the first-line defense against overtime abuses. However, based on our interviews with WPD personnel, there seems to be a lack of urgency with respect to managing overtime. Paying officer overtime is viewed as a routine solution to real or perceived personnel shortages. In most police departments, first-line supervisors (e.g., sergeants) formally approve or restrict the use of overtime. Our review revealed that currently within the WPD, lieutenants are tasked with approving overtime—oftentimes without knowledge of whether the overtime is justified for a particular officer because these lieutenants are not involved in enforcement supervision in the field. More importantly, we were advised that supervisors are not provided with adequate recordkeeping and analysis of overtime usage—a key tool that could be used to monitor overtime worked by officers. Factual information about overtime is required by supervisors to assist in controlling the usage of overtime.

Because overtime represents police work performed at premium rates (i.e., time and a half plus shift differential), the Department should conduct a thorough analysis of overtime expenditures to ensure that overtime is being used effectively, efficiently, and responsibly. The analysis should be conducted in a way that assesses both individual officer use and unit use, as a means to identify patterns of overtime spending. For example, large, undetected overtime earnings by individuals or units may indicate supervision deficiencies, including potential overtime abuses.

**External Funding Resources**
The WPD has a full-time sworn officer charged with seeking out grants. According to the WPD, the Department’s grants manager routinely seeks and receives grant funding, including state and federal funds, for the purpose of aiding the Department’s efforts in targeting crime problems, the purchase of equipment and supporting training for personnel. Additionally, the Department receives funds for specialized programs that can be used for overtime via state (Criminal Justice Council and State of Delaware) and federal grants and task forces such as the FBI Safe Streets Task Force Program.

For our review, we were provided with a list of active or still available grants that the Department received from state and federal funding sources (regardless of year awarded). Our assessment found that most of the resources sought were used for the procurement of equipment or to pay for additional overtime, as opposed to funding efforts that would increase the capacity of the Department over the longer term and improve policing strategies. Significant amounts were available through these grants, some of which are awarded annually to the City. The allowable uses of these grants, based on limited information available, including hiring, overtime, training, equipment, technology, flexible use, body armor, enforcement support (OT) and school safety (SRO) funding. Based on our review, and the information we were
provided, we identified more than $5 million in available state and federal funds from grants awarded mainly in prior years, including more than $2 million for technology-related purposes and nearly $1.8 million in broad purpose funding. This does not include all grants received, only those grants that remain active, according to the data we were provided. This also does not include reimbursement funding from federal agencies for overtime worked on federal task forces and investigations.

We also learned that the Wilmington Police Department is poised to receive additional federal resources through funding applications currently under consideration at the U.S. Department of Justice. These federal funding programs, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and the Smart Policing Initiative, appear to be strategically aligned with the needs of the WPD and will hopefully provide resources that will allow it to significantly enhance its technology and crime analysis capabilities in support of a renewed community policing emphasis, and put officers back into the communities where they are most needed, and in ways designed to reestablish community trust. It is encouraging to see thoughtful proposals being jointly developed with the research community, focused on capacity building within the Department and on building community trust through a research-based approach. In addition to these proposals, the City is eligible to receive additional funding in the late summer/fall of FY 2015 through the following annual Department of Justice programs:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Amount of Eligibility</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJA’s Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) Program</td>
<td>$20,379.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJA’s Justice Assistance Grants Program (JAG)</td>
<td>$234,000 (est.)</td>
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**Findings and Recommendations**

The Department has been successful in obtaining state and federal funds to support the acquisition of equipment, training, and support personnel associated with specific enforcement programs, particularly those involving overtime. However, the Department does not appear to seek or receive strategic grant opportunities that would enable it to enhance its crime analysis capabilities and community policing activities or to enhance police-community strategies. Further, the WPD does not appear to actively engage in soliciting non-government (e.g., area corporations, businesses, and private foundations) sources of funding and other support as may or may not be legally permitted. The City of Wilmington is referred to as “The Corporate Capital of the World”, and as such there are opportunities for the Department to develop and build relationships with major area corporations and the local business community, and to seek their help to improve public safety. These major corporations, local businesses, and charitable foundations can provide resources for the WPD with respect to staffing for enforcement programs, training and education of officers, as well as the purchase of technology and equipment. Collaborative efforts that can leverage, for example, the analytic expertise and capabilities of the banking and finance community should also be pursued and at least one representative of these communities indicated during an interview that
this type of approach was certainly possible. Another possibility is the tremendous marketing and public relations capabilities of businesses and other organizations, which one noted could be leveraged to develop a communications strategy for the WPD to better engage the community and share positive stories of the contributions made by the rank and file on a daily basis. The WPD should develop a strategic plan that incorporates obtaining corporate and local business sources for funding and other types of in-kind support to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its public safety efforts. According to the City of Wilmington’s charter and code—Section 8-204 – Acceptance of gifts or donations:

Every department, board and commission may accept on the behalf of the City unconditional gifts or donations of money, securities or other personal property which, or the income from which, shall be useful in connection with the work of the work of such department, board or commission. A department, board or commission shall not accept any gift of real estate or any interest in real estate or conditional gifts of money or personal property without specific authority from the council to do so.

Funding programs such as Byrne JAG funds are flexible annual awards that can be used over a period as long as five years, it is important to leverage these funds and others for the most strategic purposes. Although JAG funds have been used by Wilmington Police Department for a variety of uses, like equipment, training, body armor, and overtime, they can be used more strategically. For example, the JAG program funds could be used to hire additional crime analysts or community policing officers that could be sustained under this grant program for at 36 to 60 months. This would allow the agency the opportunity to hire officers or civilians regularly, to fill the vacancies created by attrition, or to secure an increase in authorized strength. In situations where attrition has been shown to be predictably consistent, such anticipatory hiring is quite possible. This approach is more strategic than relying on a 12 or 18-month grant to hire an analyst or officer, due to the requirement to sustain the position. Similarly, for example, it is not recommended to use JAG funding for purposes which another program exclusively addresses, such as the Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) Program, which provides funding only for body armor. Unless BVP’s funding level cannot sufficiently provide the number of vests required in a given year, the most strategic decision for any agency eligible to receive any significant BVP funding is to rely on BVP as the primary outside funding source for armor or to at least make that the primary funding source. WPD participates in the Equitable Sharing Program administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, which is often less predictable and therefore creates a better opportunity for purchasing those things that do not require sustainability, such as equipment, training, and overtime. Discretionary grants with a strategic focus, such as Smart Policing, Project Safe Neighborhoods, COPS Community Policing Development grants or state funds to address crime reduction offer the best opportunity for an infusion of funding to support the development and implementation of a new approach or strategy. All of these grants represent a shorter project timeline, and often encourage a partnership with a local research
partner make these funds ideal for developing new policing strategies that are grounded by best practices and or evidence.

**Operational Resources from Federal, State, and County Agencies**

The Wilmington Police Department enjoys strong support from the New Castle County law enforcement neighbors and from the Delaware State Police through a variety of means, some of which are described below. Although not a new phenomenon, federal law enforcement agency support is present in the area and has substantially increased, particularly since Wilmington was designated as a participant in the Violence Reduction Network (VRN).

The New Castle County Police Department (NCCPD) currently provides support to the Wilmington Police through its supplemental Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) patrols that take place in Wilmington one day each week. NCCPD also participates in each Wilmington Police Department ‘Targeted, Analytical Policing System’ (T.A.P.S.) meeting which is designed to provide situational awareness and accountability for crime occurrences in the City. Through these meetings and the ongoing operational coordination efforts, information and intelligence is shared between the two agencies, which also work together on many of the regional task forces noted previously.

The Delaware State Police (DSP) also provides support to the Wilmington Police Department through participation in the T.A.P.S. meetings and the provision of general support through the Delaware Intelligence and Analysis Center (DIAC), the state’s criminal intelligence fusion center. These tactics and approaches are described in more detail in VRI’s report on police strategies.

Other state agencies, including the State Attorney General’s Office for example, are providing exemplary support to the Wilmington Police Department and to Wilmington communities directly. Through innovative approaches, such as the Crime Strategies Unit (clearly a best practice among American prosecutors), the Attorney General’s Office is providing enforcement, investigative, and even community engagement and problem-solving services and makes available criminal intelligence and information sharing, as well as engages in crime analysis discussions. Within the last few weeks, the WPD has begun participating in regular meetings with prosecutors to discuss open homicide cases and to plan investigative approaches, which is seen as an excellent step forward.

Similarly, state probation agencies often have unique information and abilities that can be used to prevent, deter, and solve crimes. For example, the High Point (NC) Police Department implemented a collaborative approach between probation agencies and community stakeholders to reduce group related violent gun crimes.

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Crime analysis is used to map the location of offenses (e.g., Part 1 Crimes) to identify patterns or “hot spots” of activity. Police and probation officers review the data to identify known violent groups, areas of operations (“turf”), and individuals (i.e., been arrested for a violent crime, which group they are a member of, and the probation status of members within those groups) in those “hot spot” locations. Based on the review process, officers were deployed to the “hot spot” location to conduct probation checks and violations, and serve outstanding warrants as deterrence to acts of violence in that location. While the probation agencies participate in the WPD T.A.P.S. meetings, we observed that the level of collaboration and engagement in enforcement, problem solving, and information and intelligence sharing could be significantly improved between law enforcement and probation.

Federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, DEA, ATF, and U.S. Marshals’ Service are all active in the City of Wilmington. At a recent hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations, FBI Director Comey reported that the FBI has as many as 22 agents assigned to the Wilmington area. The DEA Administrator reported it is also supporting the VRN through its resources and the ATF has assigned additional agents to assist with homicide investigations and will focus its innovative ballistics technology and intelligence gathering on weapons traffickers and trigger-pullers. ATF is also providing WPD with a NIBIN Matchpoint machine to provide more rapid NIBIN results. In addition to these efforts, the Office of National Drug Control Policy recently authorized the creation of a new High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) focusing on Wilmington and the region, as a regional extension of the Philadelphia-Camden HIDTA. All combined, this represents a rare leveraging of support from the federal level. However, just as the assessment was initiated, we learned that the Wilmington Police Department had pulled back nearly all Wilmington officers assigned to these federal task forces. While we understand that this decision was made in response to the number of shootings that took place in January of 2015, and in an effort to increase police presence on the streets through a Departmental operation called “Operation Disrupt,” the decision is not sustainable for a variety of reasons. Intensive operations such as this have impacts on officers, potential negative impact on the community, and “opportunity costs” (e.g., pulling WPD officers from federal task forces) are all reasons this approach is not sustainable.

**Findings and Recommendations**
The Wilmington Police Department is fortunate to have some of the most capable and willing law enforcement and criminal justice partners in the region. The available resources are certainly sufficient, but at this point are not well coordinated and therefore are not as effective as they could be. We note that within the last two weeks, the WPD has initiated meetings with the state prosecutors office to discuss open cases. While it is remarkable to think that such coordination had not been

*Overview of the Model, University of North Carolina Greensboro: Center for Youth, Family and Community Partnerships.*
taking place, we applaud the WPD for establishing the collaboration. It appears, as was remarked during our interviews, that the Wilmington Police Department is in “response mode,” as a fire department responds to put out fires. It is essential that the City and the Department not only re-commit to true coordination and collaboration with these partners, but to also include them in developing comprehensive and strategically focused initiatives to address violent crime in the City. The WPD’s inclusion of these partners can serve to leverage the monetary and operational resources needed to address crime problems in the City. Fortunately, the Violence Reduction Network (VRN) provides the City with just such an opportunity and framework.

**Identification of Resource Gaps**

Although there was insufficient time to comprehensively assess the resources, expenses, and needs of the Wilmington Police Department, both VRI and the Police Foundation identified potential priority funding needs in order to improve public safety:

1. Crime analysis and technology capacity is sorely lacking within the Department, diminishing the Department’s ability to analyze crime and crime patterns effectively, resulting in missed opportunities to prevent and respond to crimes. In addition to adding at least one additional crime analyst, the WPD requires improved systems, substantial training, and technical assistance (e.g., advances in using GIS for crime analysis, the necessary hardware and software to conduct this analysis, more advanced statistical training, enhanced data interpretation skills). In addition to the recommendation regarding partnering with the business community to enhance WPD’s analytic capacity, a partnership with a local university to support the analysis and problem solving process should be explored. While the pending Smart Policing proposal, if funded by BJA, will start to address this need, additional resources and expertise are well advised. The funding for the Smart Policing Initiative will require the WPD to work collaboratively with a research partner and demonstrate that WPD has the ability to collect data, and incorporate meaningful performance measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts.

2. Investigative tools, such as a limited number of license plate readers deployed in and around key crime hotspots to address drug markets, burglaries, auto theft, and other violent and property crimes, are needed. These devices can connect vehicles and persons to crime scenes and can assist in identifying regional criminal activity in support of longer-term investigations. Contrary to body cameras, these devices do not typically generate substantial cost for data storage or records requests, although the privacy considerations must not be overlooked and should be addressed before procuring the technology. Funding for these resources may be available from HIDTA and from the Department of Transportation’s Highway Safety Program.

3. While some in the community have encouraged the WPD to deploy body cameras on officers for improved accountability, our view is that a full deployment would
place additional resource strain on the WPD. It should be noted that the WPD only has 15 body cameras on hand, far less than the amount that would be required for a full deployment. Deploying the 15 they have is insufficient to cover all officers working at one time and would require additional resources even at this level, in order to provide appropriate video retention and to process the likely increase in open records requests for body camera video as has been seen in other places around the country, often requiring hundreds of hours of time consuming privacy reviews and redactions. Some departments have had to hire additional staff just to handle the significant increase in requests for video once launched. There are a small number of dashboard cameras in existence within the WPD and those units are currently deployed. Regardless of cost implications, there is an ongoing effort to develop consistent policies for body camera use across the state and any deployment will need to be considered after that process has been completed.
## ATTACHMENT: Agencies in the Region – Quick Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th># Sworn officers</th>
<th>Population served</th>
<th>Jurisdiction size (sq. mileage)</th>
<th>Violent crime (rate per 100,000)</th>
<th>Residency Requirement</th>
<th>Mandatory retirement age</th>
<th>Starting salary (Post-Academy)</th>
<th>Take home cars for patrol officers</th>
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<tr>
<td>Wilmington P.D.</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>72,630</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1625</td>
<td>First 5yrs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$42,000</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>New Castle County P.D.</td>
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<td>549,684</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>179</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
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<td>678</td>
<td>925,749</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>491.4</td>
<td>Yes (Post-Academy)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>$54,115</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>5,385</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>30yrs of service</td>
<td>$49,326</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Delaware Police</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24,000</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middletown P.D.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19,658</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>244.2</td>
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<td>No</td>
<td>$50,477.44</td>
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<td>Delaware River and Bay P.D.</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Del. Memorial Bridge, 5 airports</td>
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<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$45,948</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Elsmere P.D.</td>
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<td>500</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Newark, Delaware P.D.</td>
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<td>Delaware City P.D.</td>
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<td>No</td>
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<td>Philadelphia P.D.</td>
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<td>135</td>
<td>1099.4</td>
<td>Yes (upon graduation)</td>
<td>No</td>
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<td>Smyrna P.D.</td>
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<td>11,000</td>
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<td>Yes (After 6mos)</td>
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<td>$45,822.40</td>
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<td>Camden P.D.</td>
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<td>2241</td>
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<td>Maryland State</td>
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<td>288.5</td>
<td>Yes (Post-Academy)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>$57,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This information was collected through open source and confirmed by each department’s Human Resources Department, Recruitment Office, or Command.

* Newport PD did not respond
An Examination of Effective Public Safety Strategies In Other Jurisdictions
An Examination of Effective Public Safety Strategies in Other Jurisdictions¹: Recommendations for Evidence-Based and “Best Practice” Policing Strategies and Tactics to the Wilmington Police Department (WPD)

In order to formulate recommendations for the Wilmington Police Department (WPD), we have taken advantage of the research evidence¹, but also include strategies and tactics utilized by other departments.

With this in mind, rather than focus only on other agency programs, we focus more broadly on four areas that align with WPD’s priority needs and have shown substantial impacts, according to the research literature, in addition to being utilized by many law enforcement agencies (in a broad sense) across the country.

The four key areas are:

- hot spot policing;
- problem-oriented policing (POP);
- community engagement/community policing; and
- crime analysis.²

This approach will allow us to present specific recommendations against the backdrop of evidence-based research, while allowing the Wilmington Police Department some flexibility in tailoring their approach.

In addition to outlining the approach, we do provide specific instances of the practice in nearby and/or similarly sized agencies.

Hot Spot Policing:

Sherman and colleagues coined the term “hot spots” (as it applies to criminology) in the late 1980s through their work done on the concentration of calls-for-service (CFS) at specific addresses and intersections in Minneapolis, MN. Since then there have been various ways of defining hot spots of crime, but essentially the ratio has held in what Weisburd (2015) calls the “law of crime concentration.” In multiple cities of various sizes, including international locations, roughly five percent of a jurisdiction’s “micro-places” account for at least 50 percent of the crime.³

The effectiveness of hot spot policing was first (experimentally) tested in Minneapolis (MN) in the early 1990s. By randomly assigning additional patrol to 55 crime hot spots (compared to the 55 “traditional” model of policing hot spots), Sherman and Weisburd (1995) demonstrated the impact additional police presence has on hot spots of crime. This

¹ Whereever possible, attempts were made to identify best practices within the region; however, if there were no best practices known within the region, we erred on the side of inclusion by pointing to best practices in other regions and in larger agencies, particularly given our focus on areas of high-priority need for WPD.
² We realize these areas have some overlap. For example, crime analysis can and should be utilized to inform the other policing strategies, especially hot spot policing.
³ See the Crime Analysis and CAD Incident Analysis, Wilmington, DE (2010-14) for a hot spot analysis of Wilmington (DE)
result has been replicated in over 20 rigorous evaluations (see Braga, et al. (2013)). The National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Police Practices and Policies (2004) concluded that “studies that focused police resources on crime hot spots provide the strongest collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available” (p. 250).

