

The Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment

By Lawrence W. Sherman and Richard A. Berk

Under a grant from the National Institute of Justice, the Minneapolis Police Department and the Police Foundation conducted an experiment from early 1981 to mid-1982 testing police responses to domestic violence. A technical report of the experiment can be found in the April 1984 issue of the *American Sociological Review*. This report summarizes the results and implications of the experiment. It also shows how the experiment was designed and conducted so the reader may understand and judge the findings.

Findings in Brief

The Minneapolis domestic violence experiment was the first scientifically controlled test of the effects of arrest for any crime. It found that arrest was the most effective of three standard methods police use to reduce domestic violence. The other police methods—attempting to counsel both parties or sending assailants away from home for several hours—were found to be considerably less effective in deterring future violence in the cases examined. These were not life-threatening cases, but rather the minor assaults which make up the bulk of police calls to domestic violence.

The findings, standing alone as the result of one experiment, do not necessarily imply that all suspected assailants in domestic violence incidents should be arrested. Other experiments in other settings are needed to learn more. But the preponderance of evidence in the Minneapolis study strongly suggests that the police should use arrest in most domestic violence cases.

Why the Experiment Was Conducted

The purpose of the experiment was to address an intense debate about how police should respond to misdemeanors, cases of domestic violence. At least three viewpoints can be identified in this debate:

1. The traditional police approach of doing as little as possible, on the premise that offenders will not be punished by the courts even if they are arrested, and that the problems are basically not solvable.
2. The clinical psychologists' recommendations that police actively mediate or arbitrate disputes underlying the violence, restoring peace but not making any arrests.
3. The approach recommended by many women's groups and the Police Executive Research Forum (Loving, 1980) of treating the violence as a criminal offense subject to arrest.

If the purpose of police responses to domestic violence calls is to reduce the likelihood of that violence recurring, the question is which of these approaches is more effective than the others?

Policing Domestic Assaults

Police have been typically reluctant to make arrests for domestic violence (Berk and Loseke, 1981), as well as for a wide range of other kinds of offenses, unless a victim demands an arrest, a suspect insults an officer, or other factors are present (Sherman, 1980). Parnas' (1972) observations of the Chicago police found four categories of police action in these situations: negotiating or otherwise "talking out" the dispute; threatening the disputants and then leaving; asking one of the parties to leave the premises, or, very rarely, making an arrest.

Similar patterns are found in many other cities. Surveys of battered women who tried to have their domestic assailants arrested report that arrest occurred in only ten percent (Roy, 1977:35) or three percent (see Langley and Levy, 1977:219) of the cases. Surveys of police agencies in Illinois (Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, 1978) and New York (Office of the Minority Leader, 1978) found explicit policies against arrest in the majority of the agencies

surveyed. Despite the fact that violence is reported to be present in one-third (Bard and Zacker, 1974) to two-thirds (Black, 1980) of all domestic disturbances police respond to, police department data show arrests in only five percent of those disturbances in Oakland (Hart, n.d., cited in Meyer and Lorimer, 1977:21), six percent of those disturbances in a Colorado city (Patrick, Ellis, and Hoffmeister, n.d., cited in Meyer and Lorimer, 1977:21), and six percent in Los Angeles County (Emerson, 1979).

The best available evidence on the frequency of arrest is the observations from the Black and Reiss study of Boston, Washington, and Chicago police in 1966 (Black, 1980:182). Police responding to disputes in those cities made arrests in 27 percent of violent felonies and 17 percent of the violent misdemeanors. Among married couples (Black, 1980:158), they made arrests in 26 percent of the cases, but tried to remove one of the parties in 38 percent of the cases.

The apparent preference of many police for separating the parties rather than arresting the offender has been attacked from two directions over the past 15 years. The original critique came from clinical psychologists who agreed that police should rarely make arrests (Potter, 1978:46; Fagin, 1978:123-124) in domestic assault cases and argued that police should mediate the disputes responsible for the violence. A highly publicized demonstration project teaching police special counseling skills for family crisis intervention (Bard, 1970) failed to show a reduction in violence, but was interpreted as a success nonetheless. By 1977, a national survey of police agencies with 100 or more

officers found that over 70 percent reported a family crisis intervention training program in operation. Although it is not clear whether these programs reduced separation and increased mediation, a decline in arrests was noted for some (Wylie, et al., 1976). Indeed, many sought explicitly to *reduce* the number of arrests (University of Rochester, 1974; Ketterman and Kravitz, 1978).

