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An Assessment of the Preparedness of Private Security in Shopping Malls to Prevent and Respond to Terrorist Attack Since the events of September 11, 2001, security concerns have figured prominently in the national agenda. Government officials and the public now recognize a wider array of potential terrorist targets extending beyond military installations. These “soft targets”, or areas with public access, include transit hubs, schools, and mass private spaces like amusement parks and sports arenas. One type of soft target that has received too little attention is the retail mall. With all the other soft targets that exist (e.g., transit systems, schools, hospitals, etc.), why should citizens be concerned about attacks against shopping malls? One reason is that the nature of malls makes them very vulnerable: there are multiple entrances and exits, and they are open to the public. Large numbers of people come and go, making it easy for potential terrorists to blend in unnoticed. Many of the visitors carry large parcels that could hide a bomb or other weapon. There are multiple ways to attack a mall, ranging from automatic weapons to car bombs to bombs placed inside the mall, even to an attack using a biological or chemical agent. Moreover, the consequences of an attack could be quite serious. In the case of an attack using a biological or chemical agent, or a bomb blast resulting in structural collapse, the casualties could be very high. An attack could also produce insurance and job losses. A coordinated series of attacks against malls would almost certainly result in long-term lost business and serious regional or national economic consequences, as we saw in the airline industry following 9/11. For the most part, malls and other soft targets that are part of our homeland security concerns are protected, not by public police, but by private security. Thus, the events of 9/11 thrust private security officers into a new and important role. Recognizing this reality, several states—including California, Illinois, and Michigan—took steps to more closely regulate the industry in the year following 9/11/2001.(1) How has the industry itself responded to the increased responsibility? Media reports after 9/11 suggested that little had changed. An early 2003 USA Today story characterized private security as “homeland defense’s weak link.”(2) Although a few states had introduced or raised hiring or training standards, the USA Today story showed that most states still do not impose minimum training standards or even require background checks. Moreover, even in states that did require training programs, there was little effort to monitor the content or quality of the programs. The Police Foundation, in cooperation with the Vera Institute of Justice, the ASIS International Foundation, and the Midwest Research Institute, in cooperation with researchers at the University of Eastern Kentucky and Carlton University undertook an assessment of the level of security in large enclosed shopping malls as well as the associated issues of training and legislation of private security forces. The core issue we address in this report is the degree to which malls have become better prepared to respond to terrorist attacks in the aftermath of 9/11. The investigation we conducted went well beyond earlier surveys conducted after 9/11. It included surveys with 33 state homeland security advisors to get their views on mall preparedness as well as surveys with 120 security directors of the nation’s largest indoor retail malls. We conducted site visits to eight U.S. malls and two Israeli malls to gain greater insight into how they are dealing with security preparedness and response to disasters. We conducted a state-by-state analysis of legislation regulating the hiring and training of private security. The detailed assessment indicates what malls are doing in the areas of risk assessments, preventive measures, emergency preparedness plans, training, and coordination with state and local government. The comprehensive picture that emerges of the state of security in large retail malls suggests that (a) there are significant gaps in preparedness, (b) there are relatively inexpensive steps that can be taken to fill those gaps, and (c) state homeland security officials and local police as well as mall owners and have a role to play in filling those gaps. The full report and an executive summary are available below: http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/Mall Security full.pdf http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/Mall Security Executive Summary.pdf(1) Robert Salladay, “ Davis Signs Bills to Give Security a Boost; Private Guards must Complete Criminal Checks,” The San Francisco Chronicle, 16 September 2002, p. A. 16. (2) Mimi Hall, “Private Security Guards: Homeland Defense's Weak Link,” USA Today, 23 January 2003, p. A. 01.