The use of hot spot policing is now widespread. For example, Weisburd et al. (2001) found that more than 70 percent of agencies with more than 100 officers report using crime mapping to identify hot spots. In addition, a 2008 PERF study found that 89 percent of police departments surveyed in 198 jurisdictions used hot spots enforcement as a (violent crime) strategy (Koper 2014). Practitioners have clear research evidence that focusing on high crime places is an efficient use of resources; however, there has been less guidance on what exactly agencies should do in those areas.

*Hot Spot Policing in Practice*

The “standard model” of hot spot policing usually realized through saturation patrols (i.e. inundating a high crime area with additional police presence, usually a specialized hot spot unit like Operation Disrupt). Particular tactics used within hot spot policing can range from the benign/neutral (mere police presence) to tactics that can negatively impact police-community relations, namely indiscriminate stop-and-frisk (see section on Community Engagement). It is safe to say the crime prevention benefits of hot spot policing should not come at the expense of public trust and satisfaction. Often hot spot policing strategies center on various crackdown activities (focused on particular types of crimes or behavior).

Evaluations of hot spot policing generally find support for crime reduction, but these effects are not long lasting, following what Sherman (1990) calls a pattern of initial and residual deterrence, followed by deterrence decay. Essentially, crime goes down while the hot spot policing takes place (initial deterrence); the reductions continue for a time after the extra patrol is removed (residual deterrence); and begins to rise after a time (deterrence decay). The “trick” of hot spot policing (by itself) is to utilize police presence in hot spots in a manner in which maximizes residual deterrence when their presence is removed.

Koper (1995) provided law enforcement with a means of maximizing these returns; however, it is only recently been formally tested. Koper examined the time to “next crime” observed in the Minneapolis Hot Spot study and discovered the optimal length of time patrol should spend in hot spots is between 11 and 15 minutes. Any additional length of time within the hot spots did not produce any additional benefit. This phenomenon has relatively recently been dubbed “The Koper Curve.”

Recently there have been a few studies that have tested the Koper Curve principle in both Sacramento (CA) and Seattle (WA). The Sacramento study (Telep, Mitchell, & Weisburd, 2014)\(^4\) demonstrated a 25 percent decrease in Part I crimes through hot spot policing.

\(^4\)This study is also noteworthy because it was conducted by Sacramento PD with limited involvement from the researchers at the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University in Virginia. The authors suggest that in an era of declining economic resources, police departments can take ownership of science and take control of their own evaluations of evidence-based interventions.
utilizing the Koper Curve, relative to a 27 percent increase in “traditional policing” hot spots. Initial assessments of Seattle have demonstrated crime reduction effects as well. Through data analysis and observation, the Camden County PD has derived their own Koper Curve principle. Their patrol officers are assigned a series of hot spots to cover during their respective shift. If an officer has not investigated a suspicious vehicle or person, or engaged with a member of the public within 14 minutes, he or she is instructed to proceed to the next hot spot.

The Koper Curve principle balanced with the knowledge that hot spots of crime are not “hot” all of the time provides evidence that hot spot policing does not require specialized units. Essentially through deployment, WPD can focus more officers at high crime times in high crime places. Research (and anecdotal) evidence also suggests that crime does not simply “move around the corner.” If anything, there is a diffusion of benefits to the surrounding areas (Braga, et al. 2013). As such, the increased presence of police within hot spots during high crime times produces crime prevention benefits that do not come at the expense of other areas of the jurisdiction.

Because of the ubiquity of hot spot policing as a deployment strategy (in its various forms), it is not productive to highlight particular agencies who have adopted the strategy.

Recommendations:

- **WPD should use crime analysis to determine precise hot locations, the specific nature of crime and times of crime, as well as conditions that may give rise to crime opportunities.** The Attorney General’s Crime Strategies Unit does much of this today to guide problem solving approaches.

- **WPD should utilize standard patrol officers operating under the Koper Curve to maximize police presence in crime hot spots at high crime times, rather than solely relying on specialized units.**

*Limits of Hot Spot policing*

The one noticeable drawback of hot spot policing is crime, once the patrol presence is removed, tends to creep back up (under deterrence decay). Although hot spot policing models are good at focusing efforts in the right place (i.e. hot spots), there is often little guidance on what to do while officers are in the hot spot places. One of the oft cited reasons for deterrence decay is that little is done to change the features of an area, or the behavior within an area, that make a particular hot spot conducive to crime. These factors will vary from place to place (and possible time to time) and require additional analysis and data on what is the crime generators or attractors within these high crime areas. This particular strategy embodies what has been termed Problem-Oriented Policing (see below).

*Problem-Oriented Policing (POP)*

Problem-oriented policing (POP) is an approach to policing in specific criminogenic areas, behavior, and people are analyzed in an effort to understand the issues in order to adopt a
strategy to correct it. POP looks at changes the factors that contribute to crime and extend beyond criminal justice agencies, often engaging community members and other stakeholders who are affected by the problem (Goldstein, 2001).

At its most basic, POP approaches rely on what has been labeled the “crime triangle.” The crime triangle (see below) is a convenient way to articulate how criminal events happen. Essentially a crime results when there is an intersection of a motivated offender, a vulnerable target in an unguarded place. The triangle has been expanded to include the elements necessary to negate criminal behavior in the form of (place) managers, (offender) handlers and (target) guardians. The presence of one or more of these reduces the likelihood of criminal behavior.

With this structure in mind, POP focuses on identifying those factors contributing to crime to come up with integrated solutions. The original method of structured problem solving was developed with Newport News (VA) PD and is called the SARA model. SARA stands for:

- (S)canning – represents identifying the recurring problems in an area and the consequences of those problems;
- (A)nalysist – identifying relevant data available (or data to be collected) and researching what is known about problem and how to address it (often utilizing crime analysis);
- (R)esponse – developing the intervention, outlining the response and developing the logic model for the intervention, culminating in carrying out the intervention, and;

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5 http://www.popcenter.org/learning/pam/help/theory.cfm
• **Assessment**. – Evaluating the POP effort in terms of process (i.e. was it implemented properly) and outcomes. In the absence of an effective intervention, the current operation is open to tweaking to address any identified short comings.

Assessment is an often-overlooked element within POP (and many criminal justice endeavors). Rigorous evaluations are needed in order to demonstrate agency effectiveness and inform other agencies that are experiencing similar issues. Many interventions are assessed in the absence of a “counterfactual” (or what would have happened in the absence of the (POP) efforts. One thing to note about POP, because it takes time to diagnose the problems in the area and engage the appropriate stakeholders, results take longer to appear. In an experimental evaluation conducted by PERF of POP versus hot spot policing in Jacksonville (FL), hot spot policing produced immediate reductions in crime; however, those declines were lost due to deterrence decay. However, POP eventually demonstrated crime reductions that were more long lasting. The **Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office** incorporated the use of POP units as a long-term strategy. Because of the specialized nature of POP efforts, it is most appropriate to highlight POP efforts in nearby and/or similarly sized agencies.  

This list is not exhaustive (see footnote), but represents examples of successful POP efforts.

- **Alexandria (VA)**
  - Moped Registration Project to reduce moped theft.
  - Alcohol Interdiction Program to combat habitual drunkenness.

- **Bridgeport (CT)**
  - Anti-graffiti Initiative that included public education on graffiti, improving abatement referrals, and providing positive alternatives to graffiti offenders.

- **Dayton (OH)**
  - The Safe Delivery Project – program to reduce robberies of delivery personnel through collaboration between police and food delivery businesses to improve safety policies and procedures and provide safety training to delivery drivers.
  - Urban High School Disorder Reduction Project – establishing community meetings, identifying high-rate offenders, assigning school staff to monitor “hot spots” in an effort to reduce disorder around schools.
  - Safer Bars for a Safer Community – conducting nuisance abatement, community discussions, and educating current and future bar personnel to reduce the incidence of crime and disorder in bars and the surrounding area.
  - Metal Theft – reduce metal theft by changing regulations regarding scrap metal, using community and business contacts to identify suspected metal thieves, and establishing a full-time unit devoted to metal theft.

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6 The following represent POP efforts by agencies that were either finalists or winners of the Herman Goldstein Award for departments engaging in outstanding problem-solving efforts: [http://www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein.cfm?browse=department](http://www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein.cfm?browse=department)
• Reclaiming the Corner of Chaos – a program to reduce crime and disorder at bus hubs through CPTED, enhancing police and transit personnel communication skills, and target high-rate offenders.

• Operation Registration – registration program to reduce bicycle thefts

• Department wide Community Oriented Policing – representing Dayton PDs philosophical change to embrace community policing to “win back the community.”

• **Fayetteville (NC)**
  - Reclaiming Neighborhoods Strategy – through forming community watch, demolishing substandard housing, home beautification and landscaping, and increased policing to reduce crime and fear of crime.

**Offender-focused strategies**

Just as there are high crime places (hot spots) there are also high crime people. Offender-focused strategies rely on the knowledge that just as a small number of places contribute to the majority of the crime, a small proportion of offenders commit most of the crime. In addition to identifying high crime places, crime analysis can identify high-rate offenders. Focusing effort on high rate offenders provides a more efficient use of resources.

Braga (2008) identifies the “pulling levers” strategy common to many offender-focused approaches as a specific example of POP.

> “In its simplest form, the approach consists of selecting a particular crime problem, such as gun homicide; convening an interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners; conducting research to identify key offenders, groups, and behavior patterns; framing a response to offenders and groups of offenders that uses a varied menu of sanctions (“pulling levers”) to stop them from continuing their violent behavior; focusing social services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement prevention efforts; and directly and repeatedly communicating with offenders to make them understand why they are receiving this special attention (Kennedy, 1997, 2006)” (p. 332).

Offender-focused approaches became most prominent under the Boston Gun Project, which later became known as Operation: Ceasefire. Ceasefire was extended to 10 additional cities under the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI). Since then, under the National Network for Safe Communities, Ceasefire efforts have been expanded to over sixty cities including the following nearby and/or similar sized agencies:

- Stockton (CA)
- Bridgeport (CT)
- New Haven (CT)
- Hartford (CT)
- Peoria (IL)
- Rockford (IL)
- South Bend (IN)
- Baltimore (MD)
• Kalamazoo (MI)
• Dayton (OH)
• Philadelphia (PA)
• Providence (RI)
• Charleston (SC)
• Madison (WI)

Additional effective pulling leverage approaches\(^7\) are the Highpoint Drug Market Intervention (DMI); Project Safe Neighborhoods; and the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative.

DMI Cities\(^8\):

• Stockton (CA)
• Bridgeport (CT)
• Hartford (CT)
• New Haven (CT)
• Peoria (IL)
• Rockford (IL)
• South Bend (IN)
• Baltimore (MD)
• Kalamazoo (MI)
• Dayton (OH)
• Providence (RI)
• Charleston (SC)
• Madison (WI)

PSN Cities:

• Mobile (AL)
• Stockton (CA)

CAGI Cities:

• Tampa (FL)

**Recommendation:**

• **WPD should engage crime analysis to identify chronic high-rate offenders (and their offending networks)**

• **WPD in coordination with other criminal justice and community agencies should engage in a “pulling levers” approach to provide additional resources to address the problem of individuals contributing to most of the crime problem. This approach was reportedly implemented in Wilmington very successfully in the 1990’s and should be reconstituted.**

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\(^7\) [https://www.bja.gov/evaluation/program-law-enforcement/offender1.htm](https://www.bja.gov/evaluation/program-law-enforcement/offender1.htm)

\(^8\) [http://nnscommunities.org/impact/cities](http://nnscommunities.org/impact/cities)
The preceding reflects recommendations of policing strategies and tactics designed to enhance crime prevention and improve police-community relations. Some of the above can be accomplished in the short-term while others (e.g. POP) may take longer to achieve results. These recommendations were intended to highlight what the research evidence says about these four global yet specific overlapping areas. Some of these recommendations can be implemented without any additional cost (e.g. hot spot policing); however, others (e.g. crime analysis) may need significant investment to enhance capacity.

Community Engagement/Community Policing

Strong police-community relations are the backbone of a just society. A common refrain among police departments across the country is "We cannot arrest our way out of crime." In an interview with The Economist, Chief Thomson (CCPD) noted “[n]othing builds trust like human contact” and neighborhood residents are a great source of information about problems; however, "but that’s not going to happen without trust." With recent events in Missouri, New York, and Ohio gaining national attention, the policing profession has often judged by departments that have lost the trust and satisfaction of the citizens they serve. In academic circles, this concept of public trust and satisfaction is articulated in the concept of legitimacy and a new yet old manner in which to enhance it is through procedural justice.

Procedural Justice & Legitimacy

We will begin with an explanation of legitimacy, as it applies to law enforcement in particular (and the CJS in general). "Legitimacy reflects the belief that the police ought to be allowed to exercise their authority to maintain social order, manage conflicts and solve problems in their communities" (PERF, 2014). Legitimacy is based on public trust and confidence in the police, reflecting the belief that the police are trying to protect their communities. The prime illustration of legitimacy is in the public's deference to police authority, i.e. their sense of obligation to obey the law. A final element of legitimacy is the belief that police behavior is morally justified and appropriate. To the extent these elements are strained through inappropriate and/or biased behavior on the part of the police, community relations will suffer and over a prolonged period of time can exacerbate into civil unrest.

In 1990, Tom Tyler wrote a book called “Why People Obey the Law” where he outlines the tenets of legitimacy and procedural justice. Procedural justice is based on the interaction (in this case between officer and citizen) rather than the outcome (i.e. arrest, ticket, etc.). In a COPS Office sponsored podcast Tyler states “‘What are people looking for when they are thinking about or reacting to their experience with a police officer?’ He has broken these down into four elements of procedural justice:

1) **Voice:** People want the officer to give them a chance to explain their situation, to let them tell their side of the story before the officer makes some decision about what’s going to happen.

2) **Neutrality:** People want to see some signs that the police officer they’re dealing with is acting in an impartial way, so they’re not acting based upon prejudice, they’re following the law, they’re using consistent principles.
3) **Respect:** People want to be treated in a respectful way. People are very sensitive to discourtesy or a sense of dismissiveness on the part of the officer.

4) **Integrity:** People want to trust in the integrity of the officer. They want to feel that the person they’re dealing with is sincerely trying to do the right thing, trying to understand what’s appropriate in the situation.

These elements have been formalized into Procedural Justice training, most notably by Chicago PD (whose training was jointly developed with Tom Tyler and Tracey Meares). To date, well over 8,000 officers in Chicago PD have been trained in procedural justice. The trainers in Chicago PD have also been asked by other departments to conduct training for their officers.

Why is procedural justice important? Mazerolle et al. (2014) note that through the use of procedural justice principles, police can expect greater cooperation with the public; greater compliance with police directives; and the public has greater satisfaction and trust in the police. Tyler has also found that perceptions of racial profile are reduced when members of the public are treated in a procedurally fair manner.

Many departments do not specifically incorporate procedural justice “pillars” into their mission statement, but often have language consistent with procedural justice. Often there is a focus on trust, accountability, integrity, fairness, etc. However, interactions with the public should also be balanced with, what Dennis Rosenbaum calls, organizational legitimacy.

**Organizational Legitimacy**

In a National Institute of Justice seminar titled “Building Trust Inside and Out: The Challenge of Legitimacy for Law Enforcement,” Dr. Rosenbaum talked about the importance of interactions between police and the public, but also interactions within the department. Through “The Platform” they find that when officers are more satisfied with their work, they are more committed with the organization’s goals. From the figure below we can see this is a very strong correlation. As satisfaction goes up, so does organizational commitment. He and his colleagues recognized barriers keeping an organization from getting the best from their officers. Overall, they argue officers, like the public, are concerned with justice. Overall there were three main things officers wanted:

1) Want to be treated fairly and respectfully
2) Want input into decision making
3) Want to trust that management will make good decisions that are fair and equitable.

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9 Dr. Rosenbaum’s lecture was informed by his work with the National Police Research Platform (http://nationalpoliceresearch.org/). “The National Police Research Platform seeks to advance the science and practice of policing in the United States. This is achieved by introducing a new system of measurement and feedback that captures organizational excellence both inside and outside the walls of the agency. The Platform is managed by a team of leading police scholars from seven universities, supported by the operational expertise of a respected national advisory board.”
Rosenbaum offers the following conceptual definition of organizational justice:

“The perception held by employees that they are being treated fairly, respectfully, and compassionately by those in authority positions; that they have some input and control over decision making in their work environment; that they are kept informed of, and given explanations for, the decisions that affect their lives; and that they have opportunities for professional growth and job enrichment.”

To the extent that an organization can commit to these ideals, there will be greater satisfaction with the job and greater retention and productivity among an agency’s employees.

Community Policing

The preceding has provided a backdrop for how a department, overall can improve police-community relations (and enhance relations within the department). However, one of the best ways to engage the public is through the use of community policing. Community policing has been described and implemented as an organizational philosophy and a strategy of police-community problem solving. There are three primary components in its purest form: organizational transformation; problem solving; and community partnerships.10 “Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational

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10 The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) has established a community policing self-assessment tool (CP-SAT) in order for departments receiving COPS Office funding to assess the extent to
strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” (COPS, 2008). The COPS Office has funded community policing efforts in over 263 cities and counties. A Bureau of Justice Statistics census found that nearly 60 percent of police departments had fulltime community policing officers, demonstrating how common a practice this is. Although community policing is intended to require an organizational transformation to accommodate this “new” style of policing, a frequent manifestation of community policing is the community policing unit or division. Other community policing efforts include the use of foot patrols in order to better engage community members and show presence, knock-and-talks, addressing quality-of-life and disorder to improve perceptions of public safety, and engaging community leaders and the general public. However, it should be noted that each of these tactics in and of themselves is not community policing; rather it is the coordination of these tactics with the specific goal of interacting with the public to engage in community-oriented place-based problem solving that defines true community policing.

Research on the effectiveness of community policing has produced mixed results (Mastrofski, 2006; Gill, 2014), in part because of the variability of community policing interventions and the need to engage with a community where often police-community relations have not been good. In general, community policing efforts do not show an impact on crime, but do show evidence for the reduction in fear of crime (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Braga and Weisburd (2007) note the available research demonstrates unfocused efforts at community policing do not show crime and disorder benefits (e.g. foot patrol, newsletters, and substations). However, focused efforts can produce both reductions in crime and fear of crime. These efforts also depend on the motivation of the officers involved (e.g. research on foot patrol).