By the mid-1970s, police practices were criticized from the opposite direction by feminist groups. Just as psychologists succeeded in having many police agencies respond to domestic violence as “half social work and half police work,” feminists began to argue that police put “too much emphasis on the social work aspect and not enough on the criminal” (Langley and Levy, 1977:218). Widely publicized lawsuits in New York and Oakland sought to compel police to make arrests in every case of domestic assault, and state legislatures were lobbied successfully to reduce the evidentiary requirements needed for police to make arrests for misdemeanor domestic assaults. Some legislatures are now considering statutes requiring police to make arrests in these cases.

The feminist critique was bolstered by a study (Police Foundation, 1976) showing that for 85 percent of a sample of spouse killings, police had intervened at least once in the preceding two years. For 54 percent of those homicides, police had intervened five or more times. But it was impossible to determine from the data whether making more or fewer arrests would have reduced the homicide rate.

How the Experiment Was Designed

In order to find which police approach was most effective in deterring future domestic violence, the Police Foundation and the Minneapolis Police Department agreed to conduct a classic experiment.

A classic experiment is a research design that allows scientists to discover the effects of one thing on another by holding constant all other possible causes of those effects. The design of the experiment called for a lottery selection, which ensured that there would be no difference among the three groups of suspects receiving the different police responses (Cook and Campbell, 1979). The lottery determined which of the three responses police officers would use on each suspect in a domestic assault case. According to the lottery, a suspect would be arrested, or sent from the scene of the assault for eight hours, or given some form of advice, which could include mediation at an officer’s discretion. In the language of the experiment, these responses were called the arrest, send, and advise treatments. The design called for a six-month follow-up period to measure the frequency and seriousness of any future domestic violence in all cases in which the police intervened.

The design applied only to simple (misdemeanor) domestic assaults, where both the suspect and the victim were present when the police arrived. Thus, the experiment included only those cases in which police were empowered, but not required, to make arrests under a recently liberalized Minnesota state law.

The police officer must have probable cause to believe that a cohabitant or spouse has assaulted the victim within the past four hours. Police need not have witnessed the assault. Cases of life-threatening or severe injury, usually labeled as a felony (aggravated assault), were excluded from the design.

The design called for each officer to carry a pad of report forms, color coded for the three different police responses. Each time the officers encountered a situation that fit the experiment's criteria, they were to take whatever action was indicated by the report form on the top of the pad. The forms were numbered and arranged for each officer in an order determined by the lottery. The consistency of the lottery assignment was to be monitored by research staff observers riding on patrol for a sample of evenings.

After a police action was taken at the scene of a domestic violence incident, the officer was to fill out a brief report and give it to the research staff for follow-up. As a further check on the lottery process, the staff logged in the reports in the order in which they were received and made sure that the sequence corresponded to the original assignment of responses.

Anticipating something of the background of victims in the experiment, a predominantly minority, female research staff was employed to contact the victims for a detailed, face-to-face interview, to be followed by telephone follow-up interviews every two weeks for 24 weeks. The interviews were designed primarily to measure the frequency and seriousness of victimizations caused by a

suspect after police intervention. The research staff also collected criminal justice reports that mentioned suspect's names during the six-month follow-up period.

Conduct of the Experiment

As is common in field experiments, the actual research process in Minneapolis suffered some slippage from the original plan. This section recounts the difficulties encountered in conducting the experiment. None of these difficulties, however, proved finally detrimental to the experiment's validity.

In order to gather data as quickly as possible, the experiment was originally located in two of Minneapolis' four precincts, those with the highest density of domestic violence crime reports and arrests. The 34 officers assigned to those areas were invited to a three-day planning meeting and asked to participate in the study for one year. All but one agreed. The conference also produced a draft order for Chief Anthony Bouza's signature specifying the rules of the experiment. These rules created several new situations to be excluded from the experiment, including whether a suspect attempted to assault police officers, a victim persistently demanded an arrest, or both parties were injured. These additional exceptions allowed for the possibility that the lottery process would be violated more for the separation and mediation treatments than for the arrest treatment. However, a statistical analysis showed that these changes posed no threat to the

validity of the experiment's findings.