Bringing
the Crime Victim into Community Policing Community policing emphasizes the importance of partnerships and problem solving. However, typically partnerships and problem solving do not involve victims of crime. Recognizing the potential for crime victims to strengthen crime prevention and problem solving efforts in community policing, this project sought to develop models for integrating crime victims and victims' organizations into community policing activities. Project activities included: (1) establishing a baseline of current practices regarding the involvement of victims and victims' organizations in community policing; and (2) identifying promising policies and practices involving victims and victims' organizations in crime prevention and problem-solving efforts in community policing. To illustrate the role that victims and victim organizations can play, we developed a set of tools designed to help police organizations prevent repeat victimization and respond effectively to victims of crime. The model policy on preventing repeat victimization provides a blueprint for how police organizations could begin to integrate the prevention of repeat victimization into general operations. The guide to first response recommends a collaborative problem-solving approach between police and victims, and then illustrates how that approach can be used in response to domestic violence, residential burglary, and automobile theft. The 105-page report,
Bringing Victims into Community Policing, is available from
the National Center for Victims of Crime. Compstat
and Organizational Change: A National Assessment Police departments across the country have turned their attention to Compstat as an innovation in police management that combines state-of-the-art management principles with cutting edge crime analysis and geographic information systems technology. Compstat (computer comparison statistics), a management system initiated during William Bratton’s tenure as Commissioner of the New York City Police Department, was implemented as a measure to control crime and improve the quality of life in that city. In the few years since its appearance, its popularity among police and policy makers suggests that it is fast becoming the model of what it means to be a progressively managed department. Compstat programs have received national publicity and have been credited with impressive reductions in crime and improvements in neighborhood quality of life. We identify a number of elements that full implementation of Compstat demands: mission clarification; geographic organization of operational command; data-driven analysis of problems and assessment of the department’s problem-solving efforts; effective problem-solving tactics; organizational flexibility; internal accountability; and external accountability. Little is known about whether and to what extent departments are implementing these elements of Compstat or whether new varieties of the program are evolving. This study provides
a systematic exploration and assessment of the adoption and adaptation
of Compstat and strategic problem solving in police agencies across
the country. It addresses five primary groups of research concerns:
Our study was designed to address these research concerns using three research methods which were undertaken sequentially: (1) a national survey of local police agencies; (2) site visits at up to 15 departments; and (3) process evaluation at three sites. These techniques provide three layers of analysis: (1) a broad-based understanding of the diffusion of Compstat in American policing; (2) a richer sense of the varieties of Compstat programs and the extent of implementation; and (3) in-depth knowledge of the most successfully implemented models and their ramifications at all levels of the organizations in which they operate. Three reports were published from the larger study: Compstat and Organizational Change in the Lowell Police Department: Challenges and Opportunities provides a detailed description of Lowell’s Compstat program. The report is available online only; print copies are no longer available. The Growth of Compstat in American Policing describes the national survey that assessed the number of U.S. police agencies using Compstat and measured the degree to which the elements of Compstat were part of their routine and structure. This report is available online only. Compstat in Practice: An In-Depth Analysis of Three Cities explores the relationship between the theory and practice of Compstat in three police departments of different size, organizational structure, and crime environment. It shows how police managers and officers adapted their routine tasks and activities to Compstat’s focus on accountability, innovative problem solving, and crime fighting. The challenges they faced in doing so reflected the culture of the individual department, the availability of resources for personnel, the sophistication of technology, and management’s commitment to the program. The distinct experiences of the three departments—Lowell, MA; Minneapolis, MN; and Newark, NJ— reveal Compstat’s complexities, highlight its contributions, and provide some insights into the direction it is leading U.S. policing. Creating an Effective Stalking Protocol The goal of this project was to develop and test a model protocol to guide law enforcement responses to stalking based on community policing. The objectives were: (1) to promote a strategic approach that encourages early intervention; (2) to broadly define the roles of functional areas within police departments, including 911 operators, patrol, and investigative units; (3) to present guidelines for developing and participating in a coordinated community response; and (4) to encourage the use of collaborative problem-solving techniques. The 118-page report, Creating an Effective Stalking Protocol, is available from the National Center for Victims of Crime.http://www.ncvc.org/pdf/resources/creatingAStalkingProtocol.pdf East Valley COMPASS Initiative Research Partner
The COMPASS model (Community Mapping, Planning, and Analysis for Safety Strategies), developed by the National Institute of Justice, offers a method for aiding police agencies in the development of more sophisticated and successful problem-oriented policing models. COMPASS encourages the harnessing of data, knowledge, and skills in police agencies through the creation of partnerships with researchers and other relevant members of the COMPASS consortium. The Police Foundation served as the research partner for the COMPASS program in East Valley, California, from May 2002 through July 2004. The major focuses of the East Valley COMPASS initiative–regional data sharing and problem solving–were to be facilitated by a partnership of police and other agencies (e.g., probation and parole, United Way, school districts, hospitals, etc.). of seven jurisdictions in the East Valley–Redlands, Fontana, Colton, Rialto, City of San Bernardino, Highland, and Yucaipa. The main difference between East Valley COMPASS and other COMPASS projects was that seven jurisdictions, instead of just one, would contribute data and be part of the problem-solving partnership. This initiative called for the collaboration of not only police and sheriff departments, but also local governments, healthcare providers, institutions of higher learning, and the private sector. The focus of our evaluation was developing technology through which regional data sharing could take place among partner agencies, among police and non-police partner agencies, and between partner agencies and the public, and to use these data to conduct regional problem solving.