Special focus on Foot patrol:

Ratcliffe et al. (2011), in the Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment, demonstrated that foot patrol conducted in crime hot spots could produce benefits. A key feature for success seems to be the amount of time and motivation of the officers involved. Problem-solving and engagement will be more influential than merely “walking the beat.” However, in a recent evaluation of Philadelphia’s Smart Policing Initiative program comparing foot patrol, problem oriented policing, and offender focused strategies did not replicate the foot patrol result. In discussions of the two studies, Ratcliffe and his colleagues have determined that there were differences in the officers in the two experiments. Initially the officers were in the hot spot more and were highly motivated to engage in problem solving with the community. They developed relationships with the people in the area and knew many of them by name. In the SPI experiment the officers were less engaged and through the design of the study, spent less time in the hot spot areas.

It is essential to highlight the importance of establishing trust and maintaining relationships within the context of community policing. Community policing should be

considered a long-term strategy rather than a short-term tactic. Trust is built over time and cessation of community policing activities can damage those relationships.

**Technological Tools for Community Engagement/Policing**

With the expansion of social media, instant messaging, and texting, it has become much easier for departments to interact with the public and vice-versa. Departments can use their website, Facebook, Text alerts, and Twitter to disseminate information to the public and receive feedback from the public. In addition, social media outlets provide a safer, more anonymous means for the public to provide tips/information to police for either proactive or reactive deployments. While it may be dangerous for residents in high crime areas (at least initially) to interact with police (either within the neighborhood or at the station), anonymous systems (e.g. tip411 and others) provide citizens with a secure way to send actionable information to the police, while maintaining personal safety. Facebook also provides a vehicle for this kind of interaction.\(^{11}\)

**CCPD** has engaged the community with a novel approach called the **Interactive Community Alert Network (ICAN)**. This program goes beyond merely offering community members a tip-line to report problems and information to the police. Residents must apply to the program and if selected have access to a web-based system where they can anonymously report crimes in their area. With access to the CCPD CCTV network, participants can direct CCPD to problem areas and crimes in progress in what has been labeled “collaborative policing.”

A final method of engaging with the public from an unlikely source has been through the use of ShotSpotter. Both the **South Bend (IN)** and CCPD have used ShotSpotter activations as a means of community engagement. Both departments, when responding to shots fired, in addition to looking for victims, guns, and shell casings, have used these opportunities to conduct door-to-doors. Officers and detectives uses these opportunities to address community safety concerns, explain what they are doing and how long they will be in the area, and hand out business cards to request information if a citizen is uncomfortable sharing information at the time. Because they go to every door in the immediate area, there is little risk to any single household in terms of retaliation.

**Recommendations:**

- **WPD** should implement “Procedural Justice” training for all personnel in an effort to establish and preserve good community relations.
- **WPD** should reconstitute their community-policing unit.
- All potential community engagement activities should come with clear guidance to officers on the goal of said activity, i.e., what problem are we addressing, why and how.

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\(^{11}\) Anecdotally, some former community policing officers have stated their personal Facebook accounts, in essence, became work-generating because their community members would send them messages.
• Community policing and patrol officers should have access to crime analysis in order to best focus efforts with the community and other stakeholders to address neighborhood problems.

• WPD should expand and create easier technological access (e.g. social media, texting, etc.) in order to provide community members with anonymous/confidential avenues to report crime tips/information, such as the approach taken in Atlantic City, NJ, which uses the Tip411 solution.

• WPD should generate more transparency with the community in terms of police activities, public relations, complaints, and investigations. WPD should also convey to the public that transparency cannot come at the expense of immediacy whereby certain investigations and operations take time in order to fully examine the facts.

• WPD, in an effort to enhance its own “organizational justice” should operate internally under the same principles it interacts with the community, namely transparency in the decision making process from promotions, policy changes, and technological acquisition and implementation. In addition, WPD should also be open to feedback from personnel directly affected by upper command decisions.

• Also related to organizational justice, WPD should establish performance measures whereby personnel can have a clear indication of their efforts (in terms of policing activities), which would also hold personnel accountable for low performance.

Crime Analysis:

“Generally, crime analysis involves the use of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze crime and law enforcement information for the purpose of apprehending criminals, reducing crime, and evaluating organization procedures.” (Boba, 2001). Crime analysis is not a strategy in and of itself, but is a set of tools which provides the initial step in addressing crime or evaluating operation procedures. It is a fundamental tool in what has been termed “Intelligence-led policing:”

Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and problem solving, which the field has considered beneficial for many years. To implement intelligence-led policing, police organizations need to reevaluate their current policies and protocols. Intelligence must be incorporated into the planning process to reflect community problems and issues. Information sharing must become a policy, not an informal practice. Most important, intelligence must be contingent on quality analysis of data. The development of analytical techniques, training, and technical assistance needs to be supported (BJA, 2005).
Crime analysis in practice is more than the compilation of statistics into weekly/monthly summary reports, but represents a systematic deconstruction of the available data in order to analyze trends, focus resources, and ultimately provide explanation of crime and police operations within a jurisdiction. There are many elements and technologies that can be utilized in crime analysis. We will highlight the key ones below.

**Crime Mapping**

Crime mapping may be one of the oldest methods of displaying crime. In the early days, crime mapping could be accomplished through the use of pushpins on a map of the city. Although decidedly low-tech, it is nonetheless an effective method. Technologically speaking, crime mapping has become a much more elaborate endeavor requiring a particular set of computational skills. Crime mapping through the use of computers; however, does allow an agency to be more creative in what they analyze. Law enforcement now has the ability to examine different types of crimes, by time of day, day of week, etc. At the same time, the use of mapping can inform the use of police resources. For example, **Camden County PD (CCPD)** has used crime analysis to identify high crime zones within the city and used their AVL system to maintain specific levels of patrol coverage within these zones.

Crime mapping is a useful tool by itself, but only represents the initial step. The use of crime mapping helps identify where and when crime occurs (and with the use of offender data it can provide information on who is committing the crime), but does not singly tell an agency why crime is happening at that particular place. Combating crime problems within a particular place requires an understanding of the crime attractors and generators within a given area.

**Data integration**

In addition to mapping, comprehensive crime (problem) analysis requires the integration of data from multiple sources in which to provide the fullest picture of what is going on in a jurisdiction. All agencies within the Criminal Justice System (CJS) (police, prosecution, probation/parole) can provide value-added to any crime prevention exercises by integrating the massive amounts of data each agency possesses. Crime within hot spots (discussed later) can be the result of a few high-rate (or chronic) offenders. Crime analysis using data from all areas of the CJS can identify these individuals and target them for specific action. The removal of these individuals can have a big impact on reducing crime; however, these individuals will one day return to the area. With crime analysis and specific targeting of resources, actions plans can be created in order to monitor crime hot spots for when these individuals return to the area. In addition, data from other city and community sources can be integrated. City housing can provide information on nuisance properties, abandoned buildings, etc. and through coordinated effort with police and prosecution, if these factors are crime attractors, focused efforts can be taken to alleviate these problems.12

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12 These examples are consistent with a process called problem-oriented policing, which will be discussed later.
Social Network Analysis

Although criminal co-offending has a long history in criminal career research (Reiss, 1986), recent advances in statistical analysis has made it possible to map out interrelationships among criminal offenders. Papachristos and his colleagues have looked at social networks using police data from cities such as Boston and Chicago. Although we have known for decades that a small percentage of offenders are responsible for the majority of crime, they have found that these offenders are often clustered in tight social networks. For example, in a forthcoming piece on gun injury, Papchristos, Widleman, and Roberto (2015) find, “[s]eventy percent of all nonfatal gunshot injuries during a six-year period occurred in co-offending networks containing less than 6 percent of the city’s population” (p. 147). Additionally, 89 percent of those victims were part of a single social network. Social network analysis can provide rich detail on offending within a jurisdiction. By examining the characteristics of the network, a tailored response can be developed (along the lines of offender-focused responses, see below). The structure of these networks are likely to reproduce themselves as more jurisdictions engage in this type of analysis.

Additional Technology:

WPD has access to additional technology that can influence patrol and investigations. Two prime examples are ShotSpotter™ and CCTV.

ShotSpotter™

ShotSpotter is an acoustic gunfire detection system spread throughout high crime areas of Wilmington. There are three initial things:

- Real-time access to maps of shooting locations and gunshot audio;
- Actionable intelligence detailing the number of shooters and the number of shots fired, and;
- Pinpointing precise locations for first responders aiding victims, searching for evidence and interviewing witnesses.¹⁴

ShotSpotter analysis, coupled with anecdotal evidence from departments, indicates that most gunshots are not reported to law enforcement. Four reasons for this discrepancy are what Chief Teachman of South Bend (IN) calls: recognition; redundancy; retaliation; and resignation. First, citizens may not recognize that a sound was a gunshot. Second, law enforcement responses to ShotSpotter activations are often so fast that citizens already see them on the scene. Third, many citizens in high (violent) crime areas fear retaliation if they do talk to the police. Finally, some citizens may become accustomed to living in high crime areas and take the sound of gunshots as part of day-to-day life.

When there is no identifiable victim on the scene of a ShotSpotter activation, law enforcement may classify the event essentially as a nuisance crime. However, ancecdotaly,

¹³ Network analysis and visual representation can be accomplished using the statistical package “R.” This is an open source statistical platform; however, it does require a particular level of expertise in statistics and programming.

¹⁴ http://www.shotspotter.com/law-enforcement
departments (such as South Bend (IN)) indicate there is a greater likelihood of either a gun and/or shell casing recovery with ShotSpotter (especially coupled with a 911 call). In the absence of a shooter, it is difficult to tell if there was a violent altercation where the potential victim was missed by gunfire or if an individual was randomly shooting a firearm. However, in order to understand the complexities of gun violence, it is vital that all recovered weapons/shell casings are entered into the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) in order to develop a profile of the weapon and ascertain if it has been used in other criminal events.

**CCTV**

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) has been extensively researched. In a systematic review by the Campbell Collaboration finds only modest effects on crime.\(^{15}\) CCTV has been most effective in reducing thefts from vehicles in parking lots. The author’s find that CCTV works best when combined with other crime prevention interventions. Criticism of the use of CCTV centers on the ability of the camera system to increase the probability of detection and apprehension, particularly when the camera to operator ratio is high. Camera systems should be moved to a more proactive detection role, and balanced by a law enforcement response to ensure its deterrent value. For examples, forthcoming research by Piza et al. (forthcoming), conducted in Newark (NJ), indicates that CCTV coupled with hot spot policing generates greater crime control benefits than having “stand alone” camera deployment, “particularly in the case of street-level crime.” Hot spot policing is covered in more detail below.

As a reactive strategy, CCTV has the potential to aid investigations and should continue to be utilized in this manner. For example, **Camden County PD (CCPD)** uses their CCTV system, coupled with ShotSpotter activations to gain video of gunshot offenders and victims. In addition, we have seen cases where the CCTV system was able to track a fleeing vehicle and provide information on the make/model as well as direction of travel to responding officers.

Like most technology, the above examples should not operate in a vacuum. Each element will work best when integrated with other information sources and analyzed by individuals with the required expertise (i.e. crime analysts).\(^ {16}\)

An exceptional (and local) example of the use of crime analytic technology and analysis is with the **CCPD Real-Time Tactical Operations and Information Center (RT-TOIC)**. The RT-TOIC provides the technological hub for directing the activities of the CCPD officers and responding to citizen issues. The Center provides a venue to synthesize the information coming in from the monitoring of CCTV (both static mounted cameras and mobile “Sky Patrol” cameras); automatic vehicle location (AVL); ShotSpotter; and real-time input from citizens participating in the CCPD’s iCan program. Through integrated crime analysis (which has been outsourced), the city can identify high crime areas and ensure their officers provide near constant coverage within those zones.

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\(^{15}\) [http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/news_/CCTV_modest_impact_on_crime_printer.shtml](http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/news_/CCTV_modest_impact_on_crime_printer.shtml)

\(^{16}\) The International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA) can provide more information on their certification standards and training: [http://www.iaca.net/](http://www.iaca.net/)
The RT-TOIC allows CCPD to monitor the “dosage” level their officers are providing to high crime zones. Personnel in the center get real-time feedback from their software indicating whether their pre-determined dosage levels are being met, or if they need to redeploy officer to accommodate. In addition, as discussed later, even high crime areas are not “hot” all of the time, and as Camden enters into high crime times (whether time of day, day of the week), CCPD can shift their officers to meet dynamic patterns. Through the RT-TOIC, Camden can coordinate their hot spot/hot zone efforts.

Recommendations:

- **WPD should move the Crime Analysis Unit out of Investigations and under the Office of the Chief or the recommended Deputy Chief of Operations.** Such a move would provide the benefit of crime analysis to the entire department.

- **TAPS meetings should be conducted in a manner consistent with New Castle County whereby crime/disorder outcomes are mapped onto WPD outputs in an effort to instill ownership and accountability in Wilmington crime and disorder issues.**

- **WPD should expand their crime analysis capability to include crime mapping, social network analysis, trend analysis and other statistical analyses.**

- **Crime analysis should be used to measure crime in addition to department efforts in an effort to analyze the impact WPD is producing.**

- **WPD should utilize ShotSpotter activations as an opportunity to collect evidence of illegal firearm behavior; collecting and processing all recovered shell casings, regardless of the presence of a victim, to identify crime guns.**

- **WPD should test the applicability of incorporating CCTV with hot spot deployment efforts.**

- **WPD should use its new AVL technologies to ensure sufficient patrol allocation time in hot spot areas.**

- **The State of Delaware should consider replicating the State of New Jersey's approach (New Jersey Public Law 2013, Chapter 162), requiring law enforcement agencies across the state to quickly (within 24 hours) process shell casings from crime scenes and recovered firearms, through a multi-step process, including use of eTrace, NIBIN, collection of various other forms of evidence so that critical leads can be provided to investigators to solve crimes quickly and to prevent retaliatory shootings. Retaliatory violence is clearly present in Wilmington, consistent with the community’s explanation of what occurs here and consistent with data. If implemented, this approach would require all law enforcement agencies to submit more information to the State Police in a more timely manner, from an estimated “up to 10 days” to within 24 hours. No-cost technical assistance is available in developing this protocol.**
A 1997 review of crime prevention programs, by the University of Maryland, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice submitted to Congress, concluded that many crime prevention programs worked, some did not, but most had not been substantially evaluated in order to draw conclusions about their effectiveness. The list of programs/strategies that “worked” would grow with the increased use of scientific evaluation. Since then there has been a broad push to evaluate new programs and synthesize what we know from previous research.

The Department of Justice hosts “CrimeSolutions.gov,” which provides a clearinghouse for criminal justice programs with a score of whether it worked, was promising, or showed no effects. The one drawback of this system is there is no measure for the quality of the evaluation, namely some research designs provide stronger evidence of a program’s impact than others. However, there are other sources that consider measures for scientific rigor include:

- Evidence-Based Policing Matrix (hosted online by the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University);
- The “Maryland Report” (Sherman et al. 1997) and its updates (Sherman et al. 2002; 2006);
- Campell Collaboration Systematic Reviews
The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

A Report of Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington
Introduction

The Police Foundation was tasked with collecting the community’s input into Wilmington’s public safety strategies.

Part I of this report provides a summary of the feedback we received by going into the community in coordination with key individuals and groups, to collect this feedback directly and proactively. This part also includes an analysis of an informal survey of community members with whom we met during our days in the community, which complements what we heard from community members in our open meetings and individual contacts. Many of the paragraph headings represent the community’s words or sentiment; therefore they are placed in quotations where necessary.

Part II of this report provides a summary of the community’s input provided during the Commission meetings.

Part III of this report provides a summary of input received from individual and group interviews with members of the business community.

Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

Part I: Input Collected in the Community

“We are tired of being studied we need action. There have been a hundred reports and nothing is ever done. We feel like Guinea pigs (Eastside Community Members, 2015)”

This section reflects the community’s sentiments concerning their perceptions of and interactions with the officers of the Wilmington Police Department (WPD). As in many communities in the United States, the poor and minority members of the community often feel disenfranchised and victimized by the police. Many of Wilmington’s community members seem to feel the same. One statement heard at every community meeting that we attended in regards to the relationship between the Wilmington Police Department and the African American community was “The police just don’t care.”

Community sentiment in the groups we interviewed was that they wanted to work with the Wilmington Police Department, but they perceived that the Wilmington Police Department
(WPD) did not want to work with them. The problems between the community and the WPD are deeply entrenched and most likely developed over a number of years. During one interview the interviewees advised that the cultural change began approximately fifteen (15) years ago and since then, they have been on a steady decline.

Community leaders described the Wilmington Police Department ‘as an island that refused to work with them - a castle protected by a moat and wall keeping the community out’.

The Police Foundation was tasked with collecting input from the community on the City’s public safety strategies as implemented by the Wilmington Police Department. Although the data here is limited to three (3) actual community meetings and forums, we were contacted via email and phone after each meeting by citizens who wanted to discuss their perceptions and the needs of their respective communities. These perceptions were identical to the survey responses we collected. In total, we surveyed one hundred and fifty (150) residents.

We also conducted interviews with government officials throughout Wilmington who represented the full spectrum of services within the criminal justice system.

The data was collected through formal community meetings, phone interviews, surveys, community “walk and talks,” and “chat and chews” (which are lunch or dinner settings).

In several of the small group meetings with community leaders, we were challenged as to our understanding of the problem. The primary concern from community members was that we report the information accurately, based on our understanding, and not alter the data in any way. This segment of the report will examine the community’s perception of the Wilmington Police Department, working relationships with other criminal justice partners, contributing factors to the epidemic of youth violence, and opportunities to begin addressing the problem.

COMMUNITY MEETINGS

We prioritized learning about what the community views as the three major crime issues, determining if the WPD and the community are disconnected, and looking at how the community views the WPD and how the WPD views the community. In each of the meetings there were two objectives: listen to the community members in an open forum while documenting their views and concerns, and asking community members to complete a seven-question survey designed to more systematically collect their perceptions.