The experiment began on March 17, 1981. The expectation was that it would take about one year to produce about 300 cases. In fact, the experiment ran until August 1, 1982, and produced 314 case reports. The officers agreed to meet monthly with Lawrence W. Sherman, the project director, and Nancy Wester, the project manager. By the third or fourth month, two facts became clear: Only about 15 to 20 officers either were coming to meetings or turning in cases and the rate at which the cases were turned in would make it difficult to complete the project in one year. By November, it was decided to recruit more officers in order to obtain cases more rapidly. Eighteen additional officers joined the project. But like the original group, most of these officers turned in only one or two cases. Indeed, three of the original officers produced almost 28 percent of the cases, in part because they worked a particularly violent beat and in part because they had a greater commitment to the study. A statistical analysis showed that the effects of police actions did not vary according to which officer was involved. Since the lottery was by officer, this condition created no validity problem for the cases in the study.

There is little doubt that many of the officers occasionally failed to follow fully the experimental design. Some of the failures were due to forgetfulness, such as leaving report pads at home or at the police station. Other failures derived from misunderstanding about whether the experiment applied in certain situations; application of experimental rules

under complex circumstances was sometimes confusing. Finally, there were occasional situations that were simply not covered by experimental rules.

Whether any officer intentionally subverted the design is unclear. The plan to monitor the lottery process with ride-along observers broke down because of the unexpectedly low frequency of cases meeting the experimental criteria. Observers had to ride for many weeks before they observed an officer apply one of the treatments. An attempt was made to solve this problem with "chase alongs," in which observers rode in their own car with a portable police radio and drove to the scene of any domestic call dispatched to any officer in the precinct. Even this method failed.

Thus, the possibility existed that police officers, anticipating from the dispatch call a particular kind of incident and finding the upcoming experimental treatment inappropriate, may have occasionally decided to ignore the experiment. In effect, they may have chosen to exclude certain cases in violation of the experimental design. Such action would have biased the selection of the experiment's sample of cases, but there is little reason to believe it actually happened. On the other hand, had they, for example, not felt like filling out extra forms on a given day, this would not affect the validity of the experiment's results.

Table One shows the degree to which the three treatments were delivered as designed. Ninety-nine percent of the suspects targeted for arrest actually were arrested; 78 percent of those scheduled to receive advice did;

and 73 percent of those to be sent out of the residence for eight hours actually were sent. One explanation for this pattern, consistent with experimental guidelines, is that mediating and sending were more difficult ways for police to control a situation. There was a greater likelihood that officers might have to resort to arrest as a fallback position. When the assigned treatment is arrest, there is no need for a fallback position. For example, some offenders may have refused to comply with an order to leave the premises.

This pattern could have biased estimates of the relative effectiveness of arrest by removing uncooperative and difficult offenders from mediation

guys" relative to the other treatments.

Fortunately, a statistical analysis of this process shows that the delivered treatments conformed very closely to the experimental design, with no problems of bias.

Things went less well with interviews of victims; only 205 (of 330, counting the few repeat victims twice) could be located and initial interviews obtained, a 62 percent completion rate. Many of the victims simply could not be found, either for the initial interview or for follow-ups. They had left town, moved somewhere else, or refused to answer the phone or doorbell. The research staff made up to 20 attempts to contact these victims and often

Table One
Designed and Delivered Police Treatments in Domestic Assault Cases

Designed Treatment	Delivered Treatment			Total
	Arrest	Advise	Separate	
ARREST	98.9% N=91	0.0% N=0	1.1% N=1	29.3% N=92
ADVISE	17.6% N=19	77.8% N=84	4.6% N=5	34.4% N=108
SEPARATE	22.8% N=26	4.4% N=5	72.8% N=83	36.3% N=114
TOTAL	43.3% N=136	28.3% N=89	28.3% N=89	100% N=314

and separation treatments. Any deterrent effect of arrest could be underestimated and, in the extreme, arrest could be shown to increase the chance of repeat violence. In effect, the arrest group would have too many "bad

employed investigative techniques (asking friends and neighbors) to find them. Sometimes these methods worked, only to have the victim give an outright refusal, or break one or more appointments to

meet the interviewer at a “safe” location for the interview.

The response rate to the biweekly follow-up interviews was even lower than for the initial interview, as response rates have been in much research on women crime victims. After the first interview, for which the victims were paid \$20, there was a gradual falloff in completed interviews with each successive wave; only 161 victims provided all 12 follow-up interviews over the six months, a completion rate of 49 percent. Whether paying for the follow-up interviews would have improved the response rate is unclear; it would have added over \$40,000 to the cost of the research. When the telephone interviews yielded few reports of violence, every fourth interview was conducted in person.

Fortunately, there is absolutely no evidence that the experimental treatment assigned to the offender affected the victims’ decision to grant initial interviews. Statistical tests showed there was *no* difference in victims’ willingness to give interviews according to what police did, race of victim, or race of offender.

In sum, despite the practical difficulties of controlling an experiment and interviewing crime victims in an emotionally charged and violent social context, the experiment succeeded in producing a promising sample of 314 cases with complete official outcome measures and an apparently unbiased sample of responses from the victims in those cases.

Results

The 205 completed initial interviews provide some sense of who the subjects involved in domestic violence are, although the data may not properly represent the characteristics of the full sample of 314. They show the now familiar pattern that domestic violence cases coming to police attention disproportionately involve unmarried couples with lower than average education levels, who are disproportionately minority and mixed race (black male, white female) and who are very likely to have had prior violent incidents with police intervention. The 60 percent unemployment rate for the experiment’s suspects is strikingly high in a community with only about five percent of the workforce unemployed. The 59 percent prior arrest rate is also strikingly high, suggesting (with the 80 percent prior domestic assault rate) that the suspects generally are experienced law-breakers who are accustomed to police interventions. But with the exception of the heavy representation of Native-Americans due to Minneapolis’ proximity to many Indian reservations, the characteristics in Table Two are probably close to those of domestic violence cases coming to police attention in other large U.S. cities.

Table Two
Victim and Suspect
Characteristics: Initial
Interview Data and Police
Sheets

A. Unemployment

Victims	61%
Suspects	60%

B. Relationship of Suspect to Victim

Divorced or separated husband	3%
Unmarried male lover	45%
Current husband	35%
Wife or girlfriend	2%
Son, brother, roommate, Other	15%

C. Prior Assaults and Police Involvement

Victims assaulted by suspect, last 6 months	80%
Police intervention in domestic dispute, last six months	60%
Couple in counseling program	27%

D. Prior Arrests of Male Suspects

Ever arrested for any offense	59%
Ever arrested for crime against person	31%
Ever arrested on domestic violence statute	5%
Ever arrested on an alcohol offense	29%

E. Mean Age

Victims	30 years
Suspects	32 years

F. Education

	Victim	Suspect
<high school	43%	42%
high school only	33%	36%
>high school	24%	22%

G. Race

	Victim	Suspect
White	57%	45%
Black	23%	36%
Native-American	18%	16%
Other	2%	3%

N=205 (Those cases for which initial interviews were obtained)

Two kinds of measures of repeat violence were used in the experiment. One was a police record of an offender repeating domestic violence during the six-month follow-up period, either through an offense or an arrest report written by any officer in the department or through a subsequent report to the project research staff of an intervention by officers participating in the experiment. A second kind of measure came from the interviews in which victims were asked if there had been a repeat incident with the same suspect, broadly defined to include an actual assault, threatened assault, or property damage.

The technical details of the analysis are reported in the April 1984 *American Sociological Review*. The bar graphs in Figures 1, 2, and 3 approximate equations presented in that article, which made statistical adjustments for such problems as the falloff in victim cooperation with the interviews. Figure 1 shows the results taken from the police records on subsequent violence. The arrest treatment is clearly an improvement over sending the suspect away, which produced two and a half times as many repeat incidents as arrest. The advise treatment was statistically not distinguishable from the other two police actions.