The first meeting was held on February 21 at the Muslim Center of Wilmington (The Masjid), where approximately 30 people attended. A total of 25 survey responses were received as a result of this meeting. The feedback collected at this meeting is provided below. We attempted to avoid altering any views or input received, to ensure that the community’s views were heard, unfiltered. Subheadings presented in quotation below indicate a quote or key sentiment from one or more community members.

“Living in a Fish Bowl”

This location was selected, with the assistance of a WPD Captain, because residents of this neighborhood are reportedly the most affected by the high crime rate. More importantly, this area is reported to have the highest number of homicides where the suspects and victims are juvenile
African American males. The residents were informed about the meeting through a flyer, which was disseminated by members of the community door to door (see Attachment 1).

One resident’s statement provided insight into the community’s frustration and anger:

“Everyone wants to study us like we are in a fish bowl. Everyone says that they are here to help. Even the lady from Newsweek said she was here to help and what do we get, we get the title of the Murder Capital. Why aren’t our City Council people here? Why isn’t the Chief of Police here to hear us? Why isn’t the Mayor here? Why should we believe you, you aren’t from here - you are here to make money then you are gone? What I am saying is we are tired of being studied; we need action. There have been a hundred reports and nothing is ever done. We feel like Guinea pigs (Eastside Community Member, 2015)”

“Insensitivity” and “Trauma”

During the open forum the residents repeatedly stated that WPD was unresponsive to their needs. Many described homicide scenes where WPD officers were allegedly laughing and joking in front of the victims’ families. The residents also shared that they had heard officers state: “They are killing each other. Doing our job for us. All we have to do is wait - no need to solve the homicides.” The residents allege that some officers have used social media to devalue the homicide and shooting victims. The victim’s families also advise that WPD has not offered any kind of support or counseling, even though WPD has a program known as Child Development-Community Policing (CD-CP).

The WPD website describes the CD-CP program as:

The Wilmington, Delaware CD-CP program was established November 1, 2005. It is a partnership between the City of Wilmington Police Department and the Delaware Division of Prevention and Behavioral Health Services (DPBHS). The Delaware Guidance Services for Children and Youth (DGS) is contracted by DPBHS to provide mental health treatment for identified children. The staff consists of master's level health professionals and case managers.

The goal of the Child Development - Community Policing Program (CD-CP) is to help heal the wounds that exposure to violence inflicts on children and families. The CD-CP program is a national model of a collaborative alliance between law enforcement, juvenile justice, domestic violence, medical and mental health professionals, child welfare, schools and other community agencies. The program provides a resource for first responders to violent or traumatic incidents to make immediate or follow up referrals to a trained trauma-focused clinician to begin the clinical healing process soon after the traumatic event has occurred. The CD-CP uses community-based counseling to help children and families cope, where life happens...in the home, in the community, in the school. Through education, coping skill building, collaboration, community connection and support, the CD-CP helps Wilmington’s children and families move forward after violence or trauma occur (Wilmington Police Department, 2015).
“We Have No Value”

When the family members of homicide victims spoke they addressed three things concerning WPD: the agency’s failure to solve their family member’s homicide; the investigators’ failure to return phone calls regarding their loved one’s case; and the amount of time that investigators spend on the scene of a homicide, noting that two hours was maximum. Finally, the family members of the homicide victims stated unequivocally “Black lives don’t matter,” making the following points:

- If a victim is Caucasian, police will stay at the homicide scene for hours. They canvas the neighborhood knocking on doors up to 6 or 7 blocks away. In one instance the FBI had assisted in the canvassing. Why is the FBI involved? Is it because the victim was white and our kids are black? These homicide scenes are worked for several hours, as opposed to the two hours dedicated to the crime scenes where an African American child has been killed.
- When a police officer was shot in the City of Wilmington, the police were relentless in their efforts to apprehend a suspect. Their efforts lasted for several hours, included knocking on doors, talking to people on the street, and stopping and frisking anyone and everyone. Yet this never happens when it is one of us.
- The question asked: ‘Why are those people’s lives more valuable than our lives’?

In an attempt to curb the violence, one Captain of the Wilmington Police Department advised that he has met with the several of the most influential local Original Gangsters (OGs) and asked them to assist in curbing the violence. The OGs advised that they could not control those involved in the violence because they are without conscience; they also described them as “crazy.”

“Living in a Fish Bowl”

Another area of concern has been the community’s difficulty in filing complaints against police. Several of the attendees advised that they had made complaints against officers and never received a disposition of the complaint. The attendees stated that in order to file a complaint, they are required to go to WPD; and oftentimes while waiting, they encounter the officer that they are filing the complaint on. The attendees state that they feel intimidated. Some state that they left WPD without filing the complaint. Others allege that they believe that their statements and complaints are discarded. This has led to a sense of frustration and enhanced the deep-seated belief in the community as shared with us: WPD doesn’t care, can’t be trusted, and will do anything to protect their officers.

The second meeting was held on March 7, 2015 at the Hanover Presbyterian Church, where approximately 57 people attended. A total of 20 survey responses were received as a result of this meeting. The feedback collected at this meeting is provided below. We attempted to avoid altering any views or input received, to ensure that the community’s views were heard, unfiltered.

This meeting took place at a community event hosted by the Movement for a Culture of Peace and was advertised via the Internet and email blasts (see Attachment 2). The event was titled Violence Reduction in Wilmington: Connecting the Dots. It was an open forum and panel
participants were Chief Bobby Cummings, Wilmington Police Department; Doug Iardella, Wilmington Public Safety Liaison; Darryl Chambers, Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission; and David Thomas, Senior Research Fellow, Police Foundation. There were fifty-seven (57) attendees with at least one representative from twenty-two (22) community organizations.

The tone of this meeting was different because the residents were not from one specific community but from all segments of the Wilmington community. The attendees were focused on one goal, ending gun violence and deaths in Wilmington. The residents echoed many of the same concerns as in the first meeting. There were several prevailing themes as shared with us: community policing; diversity training for officers; failure of the agency to respond to victims of homicide; lack of support for families in the aftermath of violence; and the ease with which juveniles can access guns.

Again, residents addressed the fact that there has been study after study and expressed how frustrated they were that none had been acted upon. One such example was the State of Delaware Strategic Plan for Injury Prevention 2005 – 2010, which provides guidance and information to reduce the number of injuries and homicides by firearm in the state of Delaware.

“Insensitivity” and “Trauma”

Residents repeated the sentiments of the first forum – that WPD was unresponsive to their needs. There were a number of family members who had lost children to gun violence. One mother whose child was killed in February 2015 made an impassioned statement driven by fear, frustration, and anger. She described how detectives did not return her phone calls, how she lives in a constant state of fear knowing that the killer is still on the street and a juvenile, and how WPD officials have disregarded her fear and concerns to a point where she feels abandoned by the very system that is supposed to protect her. Chief Cummings was asked if WPD offers counseling services, and he discussed the Child Development-Community Policing Program (CD-CP), which is highlighted earlier in this report.

The attendees described their beliefs that WPD treats members of the African American Community without respect by being verbally abusive and using intimidation tactics. Chief Cummings was asked if WPD officers had received any diversity training. He assured the audience that they had recently been trained. The Police Foundation verified that Dr. Yasser Payne, from the University of Delaware, conducted training for the police department in April 2014, and those 325 officers received a 4-hour training, in groups of 30-50 officers. He provided a copy of his PowerPoint presentation, which we reviewed. A summary of the training content was provided by Dr. Payne via e-mail and is excerpted below:
Information about the training:

Walking With the Community is a racial sensitivity training designed to inform and equip community professionals about the culture of street identified Black populations involved with the criminal justice system. This workshop challenges dominant arguments by asserting the streets of Black (and Brown) America are in fact resilient. Much of their illegal behavior can be attributed to a historical and present entrenchment in structural inequality. The workshop ties the history of crime in the Black community to contemporary accounts. Also, this workshop focuses on the relationship between law enforcement (and other authorities) and low-income Black communities. Further, the workshop teaches participants how to develop activities to constructively work with and reach street identified Black populations as well as strongly encourage participants how to educate other community professionals to work with and reach street identified Black populations of color caught up in the criminal justice system.

Workshop

a. Session 1 (hour) – intersectionality
b. Session 2 (hour) – variation: applying intersectionality to the streets of Wilmington
c. Session 3 (hour) – community policing
d. Session 4 (hour) – unconscious bias

There is an overall sense from community members that the training has had little impact on officers’ actions in the African American community. The audience was quick to point out that all African American juveniles are treated as if they are suspects and not citizens of the community. The attendees also noted that when this happens, it furthers the divide between community and police. Police are viewed by segments of the community as enemies and as not to be trusted. The community described the tactics of WPD as “aggressive, racially motivated, insensitive to the needs of the African American community,” and ultimately “disconnected” from the community that they serve.

“We Have No Voice”

The final area of concern was the disposition of complaints made against officers. Several of the attendees, before and after the meeting, stated that they had filed complaints against officers and were never advised of the disposition of the case. Because the issue had become a recurring theme, the Police Foundation contacted the Commander of the WPD Office of Professional Standards regarding the agency policy and process for handling citizen’s complaints. The Commander advised that citizens must come to the department to file a formal complaint. He also advised that they do not use tracking numbers for all complaints, and that they use patrol supervisors to investigate some complaints. He confirmed “without witnesses the matter would be the complainant’s word against the officer’s and that there is no way that such complaints could be sustained.” The Commander also stated that all complainants are sent a letter advising them of the outcome of the complaint filed: unfounded, substantiated, unsubstantiated, unfounded, proper conduct, and policy failure (see Attachment 3 WPD Policy Directive 8.6: Authority and Responsibilities of the Internal Affairs Division and the letter sent to complainants).
Finally, in regards to complainants and their dispositions, the Commander advised that many complainants want to know if the officers received any disciplinary action. He stated that the department is prohibited by state statute from advising the complainant of anything more than the aforementioned dispositions, per Delaware State Statute 9200 entitled: Limitations on political activity; "law-enforcement officer" defined; rights of officers under investigation (Delaware State Legislature, 2015).

The third meeting was held on March 9, 2015 at the Westside Health Center, where approximately 18 people attended. A total of 12 survey responses were received as a result of this meeting. The feedback collected at this meeting is provided below. We attempted to avoid altering any views or input received, to ensure that the community’s views were heard, unfiltered.

This meeting was unique on two fronts. First, it was not the traditional neighborhood forum. The organization Westside Grows Together is a coalition of Wilmington's West Side residents, businesses, churches, and community groups working together to create a safe and prosperous environment for its residents. Second, the steering committee was present at this meeting and represented were eighteen (18) of twenty-five (25) member organizations.

Also in attendance at this meeting was Delaware Attorney General Matt Denn who discussed his Lifting Up Delaware’s Communities Plan, which is composed of three components: investing in people and neighborhoods, providing help with high poverty schools, and promoting affordable housing and development in economically impacted areas (see Attachment 4).

One community leader felt that the initiative did not go far enough because the $36 million was spread over too many programs to be effective. He suggested that all the money be spent on juveniles, by offering jobs, job training, and intervention and prevention programs. He argued that youth are the most disenfranchised, and if they continue to ignore them, the cycle of violence will continue.

In addition to focus group or town hall type discussions, we analyzed approximately 150 survey responses collected through various means, including in-person, U.S. Mail, and electronic delivery. The survey was disseminated by more than one community organization to solicit the input of the community. The responses to the survey’s open-ended questions are below.

SURVEY

The survey was designed with seven open-ended questions to allow the community members to express their perceptions, feelings, and observations in a short answer format. The responses for each question were categorized based on the most common topical areas response.

Survey Questions and Data:

1. What are the greatest challenges facing the community and the police?

The respondents (N=150) described the greatest challenges facing the police and the community with the following responses themes:
• **Lack Of Trust** - There is no trust between the community and the police.

• **Drugs** - The community has always had drugs. It began with “crack cocaine,” and those who did not use “crack” used prescription drugs. After the police came down hard on the prescription drugs, the drug of choice became heroin.

• **Gang Violence** - We never had a violence problem like we do today. Gangs began to rise after a huge drug bust. The problem that we have now is that it’s not the 26-year-old that will kill you, it is the 13-year-old on a skateboard or bike. This group has no conscience and anyone can fall victim.

• **Murders/Shootings** - The fallout from the gangs are the murders and shootings between gang members. Central to the shootings are drugs.

• **School Bias/Unemployment** - Although gangs, drugs, and homicides are an issue, other contributing factors are our school system and the biased suspension policy of the school districts that service our community (African America). In conjunction with the school policies is the fact that there are no jobs for our youth (African American). In fact, this summer the kids have to place their name in a lottery in hopes of being selected for a job with the city this summer.

• **Ineffective Policing Style** - The police ‘don’t have a style when it comes to policing. There is no consistency and until they get their house in order they are of little value’.

2. **How would the community describe the Wilmington Police Department’s policing style?**

The respondents (N=125) provided responses along the following themes:

• **Irregular** – Respondents described WPD’s policing style as ineffective, inconsistent, hands off and/or irregular. They were clear that WPD polices differently depending on the residents or side of town that they are working. The residents state that they have seen the police drive by areas where there has been violence and not stop to address people who are loitering. On the other hand there were many descriptions of officers stopping and harassing juveniles.

The respondents described groups of juveniles who were walking and bothering no one, and officers will stop them, handcuff them, and then search them. If they don’t find anything they release them. Residents have classified it as “Walking While Black” and when they inquire about what is happening, they report that officers allegedly swear at them or threaten to arrest them.

• **Unapproachable and Isolated** – The respondents advised that the police are unapproachable. The respondents noted that when they have offered to help, the police have refused their help. One resident shared a story about a burglary where the suspect left his phone at the victim’s house. WPD’s Crime Scene Unit allowed the victim to take names from the suspect’s phone and the victim located the suspect online the same night. The suspect had taken pictures of the victim’s shoes that he had stolen as well as a watch. When WPD was contacted with the information, there was no response. It allegedly took over six months for a response and by that time the victim was frustrated and refused to
cooperate. This same frustration was reiterated by homicide victim family members during each meeting. They all stated that WPD refused to return calls.

- **Elimination of Community Policing** – Segments of the community had excellent relationships with their Community Police Officers, while others advised that they had not received the same level of service. Respondents felt that services are not equitably distributed, and if they are, there is no accountability. Those who had community police officers spoke very highly of them but wanted the WPD to stop changing them.

3. **Why is there a disconnect between community and the police in this community? Are there incidents which have caused the disconnect? If so what are they?**

Respondents (N=150) provided responses along the following themes:

- **Lack of Trust on Both Sides** – The respondents offered the following incidents as examples of a disconnect between the community and the WPD: The lack of follow up by the police department when it comes to their investigations, their failure to solve homicides and shootings, their use of social media and making of negative comments by the officers about the community, the tactics that some WPD officers employ, and the fact that the community believes that there are no consequences for the officers’ unprofessional behavior (the police shooting on Vandever Avenue where the community describes the story as changing multiple times), a refusal of the police to work with the community and accept citizen assistance, what the community perceives as some officers displaying poor attitudes towards the community.

- **The Chief of Police and the Command Staff** – Several respondents noted that WPD’s failure was due to the lack of leadership and discipline. They believe that the Chief and the command staff are aware of the problems but have failed to address the problem. The questions were asked: Why aren’t officers being disciplined for their behavior? One respondent noted that this disconnect did not happen overnight, that it is the culture of the department that has to change because it took years for the department to get this way.

4. **Identify and prioritize what you believe to be the top three crime problems that need immediate attention. If I were to ask law enforcement officials the same question do you believe that they would view them as the same?**

Respondents (N=150) provided responses along the following themes:

- **Community Priorities** – Although respondents were asked to prioritize the top three (3) crime problems, they listed five (5) from highest to lowest: guns, murder, drugs, gangs, robbery, child neglect, and a lack of funding for youth programs.

- **Police** – The respondents believe that police would prioritize the problems in order of highest to lowest as murder, guns, and drugs. Several noted murder and guns, but did not know what else the police saw as important, which is the same feedback we obtained from interviews of business leaders.
5. What are the resources you believe the agency should use to address the aforementioned problems?

Respondents (N=100) provided responses along the following themes:

- **Community Resources** - The respondents noted that they were frustrated because there are so many organizations that want to help; however, WPD has not taken any initiative to organize the groups or to address the problems. All mention that they have contacted WPD to offer assistance, but have gotten no response.

- **Deployment of Resources** - The respondents all noted that having more police on the street is essential and described policing styles that they believe to be effective: community policing, hot spot patrols, enforce curfew, advertising of their crime solving successes.

- **Investing in Youth** – The respondents would like to see WPD invest in youth by expanding PAL, and creating a Cadet or Explorer Program to cultivate productive citizens. It was noted that failure to invest in such programs does nothing but foster poor relationships and perceptions by both sides.

6. History shows us that police cannot solve the problem alone so, what will it take to get the community involved and to form partnerships with law enforcement?

Respondents (N=150) provided responses along the following themes:

- The respondents felt, as they noted in question 5, that WPD and the citizens should become partners working together to address the many problems, which means that there needs to be a fair and equitable exchange of information with both sides listening, the development of an effective community model, and participation by local businesses.

7. How does the community view the agency? How does WPD police personnel view the community they serve?

Respondents (N=132) provided responses along the following themes:

- **Community Views the Agency** – “WPD doesn’t care; nothing but broken promises, especially when it comes to the homicides and shootings; disparities and differences in how the blacks are treated, versus whites; officers are not invested in the black community; police are our enemy; they treat our kids as if everyone is a suspect; ineffective and untrustworthy.”

- **WPD View of the Community** – “The black community is the enemy; the black community is nothing more than criminals; they (the black community) are all drugs abusers and scum; and every kid is a suspect. The black community believes that the officers are sacred and don’t understand them and as a result the black community is treated with disrespect.”
MEETINGS WITH LOCAL RESEARCHERS

On February 19, 2015, the Police Foundation team met with researchers at the University of Delaware to learn about their work in studying and addressing the public safety issues in Wilmington.

In order to obtain a better understanding of the homicide and violence problem in Wilmington, questions were prepared in advance, to serve as a starting point for the conversation, and were based on our preliminary research and informed our subsequent discussion and findings. The questions revolved around getting a better picture of the nature of violent crime in Wilmington. In order to get this information, we posed questions about demographic of offenders and victims, such as age, sex, race, and relationships. We asked about gangs, seeking information about the geographic area that they claim, the names of the gangs, the age and race of the members, and if gang violence is related to the drug trade, and if the days when drugs were delivered corresponded to violence such as shootings and robberies. We also posed questions about the number of homicides and/or aggravated assaults, and how many of them were related to domestic violence.

Crime Data

The University of Delaware researchers advised us that there are gangs in Wilmington and that there were juveniles as young as thirteen (13) involved in the gang activity. In fact, they stated that the majority of the shooting incidents involved youth between thirteen (13) and seventeen (17) years of age. They noted that it is often predictable when a shooting is going to occur because the shooters have arguments on social media, that can be followed back and forth, until it reaches the point that a shooting is going to occur. Data supplied by the researchers shows the following:

- In 2009, 77.5% of all the shootings were perpetrated by black males against black male victims.
- From January 2014 through June 2014 most of the shootings occurred in neighborhoods or blocks which have a vacancy rate of 21% or higher.
- From January 2014 through June 2014, most of the shootings occurred in neighborhoods or blocks that have an unemployment rate greater than 15%.
- From January 2014 through June 2014, most of the shootings occurred in neighborhoods or blocks where the poverty rate is 21% or higher.

Contributing Factors to Violent Crime

In reviewing the data provided by the researchers, we discovered that the most prominent contributing factors to the homicides and violence are unemployment, poverty, and neighborhoods or blocks that have been abandoned. This data supports the arguments made by residents in the surveys and community meetings.

Source of Firearms

Since firearms are central to the majority of the violence in Wilmington and seem so readily available to juveniles, we inquired as to the source of the firearms. We were told that the firearms used are often straw purchases and bought in Wilmington locally. The buyer is usually a
single mother or drug addict who purchases the firearms for shooters in exchange for money, narcotics, or both.

MEETINGS WITH GOVERNMENT & POLITICAL OFFICIALS

The same questions were posed to various government officials within the criminal justice system. The officials confirmed that there were gangs, and that the primary motives are drugs and money. They also advised that they can see the trends and alliances, and have gained information from the juveniles in detention, but WPD does not take advantage of the resources or intelligence information.

Source of Firearms

These officials agreed with the researchers that most, if not all, of the firearms are the result of straw purchases.

School Performance

Many officials noted that many juveniles do extremely well in school during the time they are in detention. This observation is consistent with the suggestion of inherent bias in schools, as noted in the meetings with community members.

Juvenile Aftercare

One of the major faults of the juvenile justice system around the country has been a lack of aftercare (reentry) services and follow-up after release. It is the view of various government officials that this is the case in Wilmington as well. They acknowledged that this has been a longstanding problem. One issue with juvenile aftercare is that the system is designed as “one size fits all.” The difficulty with such an approach is that many juveniles have different needs and the system is not designed to address those needs so it focuses on what it can, such as drug treatment. Missing are programs that address employment skills, parenting skills, and educational needs.

Perceptions of the Wilmington Police Department

Various officials stated they have very little input into the police department. They believed that hiring and promotion practices were detrimental to the morale of the police department and that Chief Cummings is not being allowed to do his best. The attendees noted that morale is so bad WPD is losing officers at the rate of one (1) per month.

They alleged and then described in detail how citizens’ complaints against officers are never investigated by the Office of Professional Standards. Their views supported those of the community in that complainants encountered the officers that they were complaining against in the lobby of the police department and that the complainants felt intimidated and did not file the complaints. In regards to the complaints that are filed, they said complainants never hear back from the department and that they were aware of instances where supervisors were instructed to investigate the complaints and never made contact with the complainant. Because no tracking number is issued the complaints can easily be misplaced. They suggested moving the Office of Professional Standards from department headquarters might be a way to remedy this situation and provide complainants some degree of comfort when filing their complaints.
Another area of concern was duplication of services that takes money away from placing more officers on the street. There was some suggestions that the WPD Human Resources and the City Human Resources could be combined.

There was also a feeling that the procurement process is too lengthy, which delays the purchase and installation of much needed equipment. The example that they cited was the new Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system and advised their belief that officers are out of the City on meal breaks, ‘sleeping on duty’, and parked under overpasses not patrolling. The implementation of the new CAD system was, in their view, to assist in eliminating the aforementioned problems because it has GPS. And non-working CCTV cameras has been a long standing issue. As an example they mentioned homicides, shootings, and drug deals occurring right in front of the cameras and when checked for data, they allege that nothing could be located.

Some officials mentioned the department losing access to valuable resources from the federal government when Operation Disrupt was implemented and Chief Cummings pulled all of his officers from Federal Task Forces to place more officers on the street. In addition, they felt that in the future other agencies would be reluctant to work with WPD because of its lack of commitment and willingness to stay the course. They describe WPD as fighting this battle alone - without support, without input from other agencies, and without the community.

Some members mentioned that there have been some successful efforts in bringing the neighborhood together by establishing neighborhood watch and block captains, by walking the community with the community police officers and knock on residents doors introducing the officers, and by hosting neighborhood events to engage juveniles as well as adults. Through these efforts she has seen total community buy in. This should be a model for the rest of the city.

**Quality of Homicide Investigations**

During each of the community meetings there were a number complaints regarding the clearance rate of homicides and shootings by WPD. Over the course of several meetings, it was revealed that there is a view that prosecutors and police apparently have differing views on case status and procedures. From media reports and professional contacts, the government officials we met with had formed views of the problems, including:

- Failure to process crime scenes and evidence appropriately (we received similar information from anonymous members of the community regarding mishandling of evidence and, in one case, contraband)

- Failure to adequately staff and process crime scenes, with some alleging that officers/investigators may spend as little as two hours at a scene instead of doing whatever it takes to process the scene appropriately. It was further alleged that the officers/investigators would return the next day with a team to follow up on the case

- Failing to canvas a neighborhood immediately after such an incident means that so much is lost even up to and including the intimidation of witnesses. (One community member advised that her son’s friend was murdered at the front door of his house. Concerned for the child and the mother the community member went to the victim’s house approximately two (2) hours after the homicide and noted that the house was dark, there was no police presence and no crime scene processing, and no detectives or officers were canvassing the neighborhood.)
“Lack of Collaboration”

Since the collection of evidence is key to the success or failure of any case we inquired if there were routine or ad hoc meetings between WPD and other criminal justice agency leaders where these concerns could be addressed. We were advised that one agency attempted to arrange regular meetings, but attendance ultimately dwindled until the meetings ended. Others we spoke with shared that they had offered to meet and work together but these offers were not responded to.

In the weeks since this data collection began, we are aware that WPD has begun reaching out to key partners such as the State Prosecutor’s Office and has since established regular meetings to review major investigations. We find this action to be highly encouraging.

“Failing the Community”

In every community meeting we met with a number of family members who lost loved ones and the plea was always the same. “WPD is doing nothing. My child has been murdered and they won’t even return my phone calls.”

In one of our “walk and talks,” an official noted that the term community was too broad and felt that police should be focusing their attention on neighborhoods. When provided with a map of the neighborhood with problems spots highlighted, it was Interest to note that each problem location was one with abandoned or rundown property. During our conversation the official provided a copy of a paper entitled: Safe Neighborhoods, which describes: community engagement, initiatives for African American Males, hot spot policing, the Broken Windows Policing Model, the use of technology, and justice reinvestment. We also discussed the concept of Community Court, which is designed to offer neighborhoods a localized method for problem solving (see Attachment 5).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

There are a number of proven programs that have been successful in researching the Wilmington Delaware Criminal Justice System; however, we did not locate many resources in the area of prevention and/or intervention when it comes to juveniles.

• Examine diversion programs as alternative sanctions and deferring prosecution for juveniles who commit misdemeanor violations. A civil citation program should also be explored. The programs that are established should be done so with the inclusion of a matrix evaluating what level of services the juvenile will need. The goals are twofold: prevention and intervention.

• In addition to the alternative sanctions, the schools should consider violence prevention programs that should be taught as part of the regular curriculum. Research shows that such programs should begin as early as elementary school.

• The Wilmington community has a number of organizations that want to assist in the reduction of violence. Although well intentioned they are disorganized. It is recommended that an organization or coalition take on organizing these resources in an effort to determine their capabilities, services offered, and funding sources. Once the
information is gathered a plan of action should be implemented, coordinating the services with each of the aforementioned partners. It is our belief that once this information is collected and the backgrounds of the members are known, that they could volunteer in schools, at WPD, and assist in any of the alternative sanction programs. This is a valuable untapped community resource.

- Wilmington Police Department should establish working relationships with all of the recommended partners: school districts, prosecutor’s office, Family Court, and Youth and Family Services. Is has long worked in isolation, but to be effective it needs to establish partnerships.

- Wilmington Police Department should reestablish the Community Policing Program. This is one of the most valuable tools that it has and it has been abandoned. The failure to maintain such a program has an impact on their ability to solve the homicides.

- Recent renewed collaboration between the WPD and the State Prosecutor is highly encouraging and both entities should work together to continue these regular meetings where open cases are discussed, action steps (including outreach to crime victims) is determined and with regular follow-up to assess progress.

- WPD should re-examine its protocol for responding to major crimes, particularly homicides, to ensure that responsibilities to canvass the neighborhood and crime scenes processing requirements are spelled out.

- At every homicide the agency’s Victim Advocate should be called and considered a point of contact for family members when seeking information.

- WPD should re-examine is protocols that may impact conduct and professionalism while using social media and while on duty and particularly at crime scenes, so that conduct and statements to not exacerbate the trauma experienced by victims and family members.

- WPD and its partners should come to terms with the extent to which gangs and narcotics are driving violence in Wilmington. Although we initially heard that organized gangs were not present in Wilmington, substantial information from the community and from criminal justice agency partners and other researchers told a different story.

- Wilmington Police Department should establish a working relationship with Juvenile Probation at the leadership and working levels, and utilize its services to assist in preventing and solving crime.

- Wilmington Police Department has had diversity training with Dr. Yasser Payne from the University of Delaware. It is recommended that this process be completed annually or biannually.

FACTORS IMPACTING CRIME THAT ARE NOT POLICE RELATED:

During every interview and on every survey the respondents noted a number of other issues that they viewed as contributing factors to the crime problem, and each understood that it was beyond the scope of this report, yet we would be remiss if we did not list them.
• Potentially biased school disciplinary practices against African American students.
• Lack of employment for juveniles.
• Lack of job training programs for juveniles and adults.
• Lack of sufficient reentry programs for ex-offenders.
• Lack of or no aftercare programs for juveniles who have been released from juvenile detention.
• Neighborhood decay, abandoned properties and homes.
• Poverty.

We would recommend that local school officials expand efforts to collaborate with Family Court, the Prosecutor’s Office, Youth and Family Services, and the Police. The goal should be to use all available resources in the establishment of prevention and intervention programs.

CONCLUSIONS

If there is going to be change, old values of organizations have to be challenged. The only way to do that is through ownership, encouraging the employees to become change agents, and supporting these efforts, listening to employees throughout the organization and considering their views.

Relationships versus Partnerships:

In addition to the cultural change, every group all the way down to the 12-year-old juvenile stated that they wanted a relationship with WPD. The term relationships in policing is similar to one having an acquaintance where there is very little investment in the process. The term partnership by itself implies that there is unity and that all who buy in to the process have the same or similar goals. The key to a partnership is that there is trust and in this case that trust has to begin in the communities that WPD serves. In order to facilitate this partnership, the Community Policing Program needs to be reinstituted with an emphasis on every community that has an officer or team, meeting the residents.

Chief Cummings and the command staff do “walk and talks” all the time but they are not the officers the community deals with on a daily basis. It is suggested that these introductions be made to the residents with City Council Members by walking the Councilperson’s District, knocking on doors, and personally introducing the officer(s). With that said, the assignment to the Community Policing Unit should be viewed as a long-term assignment, a minimum of one (1) year. To change officers any sooner destroys the possibility of establishing meaningful partnerships. It is here where the information exchange begins regarding narcotics, shootings, and homicides. The Community Policing Units should have some autonomy and be allowed to organize neighborhood cleanups, sporting activities, tutoring, mentoring, and field trips as examples.

Mending Broken Partnerships with Criminal Justice Partners:

Some of the government officials within Wilmington’s criminal justice system described their relationship with WPD as being non-existent. Each noted a failure to use available resources to assist in solving cases. To repair these partnerships it will take meetings with Division
Chiefs/Directors and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the organizations detailing expectations, roles, and responsibilities.

The history of WPD is such that its only engages in programs short term and has been described as reassigning officers frequently. Again, this investment is something that has to be long term because without such a commitment there is no continuity and a lack of trust by participating agencies.

Ultimately, to fix the problems it has to begin in the halls of WPD. It must examine its core values and mission. Internal culture, including how the rank and file is heard and responded to within the agency is critical to re-examine. WPD must and should reinvest in Community Policing. WPD must reestablish its credibility with its Criminal Justice Partners. Finally, when WPD makes a commitment it must understand the value of such assignments and allow officers to remain in those assignments. Anything less destroys the bond and successful partnerships.

Community Input on
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington
Part II: Input Collected from the Community During Commission Meetings

The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission (“the Commission”) held five public meetings between February 10, 2015 and March 31, 2015. The first four of these meetings were public in nature and included cursory briefings from the Police Foundation and VRI as well as brief invited topical presentations. The bulk of the time in the first four meetings was dedicated to hearing from community organizations and entities (e.g., community organizations, business leaders, law enforcement, etc.) and members of the community. According to the Delaware Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, which staffed the Commission meetings, 277 individuals from the community attended the first four meetings, with 72 signing up to speak. Some citizens attended and spoke at multiple meetings and thus the attendance figure includes these “duplicate” counts. In addition to these public meetings, many individuals approached or contacted various members of the study team between the first meeting on February 10, 2015 and the last meeting on March 31, 2015. Despite very consistent and clear messaging that the community was “tired of being studied,” the team found the community to be very forthcoming and engaged, with some individuals even expressing disappointment about not being contacted or interviewed by the team.

The subheadings below are in quotations to reflect the fact that, in many cases, these are direct quotes from one or more community members who attended a Commission meeting.
“Establishing trust, especially between communities of color and police is as priceless and fragile as a Faberge Egg. Equally, it’s as hard to come by and easily shattered. But it is a prize worth working for. Let’s work with them and make it happen.”

- Browntown Resident’s Comments Made at the March 10, 2015 Commission Meeting

“Return to true community policing”

As stated by a neighborhood association leader and dozens of other citizens and business leaders who spoke publicly to the Commission or in individual meetings with the consultants, “we need true community policing.” Of interest to the Police Foundation is that in many communities across America, members of the public often describe community policing by its tactics, without using the “community policing” terminology or knowing that it is community policing they are describing. In Wilmington, it was overwhelmingly the opposite, with citizens not only calling for community policing by name, but describing its features as if reciting a family recipe that they had become familiar with over many years of use. This was true nearly regardless of whom we spoke to in terms of affiliation or neighborhood. Some feedback to the Commission was very specific, for example, asking for “at least 30 dedicated community officers,” or stating, “officers that are empowered to solve problems is key.” Others spoke of the trust that is both necessary for community policing to be effective and an outcome of the approach when implemented successfully: “Trust itself evolves out of relationship of two parties relating to each other as a result of having consistent engagement over a protracted period of time. Hence, the vital nature and value of having a dedicated officer getting to know and becoming embedded into a specific geographical location. But solidifying that trust also means the community willingly [taking] the risk to stand in the gap for our CPU and vouch for them to the community. Some of us are willing to step up and take that chance in order to help build that bridge between residents and the police.” Those who spoke of problem solving as a key resource that community policing brings to the community, spoke of the importance of streamlining problem solving, sharing an example of an officer who could make a phone call from the neighborhood and have the Department’s Command Bus driven to the community where it was parked on the street to serve notice to residents and troublemakers alike of the police presence in the community or to have other steps immediately taken. Those who spoke of trust as a key factor often talked about specific individuals as examples, who have earned the community’s trust through their deeds. For example, one resident shared “There is something I fundamentally believe and often state. People trust what they know. Case in point – we in the 6th district know Corporal “V” (name withheld). We know as a community we can rely on him. We know we can partner with him to devise effective strategies to deal with the crime issues specific to Browntown and experience success with our collective ideas. We know he will take our concerns seriously and address them best he can. Most importantly, the community knows that we can safely pass sensitive information to our Community officer necessary for them to do the job they do without fear of our safety being compromised.” Others referred to selected commanders in the Department who have worked hard to establish such trust and many echoed this same sentiment for Chief Bobby Cummings, as was previously echoed in The People’s Report, prepared by Yasser Arafat Payne, Ph.D. of the University of Delaware, when Chief Cummings was then a Captain in the Wilmington Police Department. This echoed what Chief Cummings told us in our first discussion with him when he shared that his policing philosophy was built around community
oriented policing and “strong connections to the community” and is also consistent with what other leaders in law enforcement shared about the Chief in our discussions with them. In addition to underscoring the importance of community engagement, problem solving and trust, those encouraging the Commission to make recommendations for the restoration of community policing also underscored the importance of consistency in assignments. Numerous citizens spoke of the importance of having an officer assigned to an area and keeping that same officer assigned for an extended period of time, to allow the relationships and trust to grow, the problems and solutions to be identified, and to give the community a chance to breathe and grow. Another member of the community noted: getting back to community or neighborhood policing as a routine manner of operation is key and is currently happening in the Downtown/Riverfront area, “but why isn’t this taking place in the other communities where there is violence?”