Figure 1. Percentage of Repeat Violence Over Six Months for Each Police Action
Official Records: N = 314




Figure 2 shows a somewhat different picture. According to the victims' reports of repeat violence, arrest is still the most effective police action. But the advise category, not sending the suspect away, produced the worst results, with almost twice as much violence as arrest. Sending the suspect away produced results that were not statistically distinguishable from the results of the other two actions. It is not clear why the order of the three levels of repeat violence is different for these two ways of measuring the violence. But it is clear that arrest works best by either measure.

Additional statistical analysis showed that these findings were basically the same for all categories of suspects. Regardless of the race, employment status, educational level, criminal history of the suspect, or how long the suspect was in jail when arrested, arrest still had the strongest violence reduction effect. There was one factor, however, that seemed to govern the effectiveness of arrest: whether the police showed interest in the victim's side of the story.

Figure 3 shows what happens to the effect of arrest on repeat violence incidents when the police do or do not take the time to listen to the victim, at least as the victim perceives it. If the police do listen, that reduces the occurrence of repeat violence even more. But if the victims think the police did not take the time to listen, then the level of victim-reported violence is much higher. One interpretation of this finding is that by listening to the victim, the police "empower" her with their strength, letting the suspect know that she can influence their behavior. If police

ignore the victim, the suspect may think he was arrested for arbitrary reasons unrelated to the victim and be less deterred from future violence.

Figure 2. Percentage of Repeat Violence Over Six Months for Each Police Action
Victim Interviews: N = 161





Figure 3. Percentage of Repeat Violence Over Six Months for Each Police Action and Listening to Victim*
Victim Interviews: N = 194



*All bars are approximate, and are drawn from a multivariate model that includes the effects of the prior number of arrests for crimes against persons.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

It may be premature to conclude that arrest is always the best way for police to handle domestic violence, or that all suspects in such situations should be arrested. A number of factors suggest a cautious interpretation of the findings:

Sample Size. Because of the relatively small numbers of suspects in each subcategory (age, race, employment status, criminal history, etc.), it is possible that this experiment failed to discover that for some kinds of people, arrest may only make matters worse. Until subsequent research addresses that issue more thoroughly, it would be premature for state legislatures to pass laws requiring arrests in *all* misdemeanor domestic assaults.

Jail Time. Minneapolis may be unusual in keeping most suspects arrested for domestic assault in jail overnight. It is possible that arrest would not have as great a deterrent effect in other cities where suspects may be able to return home within an hour or so of arrest. On the other hand, Minneapolis seems to have the typical court response to domestic violence: only three out of 136 of the arrested suspects ever received a formal sanction from a judge.

Location. Minneapolis is unusual in other respects: a large Native-American population, a very low rate of violence, severe winters, and low unemployment rate. The cultural context of other cities may produce different effects of police actions in domestic violence cases.

Interviewer Effect. Strictly speaking, this experiment showed the effects of three police responses *plus* an intensive effort by middle class women to talk to victims over a six-month follow-up. It is possible that the interviewers created a “surveillance” effect that deterred suspects. Whether the same effects would be found without the interviews is still an open question.

A replication of the experiment in a different city is necessary to address these questions. But police officers cannot wait for further research to decide how to handle the domestic violence they face each day. They must use the best information available. This experiment provides the only scientifically controlled comparison of different methods of reducing repeat violence. And on the basis of this study alone, police should probably employ arrest in most cases of minor domestic violence.

Legislative Implications The findings clearly support the 1978 statutory reform in Minnesota that made the experiment possible. In many states the police are not able to make an arrest in domestic violence cases without the signed complaint of a victim. In at least one state (Maryland), police cannot make an arrest without a warrant issued by a magistrate. This experiment shows the vital importance of state legislatures empowering police to make probable cause arrests in cases of domestic simple assault.

Impact of the Experiment. As a result of the experiment’s findings, the Minneapolis Police Department changed its policy on domestic assault in early March of 1984. The policy did not make

arrest 100 percent mandatory. But it did require officers to file a written report explaining why they failed to make an arrest when it was legally possible to do so. The policy was explained to all patrol officers in a roll call videotape. The initial impact of the policy was to double the number of domestic assault arrests, from 13 the weekend before the policy took effect to 28 the first weekend after. On one day in mid-March there were 42 people in the Minneapolis jail on spouse assault charges, a record as far as local officials could remember.