“Implementation is the Challenge”

At the initial public meeting of the Commission on February 10, before the fifth speaker had come to the microphone to speak, a phrase was uttered that would be heard over and over again in nearly every corner of the community: “Implementation is the challenge.” Repeatedly, community members and professionals in Wilmington’s justice community commented that one of two things typically occur in Wilmington. Most frustrating to the community is that problems are studied and nothing is done to react or to implement the recommendations. At one meeting, a community member brought copies of four prior studies and asked the Commission how this process will be different. A member of the faith community commented at the March 10 meeting that “the answers are the same from all the studies, the question is, what are we doing about it?” The other scenario that community members and justice professionals said frequently occurs is where an approach is designed and implemented to address a particular problem, but not fully or properly implemented or implemented and then dismantled or disbanded within a short period of time, before the strategy has a chance to be effective. Some seemed to suggest that this was due to an event or spike in crime that causes a “knee-jerk” reaction in the leadership, believing that the strategy isn’t effective or quickly jumping to another strategy so as to appear to be doing something about the problem. Examples of this phenomenon include the implementation of the Boston Ceasefire Model, the Hope Outreach Experience, and the Drug Market Intervention or DMI, all of which were implemented to address a particular problem but ultimately “died.” One member of the community noted his concerns with a lack of support for Cure Violence in Wilmington, another evidence-based program that holds great promise for stemming retaliatory violence among youth, citing a lack of political, managerial and resource (e.g., job opportunities) support behind the program. As one community member shared at the March 10 Commission meeting “we’ve got to rally around things that work.”

“Not Everyone is a Criminal”

Many in the community passionately spoke to us about feeling as though the police often see everyone in the community as a criminal, a comment that was often emphasized with regard to African-American males, particularly the youth. A member of the faith community commented at the March 10 meeting that youth in the community don’t trust the police due to their lack of communication and the fact that they only come into the community when there is a problem.
Others commented about what they see as disrespect by the police towards youth generally and at times towards the community generally, with some noting observed apathy and an appearance of carelessness by law enforcement while at crime scenes or on personal social media where officers allegedly posted insensitive or disrespectful comments about events in the community. To be clear, while these comments were received from a variety of individuals in the community, we also received or otherwise observed many positive comments about Wilmington law enforcement officers and the WPD, including many unsolicited favorable comments. In fact, it was somewhat surprising to hear so many community members in Wilmington acknowledge that they understood the purpose and value of law enforcement in the community and supported law enforcement’s efforts, but urged it to be done fairly and respectfully, as if arguing for procedural fairness as a means to greater legitimacy within the eyes of the community.

“Anything Other Than a Comprehensive Approach Will Not Work”

Across all four Commission meetings and in individual discussions, community members pointed out that the City has many organizations doing great work and the work they do often addresses the root causes of the safety, economic and achievement issues, which is also critical for the success of the community. It quickly became obvious that Wilmington is fortunate to have many community assets and is likely well poised to establish a broader collective efficacy than many would expect, given the recent media coverage of Wilmington. Indeed, Wilmington has more than its fair share of great, committed and talented people who are willing “to roll up their sleeves” and make their communities safer in partnership with the Wilmington Police Department and other agencies that can contribute to public safety, at the City, County, and State levels. As community members and the business community pointed out, particularly at the March 10th meeting, insufficient effort has been applied towards organizing and supporting these groups, mobilizing and coordinating their resources to fill gaps. Should there be the need for any “army of occupation” in Wilmington, it should be this army, an army of the willing. Time after time, we heard stories of organizing efforts at the neighborhood level and witnessed individuals with strong leadership skills and charisma who could do so much more if supported and enabled through a strategic, neutrally-facilitated organizing effort that brings the power of the informal and formal community groups to the places that need them and helps to ensure that those in the community who need the services and supports know where to find the resources and ultimately reach them. Many community members raised questions about who resources have gone to in the community and questioned the wisdom of providing more funding for police overtime versus allocating those funds for root causes. As one public official noted, the Commission meetings raised awareness among many of the existence of some of these groups.

A variety of other themes emerged less consistently as we heard from citizens at the Commission meetings and in individual discussions.

These themes included the importance of engaging Wilmington’s youth in the discussions of crime and safety and more generally how to improve the community. As one community member stated at the initial public meeting, “we need to support the kids raising kids.” Without question, true community policing does engage the youth in the community, as they are a key part of the community and, they are the future of all of our communities. But what was encouraged by most was a broader effort to listen to the youth in the community and to engage
them in broader problem solving, as many feel, and likely so, as things have changed since any of us walked in their shoes.

Another theme that emerged in the Commission meetings and more so in individual meetings, was the need for transparency and accountability, not only within the Wilmington Police Department, but across City government. This issue was raised in a variety of contexts, including the need for more transparent police handling of complaints against officers from the community, budget and funding transparency for services and resources within the City, officer deployment, productivity, and staffing levels, and the operation and utilization of the City’s network of cameras, most of which are monitored by City personnel located within the Downtown Visions facility. In terms of accountability, one law enforcement leader noted, “in some cases, [the community] is right, and we need to do better.” In fact, Chief Cummings at the fourth Commission meeting made a point to say to the audience that he and the Department want change as much as everyone else. The specific concerns raised regarding accountability and transparency include a feeling from within the community that it is intentionally difficult and at times citizens are discouraged from making complaints against officers. Some noted that once a complaint is made, they rarely hear anything back from the Department regarding whether the complaint was looked into and whether the allegations were founded or unfounded. The specific concerns noted with regard to the cameras centered around whether the cameras were working and if they are being actively monitored. This latter concern is the subject of a separate document within the report to the Commission, due to its importance to the community.

Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington
Part III: Input Collected from the Business Community

“The Commission should produce full disclosure on what’s being done by the City and the Police Department… lifting the veil on what’s being done. The secrecy has not been helpful.”

- Wilmington Business Leader via Individual Interview

Members of the corporate business community, representing thousands of Wilmington workers, were engaged through one-on-one interviews and through focus-group type discussions. Additionally, members of the business community were invited to the fourth Commission meeting to share their views with the Commission.

“Perception Becomes Reality”
Members of the business community stressed that the perception of crime and disorder in Wilmington is as harmful to them as the actual crimes taking place. Several members of the
business community pointed to the Newsweek and Wall Street Journal articles and the lack of positive or strategic messaging coming from the Wilmington Police Department and the City as being highly detrimental. Similarly, some commented on how stories of public order offenses and something as basic as the theft of an iPhone are like “fish stories” that grow bigger and bigger as they make their way from Wilmington to corporate headquarters and ultimately to the board room via official channels as well as the “company water cooler talk.” Many lamented about the media’s coverage of Wilmington’s crime and described it as slanted, unfair, and “glorifying” of those who commit gun violence within the City. The perceptions not only influence corporate decisions about their future in Wilmington, but impact the employees as well, with some noting that employees are “afraid to come outside.” When asked whether the business community had access to factual information from the Department and the ability to engage the Department in discussions of the crime issues, it was apparent that access was highly dependent on personal relationships as opposed to any process or mechanism of information sharing. When asked about the Police Advisory Council, Business Roundtable, or Security Advisory Committee, some in the business community were unfamiliar with those groups.

“The Police Department Doesn’t See Public Order Crimes as a Priority”

Citizens who attended and spoke at Commission meetings and business leaders who were interviewed seemed to agree that creating order in public places was a necessity. However, many believe that these offenses (e.g., public intoxication, aggressive panhandling, public indecencies, littering, loud music, etc.) are simply not a priority and that the Police Department doesn’t fully understand the impact of these crimes on employees, the business community, the perception of crime in Wilmington overall, and ultimately the economic basis of the City. Business leaders seemed to agree that there is “a big lack of visibility” by the Department and that community policing, and in particular, foot and/or bike patrols in the downtown areas were a much-needed tactic in order to address these issues.

Other issues, less consistently raised by the business community, included offers of assistance to the Police Department and/or the City from the business community and neighboring jurisdictions, which have reportedly been left unaccepted. Examples include a recent offer to provide analytic support that has not yet been followed up on and a donated substation within the LOMA area of downtown, which is “not used” according to the community. The study team did stop by this storefront during the daytime hours and found it unoccupied and having the appearance of never having been occupied. One business leader with a background in public relations did offer to provide assistance and expertise to the Police Department in terms of its communications and communications strategy. Another issue raised by members of the business community was that it is clear to them that morale within the Wilmington Police Department is very low. One business leader commented to us that good officers have left due to perceived lack of advancement and leadership and due to a perception that “if you are white, you don’t have a chance.”
“Chief Cummings is the Best Thing to Happen to That Police Department in a Long Time”

While business leaders expressed concern and frustration with what they regard as a lack of visible community policing and attention to public order in the downtown area, many business leaders, like community members, expressed strong views about what they described as very positive developments from the Police Department and from the State Attorney General’s Office. One business leader commented that “Chief Cummings is the Best Thing to Happen to That Police Department in a Long Time,” and another talked about how the WPD’s Sector Commander and the Crime Strategies Unit were working together with the business community on an effort called the Creative District Strategy, of the Wilmington Renaissance Corporation. This strategy involves reducing vacancy rates, creative place making, changing perceptions of place and engaging residents in a proactive way to improve the community and ultimately to reduce crime and improve safety. The business leader we spoke to described this as very good coordination and engagement by various members of the Wilmington Police Department and great collaboration across City and State agencies.

In addition to this positive support for the Wilmington Police Department and the State Attorney General’s Crime Strategies Unit, the business community was openly appreciative of the efforts of Downtown Visions, the management company for the Wilmington Downtown Business Improvement District (WDBID). In addition to its other roles and functions, Downtown Visions provides goodwill ambassadors in the downtown area and monitor and maintain dozens of cameras as well as supporting nearly 70 others within Wilmington. Many business leaders encouraged continued and expanded support for the work of Downtown Visions, which they say has made a tremendous difference in the downtown area.

REFERENCES


A Report of Community Input on
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 1
YOU CAN'T BUILD PEACE WITH A PIECE.

ASK YOURSELF THESE TWO (2) QUESTIONS
If you could change anything about the Wilmington Police Department what would it be?

What do you want the Chief of Police and the officers to know about you and your community?

If your truly fed up with the senseless gun violence plaguing our City & KILLING OUR CHILDREN, PROVE IT!

join me

Saturday, February 21, 2015
10:00am—2:00pm
2102 Northeast Boulevard (The Masjid)
A Report of Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 2
MOVEMENT FOR A CULTURE OF PEACE

VIOLENCE REDUCTION IN WILMINGTON

Connecting the Dots

Many new initiatives and programs seek to stem violence in Wilmington. How do they interact and overlap? What will our combined efforts look like going forward? How do we see this coming together?

PUBLIC PANEL AND OPEN DISCUSSION

BOBBY CUMMINGS, Chief, Wilmington Police Department

DOUG IARDELLA, Public Safety Liaison, City of Wilmington

DARRYL "WOLFIE" CHAMBERS, Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

DAVID J. THOMAS, Senior Research Fellow, Police Foundation

SAT., MARCH 7 — 9:00 a.m. to 11 a.m.

HANOVER PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH
1801 N JEFFERSON ST, WILMINGTON, DE 19802

Info at: www.wilmingtonpeaceproject.wordpress.com
Questions: (302) 656-2721
A Report of Community Input on
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 3
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

Directive 8.6

A. Authority

The Internal Affairs Division is a staff section which coordinates and exercises supervision over investigations and complaints or allegations of misconduct against members of the Department. Since discipline is a function of command, the responsibility for the conduct of such investigations normally rests within the chain of command. However, the Internal Affairs Division will be responsible for the following types of cases. (CALEA 52.2.4)

1. All allegations by citizens against departmental personnel.

2. All cases referred by the Chief of Police. (CALEA 52.2.4)

3. Any allegations against departmental personnel involving any violation of departmental rules, regulations, or orders, which are not suitable to the summary punishment process by nature of seriousness or other circumstantial considerations (CALEA 52.2.4)

This section applies to those instances where a violation meets the criteria for "elevation" in the classification of punishment. (See Section 8.2.)

B. Responsibilities

The Internal Affairs Division will:

1. Upon receipt of a complaint from a citizen, fully investigate the complaint.
a. All serious complaints will be recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim in a standard typed form. (CALEA 52.2.4)

b. Once the serious complaint has been transcribed, the following paragraph will be inserted at the end of the last transcribed paragraph. (CALEA 52.2.4)

I _______________________
              of _______________________
do solemnly swear/affirm that the information contained herein is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge. Further, I acknowledge receipt of a copy of this complaint.

c. The complainant will be given a copy of the complaint.

SEAL Signature of Complainant _______________________
Signature of Witnessing Official _______________________
Signature of Investigating Officer _______________________
Date _______________________

2. Enter all complaints in the Internal Affairs Control Log. Spaces will be provided for control numbers, departmental case numbers where applicable; name, rank, badge number, and assignment of the alleged violator, date and time complaint was received or investigation ordered by the Chief of Police; nature of the alleged violation; name of the reporting person, (if sworn, name, rank, and badge number of reporting officer); date and time of all reports submitted relative to the complaint; if suspended, date and time, date and time case is presented to departmental Complaint Hearing Board; date and time of any appeal action on the case. In addition, the Internal Affairs Division is required to document and maintain all disciplinary action by subject matter or charge. (CALEA 52.1.2)

3. Safeguard the Internal Affairs Control Log, files, and other records of the division. Access to inactive files shall be limited to the Inspector of Staff Inspections, the Chief of Police, The Director of Public Safety, and the City Solicitor. Physical control of inactive files shall be the responsibility of the Inspector of Staff Inspections. Access to active files shall be limited to the Chief of Police, the Director of Public Safety, the Inspector of Staff Inspectors, the Commander of Internal Affairs Division, Internal Affairs investigating officers, and the City Solicitor. Other persons may be permitted access to Internal Affairs records from time to time by order of the Chief of Police upon the advice of the City Solicitor. (CALEA 52.1.2)

4. Be responsible for the expeditions and timely investigation of all complaints.

5. Assist in preliminary investigations conducted by other units of the department:

   a. Upon their justifiable request.

   b. When Inspector of Staff Inspections concludes that the circumstances
warrant elevation in the classification of a violation (as per Section 8.2). Conduct an investigation at the request of any member of the department, who upon showing of justification, believes he is threatened by false accusation or the complaint is contrived by ulterior motives. Such persons are permitted to report their situations directly to the Inspector of Staff Inspections, without prior knowledge or approval of their immediate superiors. Suspected criminal activity or activity contrary to the regulations so stated in this manual shall be reported in the above manner.

6. It will be the responsibility of the Commanding Officer of the Internal Affairs Division, or his designee, to notify the Chief of Police, or his designee, as soon as possible under the following circumstances: (CALEA 52.2.2, 52.1.3)

a. Any incident where the possibility exists that an officer may face criminal prosecution.

b. Any police action, where there is an allegation of misconduct which may result in public dissemination of the complaint and/or the possibility of public inquiry or discredit.

7. The Commanding Officer of the Internal Affairs Division, or his designee, will inform the Chief of Police, or his designee, of all other complaints of police misconduct through the normal chain of command. (CALEA 52.2.2, 52.1.3)

C. Review of Complaints (CALEA 52.2.8)

The Internal Affairs Division will review complaints and classify each complaint as substantiated, unsubstantiated, unfounded, proper conduct, or policy failure according to the following criteria:

**SUBSTANTIATED:** There is sufficient proof to confirm the allegation by a preponderance of the evidence. In any case where a complaint against an officer is not substantially refuted by opposing facts or testimony and the Internal Affairs investigator determines that conflicting versions of the allegations cannot be resolved without resort to the taking of live testimony to test the credibility of the witnesses, then the complaint shall be deemed substantiated for purpose of referring it to a Complaint Hearing Board for a hearing.

**UNSUBSTANTIATED:** There is insufficient proof to confirm the allegation.

**UNFOUNDED:** The allegation is either demonstrably false or there is no credible evidence to support it.

**PROPER CONDUCT:** The officer is exonerated, in that he conducted himself in the
manner alleged, but was within policy guidelines.

POLICY FAILURE: A review by the Internal Affairs Division will be made to determine if the policy is proper or improper, or if additional training is required.

D. Substantiated Complaints

After a complaint has been classified as "substantiated," the Internal Affairs Division will:

1. When the action recommended to the Chief of Police falls under the provisions of the Summary Punishment Section, the Internal Affairs Division will be notified in writing, and will inform the accused. From the time of his being informed, the accused will have twenty-four (24) hours to waive or exercise his right, in writing, to a departmental hearing.

2. Upon receipt of written notice from the accused that he is requesting a Complaint Hearing Board, a report will be forwarded to the Inspector of Staff Inspections requesting the convening of a Complaint Hearing Board.

3. Upon receipt of a written notice from the accused, that he is waiving this right to departmental Complaint Hearing Board, a report will be forwarded to the Inspector of Staff Inspections, with specific recommendations, for approval or revision. (See Summary Punishment Section 8.9)

E. All internal investigations of departmental personnel will be conducted in such a manner as to safeguard the rights of all parties involved.

F. When an internal investigation involves administrative issues related to duty performance, the employee(s) may, or may not, be required to participate in the following:

1. medical or laboratory examinations
   a. can be administered as per the substance abuse policy (Dir. 6.43)(CALEA 52.2.6)

2. photographs
   a. if a photo identification of an officer is needed, a photo book of all members of the Department is maintained in the Internal Affairs Division(CALEA 52.2.6, 22.2.7)

3. line up
   a. officers are not required to participate in a physical line-up(CALEA 52.2.6)

4. financial disclosure
a. officers are not required to submit a financial disclosure statement (Police Officers Bill of Rights)(CALEA 52.2.6)
A Report of Community Input on
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 4
From: Dunn, Matthew (DOJ)
Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2015 3:58 PM
To: Dunn, Matthew (DOJ)
Subject: Invitation to Members of the General Assembly

Dear Colleagues:

I am writing to invite you to participate with us at 11:30 on Wednesday, January 21 in the unveiling of an exciting proposal that will have a profound impact on some of our most economically distressed and crime-stricken communities. The event will be in the Carvel State Office Building auditorium (2nd floor).

As you may know, the U.S. Department of Justice and several state Attorney General’s offices (including Delaware’s) investigated wrongdoing by a number of banks that resulted in massive disruption to the nation’s financial markets and the 2008 economic recession from which we are still recovering. The settlement of those investigations and resulting lawsuits, in addition to providing direct relief to some homeowners and the state’s pension funds, has also resulted in the state having $36,615,801 that it is permitted to spend to (a) remediate harm the state suffered from the mortgage and financial crisis, and (b) improve housing. Given the nature of the settlement, the settlement funds are not meant to be used to simply supplant existing state programs or for programs that do not target economically impacted areas or individuals.

Although the Attorney General’s Office has, in the past, independently exercised its common law authority to distribute lawsuit settlement funds, we believe that given the unprecedented sum of money involved in this settlement, it is a sound practice to consult with the Governor and General Assembly regarding the expenditure of the funds. We have already consulted with the Governor and obtained his agreement regarding the use of the funds. We will next be seeking to enter into an agreement with the General Assembly’s Joint Finance Committee regarding that same use of the funds, before disbursing them.

The plan that we will be unveiling on Tuesday, which we have agreed upon with the Governor and will be presenting to the Joint Finance Committee in February, is called Lifting Up Delaware’s Communities. It consists of three components:

1. **Investing In People and Neighborhoods.** An investment of almost $16 million in programs to help youth succeed, provide treatment for Delawareans with substance abuse disorder, help inmates being released from our prisons to avoid re-offending and going back to jail, and fund a variety of policing and other
enrichment activities for economically impacted communities. Specifically, we are proposing:

a. **Substance Abuse Treatment.** We are proposing that $3 million be spent over a period of three years establish additional treatment facilities for persons suffering from substance abuse disorder or related conditions.

b. **After-School and Summer Programs.** We are proposing that $3 million be spent over three years for summer and after-school programs targeted at children from economically disadvantaged neighborhoods.

c. **Prison Re-Entry Programs.** We are proposing that $3 million be spent over three years to provide competitive grants to non-profit organizations that assist persons being released from correctional facilities in Delaware to avoid new criminal offenses.

d. **Community Policing and Community Support.** We are proposing that $5.9 million be allocated to the state’s Neighborhood Building Blocks Fund, which can make grants for a broad array of government and non-profit efforts to support economically impacted neighborhoods. The fund currently has $1 million available from a prior bank settlement. One example of a potential use of these funds is the Wilmington neighborhood foot patrol initiative that the Department of Justice and the City of Wilmington are about to propose to the Fund. We are also proposing that $1 million of the funds be used to continue the existence of the Department of Justice’s Crime Strategies Unit, which is designed to address underlying causes of crime in economically disadvantaged areas (such as abating nuisance properties).

2. **Providing Help to Our High-Poverty Schools.** We are proposing to invest almost $5 million in adding teachers and paraprofessionals for the 16 elementary schools in Delaware with the highest percentage of low-income students. Each of the following elementary schools would receive $300,000 over a three year period to hire additional teachers or paraprofessionals to provide additional assistance with their students:

i. Brimingham Elementary (Cape Henlopen School District)
ii. East Dover Elementary (Capital School District)
iii. Towne Point Elementary (Capital School District)
iv. Bancroft Elementary (Christina School District)
v. Elbert Palmer Elementary (Christina School District)
vi. Pulaski Elementary (Christina School District)
vii. Stubbs Elementary (Christina School District)
viii. Eisenberg Elementary (Colonial School District)
ix. Colwyck Elementary (Colonial School District)
x. Dunbar Elementary (Laurel School District)
xii. Highlands Elementary (Red Clay School District)
xiii. Lewis Dual Language Elementary (Red Clay School District)
xiv. Richardson Park Elementary (Red Clay School District)
xv. Shortlidge Elementary (Red Clay School District)
xvi. Warner Elementary (Red Clay School District)
xvi. West Seaford Elementary (Seaford School District)

3. Promoting Affordable Housing and Development In Economically Impacted Areas. We are proposing to invest almost $16 million in efforts to promote affordable housing and economic development in economically impacted areas of the state. Specifically:

a. Foreclosure Prevention. We are proposing to direct $1.5 million to the Delaware Mortgage Assistance Program to help Delaware homeowners prevent foreclosures on their primary properties.

b. Affordable Housing. We are proposing to dedicate over $10 million to the Delaware State Housing Authority's Strong Neighborhoods Revolving Housing Fund, which is dedicated to the creation of affordable housing in economically impacted areas.

c. Economic Development in Low Income Areas. We are proposing to devote almost $4 million to the Downtown Development Districts Program, half of which would be used to provide down payment assistance to homeowners willing to purchase homes in those districts.

We believe that this ambitious investment in Delaware's economically impacted communities has the potential to transform parts of our state. We hope that you can join us on Wednesday at 11:30 at the Carvel State Office Building auditorium to help unveil this proposal to use these settlement funds in a targeted way that will have a real impact on people in our state who desperately need help.
A Report of Community Input on
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 5
From: Denn, Matthew (DOJ)
Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2015 3:58 PM
To: Denn, Matthew (DOJ)
Subject: Invitation to Members of the General Assembly

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defendant in avoided victimization costs relative to similar cases processed in a
traditional misdemeanor court. After factoring the upfront costs of operating the Justice
Center, total savings in 2008 were $6,852,477.

C. Wilmington Today

Demographics
According to 2010 U.S. Census data, the city of Wilmington, DE encompasses 17 square miles and is
home to 70,851 individuals, a decrease of 2.5% compared to 2000. Census data also revealed that 23% of
individuals fell below the poverty line and 21% of individuals over the age of 18 lack a high school
diploma. As of August 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 10.7% of the population is
unemployed.

Crime Rates and Quality of Life
In 2013, the Wilmington Police Department received over 80,000 calls for service. Of those, at least 25%
involved low-level, quality of life matters such as disorderly conduct, drugs, loitering, prostitution,
shoplifting, and trespassing. In addition, during the first six months of 2013, Delaware 2-1-1 received
over 14,000 calls from Wilmington residents in need of housing, food, and financial assistance.

In 2013, the Justice of the Peace Court surveyed 180 Wilmington community members at local
community meetings and forums to gauge their perceptions of crime, public safety, and overall quality of
life conditions. What follows is a summary of their responses:

- 36% rated the quality of life in their neighborhood as poor or very poor;
- Between 30-50% of respondents (based on the specific issue) view quality of life crimes, such as
  drug selling, loitering, theft, public drinking, pan handling, and vandalism as a big problem;
- 35% feel unsafe on the street and in local parks;
- At least a third reported neighborhood problems—such as needed street repairs, drug use,
  abandoned or rundown buildings, and littering—as big problems;
- 34% characterized the court system as ineffective in responding to community problems;
- The top five services requested by respondents include employment/job training, housing
  assistance, financial services, substance use and mental health services, and children and
  family services;
- Nearly half (47%) are in support of alternative sanctions.

Delaware Justice of the Peace Court Operations
The Justice of the Peace Court is Delaware's entry-level court and is responsible for arraignment in the
vast majority of all criminal cases. The criminal jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court includes, but

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55 This data is not complete as it does not include crime data from the New Castle County PD or the State Police also involved in
the City of Wilmington and northern New Castle County.
5. **Accountability**

Community courts send the message that all criminal behavior—even low-level "quality-of-life" crime—has an impact on community safety. By promoting community restitution and insisting on regular and rigorous compliance monitoring—and clear consequences for non-compliance—community courts seek to improve the accountability of offenders.

6. **Outcomes**

Community courts emphasize the active and ongoing collection and analysis of data—measuring outcomes and processes, costs and benefits. Dissemination of this information is a valuable symbol of public accountability.

**II. Community Court Results**

A growing body of research supports the effectiveness of community courts in reducing crime, changing sentencing practices and reducing jail time, improving public trust, increasing accountability, and saving money. What follows are highlights of some community courts’ success in meeting these goals.

* **Reducing Crime and Recidivism**
  
  - Midtown Manhattan New York street prostitution fell by 56%; illegal vending fell by 24%.
  - The crime rate in Melbourne, Australia was rate reduced by 12%; burglaries down by 26%, and motor vehicle thefts down by 38%.
  - A recent impact evaluation of the Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York found a 10% recidivism reduction compared to traditional courts.
  - Washington D.C.'s East of the River Community Court experienced a 42% reduced rate of reoffending.

* **Increasing Accountability and Reducing Disorder**
  
  - Midtown New York community service compliance rate is 85%, compared to 50% in the traditional system.
  - Use of community service sanctions in Red Hook and Midtown New York contributed 75,000 hours and $600,000 worth of labor per year.

* **Changing Sentencing Practice**
  
  - 7% of resolved cases at Red Hook resulted in jail sentences compared to 17% in the traditional court.
  - 75% of Red Hook dispositions involved the use of community and/or social services, compared to 19% in the traditional court.

* **Improving Public Trust**
  
  - 62% of Red Hook residents feel safe on the street at night, up from 40%.
  - 85% of Red Hook defendants felt *one handled fairly*.
  - 57% of Midtown New York residents willing to pay more taxes for a community court; 94% of Red Hook residents approve of the court.

* **Saving Money**
  
  - For each of the 3,210 adult misdemeanor defendants assigned at the Red Hook Community Justice Center, taxpayers realized an estimated savings of $756 per
A. What is a Community Court?

Community courts are neighborhood-focused courts that attempt to harness the power of the justice system to address local problems. They can take many forms, but all focus on creative partnerships and problem-solving. Community courts strive to create new relationships, both within the justice system and with outside stakeholders such as residents, merchants, churches, and schools. And they test new and aggressive approaches to public safety rather than merely responding to crime after it has occurred. Community courts employ the following six principles:

1. **Enhanced Information**
   Community courts are dedicated to the idea that better staff training combined with better information (about litigants, victims, and the community context of crime) can help improve the decision-making of judges, attorneys, and other justice officials. The goal is to help practitioners make more nuanced decisions about individual defendants, ensuring that they receive an appropriate level of supervision and services.

2. **Community Engagement**
   Community courts recognize that citizens, merchants, and neighborhood groups have an important role to play in helping the justice system identify, prioritize, and solve local problems. By actively engaging citizens in the process, community courts seek to improve public trust in justice.

3. **Collaboration**
   Community courts engage a diverse range of people, government agencies, and community organizations in collaborative efforts to improve public safety. By bringing together justice players and reaching out to potential partners beyond the courthouse (e.g., social service providers, victims groups, schools), community courts improve interagency communication, encourage greater trust between citizens and government, and foster new responses to local problems.

4. **Individualized Justice**
   By using validated evidence-based risk and needs assessment instruments, community courts seek to link offenders to individually tailored community-based services (e.g., job training, drug treatment, safety planning, mental health counseling) where appropriate. In doing so (and by treating defendants with dignity and respect), community courts help reduce the use of incarceration and recidivism, improve community safety, and enhance confidence in justice. Linking offenders to services can also aid victims, improving their safety and helping restore their lives.
is not limited to, all criminal violations, low-level criminal misdemeanor cases, and violations of the County Code and other ordinances of municipalities.

Case load
In 2013, there were over 30,000 cases filed in the Justice of the Peace Courts 10 and 20, of which more than a third were non-traffic case filings. Of those, 13% (or 1309) include low-level crimes, such as disorderly conduct, littering, shoplifting, open container, underage drinking, and panhandling. The following chart illustrates the breakdown of charges currently being considered for the Justice Center:

Disposition Rates and Sentencing Practices
In 2013, 26% (or 2706) of all non-traffic cases were disposed at Courts 10 and 20. The remaining 74% were transferred to a higher court. This begs the question: if the JP Court could offer additional sentencing options for cases within its jurisdiction, would the number of cases transferred decrease?

Of those cases disposed, 30% (or 815) were found guilty, of which the vast majority (83%) received a fine. The most common fine was in the $30 - $50 range. Unfortunately, this type of outcome tends to make little impact on defendants or the community and often times results in unpaid fines and outstanding warrants.

footnote
21 According to the justice of the Peace Court statistical summary, out of 10,224 case filings in Court 10 and 20, there were 12,384 non-traffic offenses and 13,840 traffic-related offenses.
Summary Review & Findings: Wilmington’s Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System
Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission:
Summary Review and Findings:
Wilmington’s Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System

Introduction
During the course of the Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission’s assessment period from February 2015 to March 2015, the topic of Wilmington’s CCTV resources and operations was repeatedly raised by nearly every segment of the community, both in Commission meetings and in individual discussions.

This report provides a discussion of the CCTV program, clarifies how the system is supported and operated, summarizes input from the community and Wilmington agencies, and offers findings and recommendations for further analysis and improvement in the effectiveness of the system.

Methodology
In addition to collecting feedback from the community via meetings in the community and Commission meetings, interviews were conducted with the business community and various agencies in Wilmington, including the Wilmington Police Department and the State Attorney General’s Office. The study teams from both VRI and the Police Foundation visited Downtown Visions and its camera operations center and interviewed the Executive Director on several occasions and reviewed selected Downtown Visions’ documents related to camera functioning.

Limitations
The most significant limitation encountered in this analysis was time. In order to fully assess the CCTV system and its potential for improving community safety in Wilmington, a more in-depth analysis and technical assistance effort would be required. This review attempts to raise issues for further consideration before additional investments are made and attempts to address the community’s concerns regarding the operation of the cameras.

The Use of CCTV to Improve Community Safety – What We Know
A growing number of cities in the U.S. have turned to CCTV to improve community safety, either by reducing or diffusing crime, reducing the fear of crime, increasing perceptions of community safety, and/or providing evidence needed to solve crimes that have occurred. This CCTV trend in the U.S. has leapt forward since 2001, purportedly in response to the terrorist attacks that occurred in that year. Ahead of the U.S. is England, which has a much longer history with CCTV and, naturally, with evaluating the impacts of CCTV on crime and safety. Considering the many evaluations and meta-analysis conducted in England and some conducted in the U.S., namely of New York and Los Angeles’ systems, we know from this research that CCTV has the potential to reduce certain property crimes (e.g., auto-related thefts, burglaries) but has had mixed reviews in reducing violent crime in any demonstrable, statistically significant way. Similarly, the data show mixed reviews about reducing the fear of crime and improving perceptions of safety, however
many feel that the deterrent effects of CCTV are yet to be truly tested or understood. In some studies, CCTV systems demonstrated reductions or diffusion of crime, but not always for all crimes and not always without displacement. Most importantly for Wilmington however, is the clear finding that the success of CCTV in reducing or deterring any crime and being useful in solving crimes is substantially dependent on a variety of factors, including:

- Camera placement
- Hotspot coverage
- Camera monitoring
- Control room operations
- Use of the video
- Technical capabilities
- Clear understanding of system goals and objectives

For an excellent overview of CCTV’s potential benefits and limitations in impacting community safety, including a review of major CCTV studies prior to 2006, see the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing’s Response Guide titled Video Surveillance of Public Places (2006), by Professor Jerry Ratcliffe. (www.popcenter.org)

**Downtown Visions**

According to its website, Downtown Visions was established as a non-profit organization in 1994 and “is the management company for the Wilmington Downtown Business Improvement District (WDBID), also known as an assessment or special services district, supported by mandatory assessments on real property and governed by a private-public Board of Directors. The BID encompasses 70 blocks and more than 730 properties.” According to Downtown Visions, it raised $800,000 to fund the purchase and installation of the first 25 Downtown cameras, as well as, the installation, service charges and service contracts required to support the operation of these cameras. Sometime after 2001, the system was transferred to the City of Wilmington. Downtown Visions agreed to provide at no-cost to the City, six staff to monitor the 25 cameras it turned over to the City. The City assumed the on-going system costs and began monitoring operations from within the Police Department. In the early 2000’s, the City added an additional camera outside of the Downtown area and the Wilmington City Council added several additional cameras within the City, which were connected to monitoring operations center within the Wilmington Police Department. At some point shortly thereafter, concerns about the Police Department’s monitoring of the cameras and staffing sufficiency were raised, at the same time the City Council was considering adding additional cameras around the City. The City Council and the Police Department then approached Downtown Visions and asked them to take over monitoring of the cameras and it agreed to do so, through a for-profit entity it created, called Clean & Safe Services (the non-profit component of Downtown Visions is limited to operating within the business improvement district). This was accomplished by contracting with the Wilmington Police Department. Reportedly, the Wilmington Police Department
contracted with Clean & Safe Services to facilitate and monitor the cameras, initially paying for nine staff to monitor the newly added neighborhood cameras, while the non-profit Downtown Visions continued to monitor the Downtown cameras without charge to the City or Police Department. Over time, additional cameras were added to the system, reaching 86 as of today, according to Downtown Visions, although there may be as many as 95 cameras throughout the City’s network if cameras belonging to agencies such as Public Works are included.

It was conveyed to us that the program was a significant success, resulting in the identification of criminal suspects and solving many crimes committed in Wilmington. At some point, like many other police agencies in the U.S., the Wilmington Police Department experienced a difficult budgetary environment signaled its intentions to end camera monitoring, to which City Council disagreed and required monitoring to continue, but reduced the number of staff involved in monitoring, effectively reducing the number of staff monitoring what was reportedly 70 cameras at that time from nine to two, causing an alleged significant reduction in arrests resulting from the cameras.

**Camera Monitoring and Usage**

Today, Downtown Visions employs six staff who monitor approximately 25 cameras within the Business Improvement District, seven days a week for at least 16 of 24 hours. The approximately 70 cameras placed outside of the Business Improvement District are supported by the City, through a contract with Clean & Safe Services, however this contract only pays for two staff to monitor the cameras five days a week. These two staff split shift to provide coverage for approximately 16 of 24 hours, which amounts to one person monitoring approximately 70 cameras during the times and days monitored. According to those we interviewed, at least 10 additional staff are needed.

Those we interviewed stated that the staff monitoring cameras have the ability to call the Wilmington Police Department’s dispatchers and have access to a Computer Aided Dispatch terminal. However, significant concerns were raised about what occurs from this point forward. Allegedly, very little use of the cameras is seen, and when those monitoring the system attempt to alert the Wilmington Police Department dispatch center to potential criminal activity spotted on the cameras, the calls are de-prioritized or not responded to until after the activity has ended. As stated to us, “for the most part, the technology goes unused” and there are apparently no protocols for how the cameras or recordings are to be used within the Police Department.