The experiment apparently has done more than contributed to knowledge. It also has helped to change police behavior in Minneapolis, and possibly in other cities as well. If the findings are truly generalizable, the experiment will help ultimately to reduce one of the most common forms of violent crime.

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When I was a young police officer in Oakland, California, nothing perplexed or concerned me more than dealing with domestic assault cases, the staple and bane of every patrol officer's work life. I sensed that my colleagues and I were not doing enough to deter future violence. We had little guarantee that when we left the scene of a violent domestic assault, it would not recur. But, frankly, like other police officers, we did not know what we could do to prevent new eruptions of violence in domestic settings.

I believe the nation's almost half million police officers are tired of responding with the same old non-effective prescriptions to the plight of the battered victims who get caught up in domestic fights. So when I was appointed director of the National Institute of Justice, I was determined to help find the answer to what the police could do to deter domestic violence. The job of NIJ is to get practical answers to important, policy relevant problems such as this one.

The answer, as this report documents, appears to be that the police should use arrests quite frequently in typical domestic violence cases if they want to reduce assaults. More research, of course, is needed before we can say that only arrest should be used in cases of domestic assault. But the Minneapolis research is very useful in guiding our way.

How the research was obtained is a landmark in policing about which readers should know. For the first time in the history of police research, a police department permitted experimentation with officers' responses to a situation involving a specific offense. As this report notes, to permit the experiment to happen, the responses were determined through a lottery method. In that way, the three typical police responses to domestic violence calls received a fair test. The Minneapolis Police Department deserves immense credit for being the laboratory in which we could gain, in the most effective way possible, important new information about a common, serious police problem.

James K. Stewart
Director, National Institute of Justice

No call for service is more familiar, challenging, and personally disheartening to a police officer than the summons to a domestic assault. Once again, two people living together are engaged in physical violence; once again, there are bruises, blood, and, perhaps, broken bones; once again, there has been an assault, and the officer fears that worse might occur. Often, terrified children witness the battle and pick up an early lesson that violence is somehow an appropriate way of dealing with problems and frustrations.

What does the officer do?

The common police tradition has been to do little. Physical violence within the home was thought to be exempt from the same laws which keep acquaintances or strangers from assaulting each other on the streets. The battered partner in the typical domestic fight was unlikely to sign a complaint, the officer learned from experience. The problems which caused the violence were probably chronic and unsolvable. So the officer restores a semblance of order, warns the assailant to behave, perhaps sends him out of the home, and goes on to the next call.

However, an increasing public awareness of the toll of domestic violence—of its injury to women, as a harbinger of possible homicide, and for its damaging psychological effects on children—has called into question the traditional police response of doing little or nothing when they intervene. But on what could the police rely if they sought to change their response to domestic violence? Hunch, supposition, tradition had been their guides and they seemed insufficient.

So the Police Foundation, through scientific inquiry, sought to supplant tradition with fact in resolving the question: How can the police deter future domestic violence?

The answer to the question and how it was obtained are in this report which I urge the police, policy makers, government officers, and concerned citizens to read and consider. Domestic violence, along with child abuse, is the quiet criminal plague of American life and must be curbed. I believe the Minneapolis experiment makes substantial progress in suggesting how the police can deter such violence.

Patrick V. Murphy
President, Police Foundation

Police handling of chronic, thorny problems such as domestic violence cases usually has been characterized by seat-of-the-pants adoption of remedies thought to work. But little lay behind such cures except an untested belief in their efficacy. Domestic violence provided a fine example of the way police approached difficult problems. Clearly productive answers based on hard evidence were needed.

The Minneapolis domestic violence experiment not only provides new insights into the spouse assault problem and its solutions, but it highlights the general need for analysis, experimentation, and evaluation in law enforcement.

A number of factors traditionally have worked against a belief that arrest works best in both gaining leverage over assailants and deterring future violence. These factors included the absence of legislation that would enable officers to make arrests in misdemeanor assault cases that did not occur in their presence; the male dominated psychology of a police world that did not relish interference in a “man’s castle” and affairs; and the notable reluctance of cowed women to come forward or, having found the courage, to see the process of arrest and prosecution through.