**Community Concerns**

In multiple interviews with community and business leaders and particularly at the March 10 and 17 Commission meetings, concerns were raised about the functionality of the cameras and in one particular incident, whether or not video of a homicide or homicide suspect was available. It was stated by a member of the community that a detective had informed them that the camera was not working on
the day of the homicide however other officials have said that the cameras were in fact working on that day. One community member stated that many in the community believe that the cameras often don’t work and that the absence of “a red light” indicated that the camera was not working. However, those operating the cameras indicated that there are no indicator lights of any color on the cameras they operate. It would seem unnecessary to have such a light, given that the camera operations center would clearly know if a camera was not functioning and there would be no need to indicate functional levels on the camera itself. In response to these concerns, the study team contacted Downtown Visions following the March 17 Commission meeting, which Downtown Visions attended as a member of the business community. We learned that Downtown Visions assesses all cameras it monitors and those that the City monitors within the Downtown Visions operations center at least twice every week, completing a Camera Status Report. It should be noted however that Downtown Visions does not currently own all of the cameras it supports through monitoring. Many cameras are owned by the City and others were purchased independently by community or business groups, but are “piped into” Downtown Visions to support monitoring. In these cases, Downtown Visions only monitors the cameras but does not provide for the general administration and funding of the camera’s operation.

We asked to review the most recent Camera Status Report and were permitted to do so. Our analysis shows that only 5 of a reported 79 cameras or 6% were not functioning to a degree that would likely impair their use entirely. Approximately 10 other cameras were reported to need adjustment in color, positioning or control, or in need of dome cleaning, but remained functioning. However, there are seven additional cameras in one area that had been shut off for some time by the internet service provider due to an administrative issue with the organization that purchased and installed the cameras (not Downtown Visions, Clean & Safe Services or the City). On the day we were provided with this information, the company that services the camera hardware was reportedly performing repairs.

On Tuesday, March 23, 2015, Downtown Visions allowed us to review a camera a status report for that day, in follow-up to our review of a prior report a week earlier. That report shows that three of the cameras in need of service the prior week were now reported in working order. The report also shows that seven of the 86 reported cameras (8%) were not operable on that day and a number of others in need of some kind of service, but still functioning. Of the cameras that were not operable, three had apparently remained out of service for the period of time since the prior report.

Our view is that the vast majority of cameras are operating, even if in need of service, such as cleaning, etc. We believe that it is reasonable to assume that operating a substantial CCTV network, particularly one with a combination of older and newer hardware, is costly and frequent repairs are often required, as the cameras are typically exposed to the elements and to intentional vandalism. With this in mind, and having reviewed the documentation provided by Downtown
Visions, we believe that Downtown Visions has appropriate internal controls and practices to properly and promptly identify and remediate camera malfunctions.

**Findings & Recommendations**

Wilmington is fortunate to have such an extensive system of cameras and two organizations (Downtown Visions and Clean & Safe Services) that are willing to support the system properly. However, without the necessary support from the City and the Wilmington Police Department, the system will never reach its fullest potential. The primary support needed includes a sustained and appropriate funding level and prioritization of CCTV system administration and use. While an appropriate funding level cannot be determined from this review, a proper analysis of the technology (software/hardware), operations and administration should be considered, in order to allow the development of a multi-year funding strategy and plan that is not subject to annual budget negotiations. Further, given the history of how cameras were added in piecemeal fashion to the system through the political process, it is essential that an assessment and planning process be considered to ensure that the factors critical for success have been taken into consideration. These factors include:

- Camera placement
- Hotspot coverage
- Camera monitoring
- Control room set up/operations
- Use of the video
- Technical capabilities
- Clear understanding of system goals and objectives

Many of these factors can become highly technical and quantified. For example, some studies have even considered factors such as camera saturation, exploring the ratio of cameras to desired coverage area, the ratio of cameras to staff, features to assist in keeping monitors oriented (e.g., maps, camera perspective/placement), etc.

As part of this review, which could clearly impact the funding needed to operate the system, it is important to also consider how the video is used within investigations for example, or whether the system is designed to deter crime, in addition to enabling crimes to be solved. If the system is designed to deter crime, Wilmington must come to terms with the fact that the entirety of camera locations is currently not something made public, which obviously diminishes the deterrence effect (see Ratcliffe, 2009). The City of Baltimore and many others around the U.S. currently publish geo-coded data on the locations of their cameras, permitting anyone to map their locations. It may also be important to identify a means of increasing transparency related to camera functioning, such as providing aggregate up time/down time statistics. Bringing the community into this review is strongly recommended.
The following recommendations are intended to serve as a starting point for improving Wilmington’s use of its CCTV network and to guide the use of existing resources that are reportedly available in the City and other possible resources:

City stakeholders should be engaged to ensure that the goals and objectives of the CCTV system are consistent with camera administration and with the research on the effectiveness of CCTV cameras in improving community safety.

Before making further investments in additional cameras, an analysis of Wilmington’s CCTV system should be undertaken to examine factors such as camera placement, hotspot coverage, camera monitoring, control room set up/operations, use of the video, and technical capabilities. It is understood that such an analysis is being undertaken, spearheaded by Attorney General’s Office and supported by the Violence Reduction Network (VRN).

An immediate increase of at least two Downtown Visions staff to monitor the 70 neighborhood cameras is needed, until the analysis previously recommended can be completed.

With an increase of staff, the cameras must be monitored seven days per week and should be monitored at least 16 hours each day.

The Wilmington Police Department should place a “light-duty” officer within the Downtown Visions camera control room to serve as the liaison between Downtown Visions and the Wilmington Police Department Dispatch Center while cameras are monitored.

The Wilmington Police Department should develop a protocol that describes how the CCTV system will be used within the agency, setting expectations and standards for interaction with Downtown Visions regarding the cameras, and requiring consultation with Downtown Visions regarding investigations and requiring that data be maintained within the CAD system to track calls or referrals from Downtown Vision camera operators to the Wilmington Police Department. This data should be reviewed monthly by the Police Department leadership in consultation with Downtown Visions leadership as part of a performance contract and frequently shared with City Council and the community.

Downtown Visions and the City should enhance transparency to address the community’s belief that the cameras don’t work, sharing data publicly as well as in regular reports to the City Council and other funding sources. A simple ratio of camera down time to up time published daily or weekly may suffice to reassure the community that their investment is working for them. Additionally, a broader transparency may have other benefits and may be worth considering, including potential crowdsourced video monitoring of IP-based cameras with partner organizations or the broader community.
The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

Guidance Concerning Violence Reduction and Patrol Allocation
Guidance on Violence Reduction

The following guidance is offered regarding violence reduction in Wilmington and should be read in conjunction with the first part of this report which addresses many of these areas.

Overview
Violence reduction requires the utilization of law enforcement and other government, private, and community organizations working in a coordinated effort.

An Intelligence led-Policing approach focusing on real-time crime analysis should be followed.

Data under Intelligence Led Policing needs to be constantly reviewed to engage in predictive policing and deploy resources based on the most current trends and patterns.

All supervisors and officers require the ability and knowledge to access and understand current crime analysis data allowing them to reduce crime and disorder, and importantly preventing crime through work with community members.

Proactive steps should be taken to address conditions at hotspots before crime occurs.

The resources, skills and ability of other law enforcement agencies need to be fully utilized. Considering that the City of Wilmington and New Castle County account for much of the criminal activity in Delaware, joint operations should be regularly conducted with the Delaware State Police, the New Castle County Police Department, and other law enforcement agencies.

Internal WPD Coordination
The Sector Captains should be recognized as having primary responsibility for reducing crime, planning, coordinating and addressing all conditions within their area of responsibility. The Captains need to work in unison focusing on the Citywide crime picture while coordination resources in their individual assigned sector.

The Sector Captains should plan and implement coordinated responses with all law enforcement and other strategic partners.

Sector Captains must consistently coordinate with their counterparts in the Drug, Organized Crime, and Vice Division and the Investigative Operations Division to ensure all appropriate information is being shared and coordinated plans are being implemented.

The Sector Captains should regularly meet with the Community Policing and School Resource Officers assigned to their Sector to discuss community concerns, crime trends, and other relevant information on crime preventative measures.

Sector Lieutenants should be reassigned to their prior positions as Platoon lieutenants. They should work the same hours and tours as their platoon and be responsible for coordinating and deploying resources in focused team led enforcement considering citywide crime issues and emerging trends.
Platoon lieutenants should work closely with the three sector captains to devise crime control strategies, and to identify and respond to current and emerging issues in each sector. This citywide approach, in the long term, should reduce the amount of overtime currently needed to provide minimum patrol coverage while more effectively addressing crime problems.

Platoons Lieutenants should have a citywide view concerning crime and have the capability to address emerging issues with existing patrols or by requesting specialized units be quickly deployed.

Platoon lieutenants and Sergeants should be responsible for the daily implementation of effective tactics which should include regular team lead enforcement to address drug markets and quality of life offenses.

Lieutenants should utilize patrol Sergeants and all available resources with a goal of making hotspot areas violence free. Drug arrests should be focused in areas prone to violence.

Once narcotics arrests have been made, preexisting plans need to be implemented to stabilize the area through visible uniformed presence.

Consideration should be given to assigning an officer to Downtown Visions during high crime times and special operations to utilize their cameras to identify the sellers and buyers of illegal drugs.

Gangs or crews engaged in illegal activity should be identified and prioritized with plans involving WPD, Federal, State, and County law enforcement agencies to dismantle them.

Supervisors must ensure officers maximize time on patrol and avoid administrative or other tasks that unnecessarily take them out of sector.

The Officers’ efforts must be specifically focused and directed toward violence reduction, quality of life issues and disorder that lead to crime and community concern, in addition to response to crimes or crimes in progress. To allow for maximum efficiency, adequate staffing levels must be maintained on patrol and excessive excusals are not to be granted.

Specific directions must be given to Officers concerning activities to be engaged in when not on radio-directed assignment. These would include parking and interacting with the community at specific locations within a hotspot. They should record these contacts with time noted on their daily activity sheets.

Community Policing Officers should focus efforts in areas prone to violence as part of a larger plan.

Canine and Traffic Officers assigned in cars should have at the Platoon lieutenants and Sergeants direction time on foot patrol and should focus their preventative and enforcement activities to violent hotspots, pedestrian corridors prone to robbery, and to the disruption of drug markets in hotspot areas. Consideration should be given to their deployment immediately after narcotics or other arrests are made to provide continued stabilization of the location.
Selected Officers should be assigned in unmarked cars to interdict crimes in progress and identify individuals carrying guns. The WPD should contract with a rental service agency to have a rotating number of rental cars.

The Department may consider initiating truancy enforcement in the early hours of the day to ensure youth understand the City’s commitment to education.

School resource Officers should be an integral part of Department efforts to reduce violence by participating in the education of students, addressing truancy, and providing a conduit for school-age youth to provide information on pending violence and illegal gun possession.

Officers should use a variety of tactics to address quality of life offenses from civil nuisance abatement, requesting changes in the structural environment, and enforcement efforts.

Officers should ensure accusatory instruments are immediately forwarded to the Attorney General’s Office to start nuisance abatement proceedings when appropriate.

Addressing quality of life issues should be a particularly high priority in the hotspot areas.

Detectives should debrief each person arrested to gain intelligence concerning homicides, shootings and other crime. The information can be entered into the State DELJIS system for future analysis and use in investigations.

Officers on patrol may also utilize the existing Field Service Report in the MDT's to enter information for further analysis.

Detectives should enhance felony arrests from within the hotspot areas to ensure maximum prosecution and to assist junior Officers’ learning to prepare the most prosecutable cases.

**Outreach**

Working groups that include members from other government agencies, business and the local community can assist through consultation, input, and a commitment to a coordinated violence reduction program.

The Chief should meet with the executives of in charge of Juvenile Probation to determine the most effective methods of coordination between agencies including possible assignment of a Juvenile Probation Officer to work with the WPD.

Regular public outreach should occur with business and community members, including informal unscheduled visits within the hotspot areas, to provide reassurance, inform parties of the policing efforts. Business size cards can be printed and carried by Officers for distribution to the public providing the number of a hotline where civilians may call with information about past crimes, suspects, and conditions requiring systematic evaluation and response.

Government, civic leaders, clergy, and community members may be invited to bi-weekly walk the streets with ranking Police Officers. These walks show unified support for corrective action and allow all stakeholders to offer their guidance concerning community and business concerns as well as the enforcement efforts of the WPD.
Consideration should be given to creating a not-for-profit Foundation that will assist the Department in obtaining critical resources including technology.

The Park and Walk program in which Officers exit their cars and engage the community should be made more robust with specific training given to officers on engaging the community. Consideration should be given to having Officers distribute pre-stamped postcards addressed to a WPD postbox to allow the public to offer comments on their encounter with officers and provide other information to the Police.
Patrol Allocation

Patrol allocation models address the number of calls for service that must be answered, the number of Officers required to answer them, and a determination of the amount of non-committed time available to Officers in which they may engage in proactive policing.

While we would have liked to consider a deployment model for each of the three sectors, the existing Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD’s) data available limited our efforts to an evaluation and creation of a patrol allocation model for the entire City. A new CAD system was being installed as we conducted our research and it may make such further analysis possible.

Several CAD’S data reports were provided by the WPD. The one with the largest number of calls for service indicates that in 2014 there were 101,553 calls for service. A close review suggests approximately 80,000 to 85,000 of these are actual calls for service with an additional approximately 20,000 cases involving other activity.1

For purposes of modeling a response to calls for service, we adopted a larger number of 88,173 calls for service that is provided in separate WPD “Unit by Unit” CAD report. While this number probably over estimates the calls for service, using 88,173 should ensure adequate resources are available to answer all calls, provide for Officer safety, and also indicate whether additional time is available for proactive policing efforts.

Among the 88,173, variations in calls for service vary up to 30% monthly from a low 6,354 in February of 2014 to a high of 8,240 in August 2014. If, however, the six months of the year with the greatest number of calls for service are examined the furthest deviation is less than 11% with 7,446 vs 8,240 calls at peak month. Examining the six months with the most calls reveals a monthly average of 7,967 calls within an overall a 184 day period. We have again chosen the peak months to ensure adequate resources are deployed.

The above analysis reveals that during the peak six months of 2014, the Department averaged 260 calls for service daily or 11 calls per hour, were the calls evenly distributed. Available data indicate the highest distribution of calls occurred within the 8 hour period between 3 p.m. and 11 p.m. with 40% of calls or an average 15 calls per hour. An analysis of the busiest 11 hour period from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. revealed considerable consistence ranging from 5.2% to 5.8% of the total calls for service each hour, and an average just under 15 calls per hour at 14.4. The two busiest hours from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. and from 8

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1 Although CAD’S data provided by the WPD indicates that in 2014 officers responded to 101,553 calls for service, a closer review suggests approximately 80,000 to 85,000 calls for service may be a more accurate number, with the additional 15,000-20,000 involving proactive policing. A review of the “Calls for Service by Call Type,” and discussions with WPD staff indicates that as is common in many Police Departments, the calls for service data has within it record-keeping concerning proactive policing. For example, the data indicate 5,677 Park and Walk (referring to events where officers exit their cars and walk among community members); 12,604 traffic stops; 3280 persons stopped. These numbers total over 20,000 of the calls for service. Our discussions with WPD personnel and our own experience in law enforcement suggest that the majority of these calls are self-initiated Police activity. Relying simply on the 5677 “park and walk” calls plus the 12,604 traffic stops, the calls for service data is reduced from 101, 553 to 83,272.
p.m. to 9 p.m. average 15.08 calls for service. (By comparison, the early hours of the morning have as little 3 to 5 calls per hour.)

Additionally CAD data indicate that the average time on a call for service during the last six months of 2014 was 20:28 minutes, with 19.06 on week days and 24:10 on weekends. The last six months of 2014 were considered since the current three sector deployment was in place.

We have made several calculations to ascertain the required patrol strength for deployment. First, recognizing that it is appropriate for officer and public safety to be cautious and assume the maximum time required for an average call for service, we have utilized the 24.10 minutes average on the weekend as a starting point for calculation. Put another way, we have assumed for our first calculation that 24.10 minutes average is the 7 day average, not just the weekend. We have rounded this to a call average time of .40% of a cars available time within one hour to answer one call for service.

Based on this calculation during the consistent period averaging 15 calls for service, 6 cars would be required were 100% of their time dedicated to call response. It is reasonable to assume however, that some calls require a response of two cars. Again, with attention to officer and public safety, we have assumed a high estimate that such a response is required in 33% percent of calls. At the same time we recognize that a second and even a third car often arrives on a scene to leave in short course. We have therefore assigned an average 12 minute time (.20 percent of their hourly time) to this second car being present. It is of course recognized that on some calls the second car will leave almost immediately (e.g., unfounded shots fired) and on others it will stay long periods of time (e.g., man actually shot). Statistically then, one additional car would be required for this function, assuming that backup were their only function and they respond to 33% of the calls as backup.

Based on this analysis, WPD would require 7 cars were the officer’s sole function radio call response and were calls evenly distributed during these peak times.

We are currently aware that the WPD has a 3 sector model with 3 patrol districts in each sector. They report they regularly deploy 3 cars with two officers to each of these sectors or 9 cars in total with 18 officers staffing them. They also deploy one person cars as available with a goal of three per sector or one per district. This full deployment requires a total of 27 officers although it is often not reached.

If 24 officers are working, the deployment of 18 officers to 2 person sector cars, with the deployment of an additional 6 officers to one person sector cars, will result in a radio call utilization rate of 46%. If 26 officers are working the utilization rate decreases to 41% during peak weekend hours. An analysis of weekdays during peak hours reveals a patrol utilization rate of 40% with 24 officers working and 35% with 26 officers working.

We recommend the assignment of at least 31 officers to each platoon. With 31 Officers, between 4 (12%) and 6 (19%) members of the platoon could be granted excusals at any given time, and the above utilization rates maintained during peak hours.

The above analysis does not include the role of other Police units that also should be handling some calls for service (e.g., canine, traffic, and community policing officers). It does assume that resources are being effectively managed and that when required cars are being assigned to respond to calls across sector boundaries. We further note that this model is further complicated in the WPD by the existence of a power tour to cover the peak hours and a smaller deployment that covers the early
morning hours. The resources to create each of these deployments are drawn from one of the two platoons that work on any given day. We do not have hourly breakdowns of average calls for service time to allow for adequate evaluation, but it is reasonable to assume that the power tour deployment would lower the utilization rate during the busiest hours.

END