The domestic violence experiment, by demonstrating the efficacy of an arrest policy, influenced the Minneapolis legislature to make necessary changes; reshaped the policies of the Minneapolis Police Department to force more arrests; and reinforced the feminist thrust calling for stricter adherence to an arrest policy in domestic violence cases.

All of this combined to change dramatically the way Minneapolis Police Department looks at, and responds to, domestic violence cases. The policy will be to arrest. The law enables us to do so and women, the usual victims, are being persuaded to come forward.

We believe an important step has been taken and that this step will influence police handling of domestic violence cases nationally. This experiment, in which the National Institute of Justice, the Police Foundation, and the Minneapolis Police Department participated, has, we think, blazed a new trail for law enforcement’s progress.

Anthony V. Bouza
Chief of Police, Minneapolis Police Department

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Gayle Gubman
Donileen Loseke
Debra Morrow
Phyllis Newton
David Rauma
Roy Roberts

Minneapolis police officers taking part in the experiment:

Edward Belmore
Dalyn R. Beske
Theodore J. Boran
Jeffrey A. Drew
Perry Dunfee
Dayton Dunn
Michael J. Falkowski
John T. Frazer
Duane A. Fredrickson
Riley N. Gilchrist
Manuel J. Granroos
Jack Hanson
Gregory S. Hestness
Phillip Hogquist
Charles R. Howe
James E. Howell
Wayne E. Humphrey
George R. Janssen
Luther C. Koerner
Charles Lechelt
David A. Lindman

Carmelo Morcillio
Marie Morse
William H. Nelson
Craig Nordby
Dennis Nordstrom
Keith L. Oldfather, Jr.
James M. Palmborg
Stephen L. Persons
Thomas Peterson
Timothy K. Prill
Myron D. Rognlie
David Rumpza
Michael R. Sauro
Michael H. Schoeben
Eugene A. Schreiber
Robert A. Thunder
Clinton Tucker
Matthew J. Vincent
Thomas E. Wallick
Martha Will

About the Police Foundation

The Police Foundation is a private, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to supporting innovation and improvement in policing. Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure, and works to transfer to local agencies the best information about practices for dealing effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns.

Our purpose is to help the police be more effective in doing their job, whether it be deterring robberies, intervening in potentially injurious domestic disputes, or working to improve relationships between the police and the communities they serve. To accomplish our mission, we work closely with police officers and police departments across the country, and it is in their hard work and contributions that our accomplishments are rooted.

The foundation has done much of the research that led to a questioning of the traditional model of professional law enforcement and toward a new view of policing—one emphasizing a community orientation. As a partner in the Community Policing Consortium, the foundation, along with four other leading national law enforcement organizations, plays a principal role in the development of community policing research, training, and technical assistance.

The foundation's Institute for Integrity, Leadership, and Professionalism in Policing (IILPP) helps police departments to acquire both the knowledge gained through research and the tools needed to integrate that knowledge into police practices. Working with law enforcement agencies seeking to improve accountability, performance, service delivery, and community satisfaction with police services, the IILPP offers a wide range of assessment, technology, training, education, certification, management, and human resources services.

The foundation has developed two state-of-the-art technologies to enable police agencies to systematically collect and analyze a wide range of performance-related data. The RAMS™II (The Risk Analysis Management System) is an early warning device that helps agencies manage and minimize risk. The QSI™ (Quality of Service Indicator) collects and analyzes officer-citizen contacts, including traffic stop data. Both The RAMS™II and the QSI™ produce detailed reports to assist police managers in making critical personnel and operational decisions.

The foundation's state-of-the-art Crime Mapping Laboratory (CML) works to advance the understanding of computer mapping and to pioneer new applications of computer mapping. The CML provides training and technical assistance to police agencies seeking to incorporate mapping technologies and applications into their crime analysis and patrol operations.

Other foundation projects are also directed at the improvement of policing. For example, the foundation has helped to create independent organizations dedicated to the advancement of policing, including the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF).

Motivating all of the foundation's efforts is the goal of efficient, effective, humane policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation.



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