In considering a regional data-sharing effort, one should consider two separate but important areas: technology and the human factor. The human factor will be more difficult to overcome. Some observations from our evaluation follow:
Inglewood, California, Collaborative Leadership Project The Collaborative Leadership Project envisioned a partnership between a local law enforcement agency, a national policing organization, and a local community organization to facilitate collaborative problem solving. As the City of Inglewood, California, is interested in building greater public confidence and trust in the department and improving the quality of service that its officers provide to the community, officials believe that crime control is most effective when police and community combine resources and work cooperatively to improve the quality of life for its residents. The project was a collaboration between the Inglewood Police Department, a number of community-based organizations, and the Police Foundation who worked together to diagnose problems that could undermine public trust and confidence in the police, and to collaboratively solve these problems. These initiatives focused predominantly on the black and Latino communities, where the problems tend to be most pronounced. The process included a community outreach process, implementation of accountability mechanisms, and a climate and culture survey within the department. The final outcomes of the project include a set of recommendations and/or strategies that can be continued in subsequent years with the department and community; new mechanisms for identifying problems at the earliest possible stages; development of shared organizational values; and a greater understanding of internal and external issues that bear upon police community relationships. Measuring
Displacement and Diffusion Over the last decade there have been a substantial number of research studies on hot spots and hot spots policing efforts (Weisburd and Braga, 2003). Overall, these studies show that hot spots policing approaches have strong impacts upon crime in targeted sites (Weisburd and Eck, 2004). However, there is often concern that focusing police resources on hot spots will simply displace the crime to non-targeted areas. In turn, when immediate spatial displacement has been examined, the findings generally support the position that displacement is small and that diffusion of crime control benefits is more likely. However, studies that are designed to measure direct program impacts are often flawed when they are used to examine displacement and diffusion. This study was designed to overcome such methodological flaws by focusing the intervention and data collection on the possibility and characteristics of displacement and diffusion, rather than on evaluating the direct impacts of the program on targeted crimes/areas. Thus the main focus of this study was immediate spatial displacement or diffusion to areas near the targeted sites of intervention. Do focused prevention efforts “simply move crime around the corner?” Or conversely, have the hot spots policing efforts that were brought in unusually high dosage to the target areas “diffused” to areas immediately surrounding the direct focus of the policing efforts? To answer these questions, two study sites were selected in Jersey City, New Jersey. One was an area plagued with drugs and violent crime, and the other had a high level of prostitution. Post 9-11 Policing In 2004, with funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the National Sheriffs' Association, the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, the Major Cities Chiefs Association, and the Police Foundation began this project to help position state, local, and tribal agencies to proactively manage a changed and continually changing police environment. The project had four primary objectives: (1) Profile High Impact Changes: Identify and prioritize the forces and demands–currently evident and emerging–that are redirecting the police mission and roles. Four promising-practice monographs were published in September 2005 and are available on the Bureau of Justice Assistance Web site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pubs/release.html
Preventing Repeat Incidents of Family Violence: A Randomized Field Test of a Second Responder Program in Redlands, California Recent evaluations of “second response” programs for domestic violence victims have cast doubt on their effectiveness. These programs are designed to educate and empower victims who have reported incidents of domestic abuse to the police. The program model involves a social worker or specially trained domestic violence police officer going to the homes of victims who have reported domestic abuse some time after the initial patrol response to the call for service. The second responder talks with victims about the nature of domestic violence, helps them develop a safety plan, and informs them about help available for counseling needs, relocation, civil legal assistance, restraining orders, and other social services. This field test, conducted with the cooperation of the Redlands, CA, Police Department, sought to vary one of the parameters thought to affect the impact of second response programs. Victims who called the Redlands police with a domestic abuse complaint were randomly assigned (a) to receive a second response within 24 hours, (b) to receive a second response within seven days, or (c) to receive no second response. A check of police records and surveys with victims six months after the initial complaint was called did not indicate any reduction in new abuse resulting from any second response condition. The current findings, coupled with earlier research results, strongly suggest that second response programs are at best ineffective in reducing the potential for new abuse and at worst may increase the likelihood of new abusive incidents. Implications for criminal justice policy are discussed. A Police Foundation Report of this project is available at Risk-Focused Policing at Places: An Experimental Evaluation of the Communities that Care Program in Redlands, California
Drawing upon the risk and protective factors model, and suggestions regarding the importance of places for understanding and targeting juvenile delinquency, the Redlands, California, Police Department has developed a risk-focused policing approach to places. Specifically, the Communities that Care Program in Redlands uses the risk and protective model developed by Hawkins and Catalano to identify census block groups where the risk of juvenile delinquency is high. The Redlands Police Department is employing a problem-oriented policing approach to develop and implement strategies to reduce risk factors in these areas and reinforce protective factors. The program is aided by sophisticated crime mapping tools, which allow the police department to draw from multiple data sources in defining the places for intervention, in analyzing problems, and in developing innovative solutions. The Redlands Police Department implemented the program under experimental conditions for approximately two years. We used a matched block randomized experimental design to evaluate the effects of the Redlands RFPP approach on the reduction of delinquency and crime among 26 census block groups in the Redlands area. We used the Communities that Care survey (CTC) to assess baseline measures of risk and protective factors associated with delinquency in the summer of 2001 and post-treatment measures were taken during the summer of 2003. Throughout the intervention period, the Redlands Police Department developed and implemented community- and problem-oriented policing strategies in the thirteen block groups that were randomly assigned to the treatment condition. Innovative treatments directed at juveniles were not administered to the thirteen control block groups. Using a hierarchical linear modeling approach, our experimental data suggest that the risk-focused policing program in Redlands, California, did not consistently reduce problematic behavior or impact upon student perceptions of risk and protective factors. We also do not find a statistically significant impact upon student perceptions of legitimacy of police actions, though juveniles overall in Redlands had strongly positive attitudes toward the police. Our findings appear to contradict recent reviews of police intervention at problem places, which have shown overall strong crime prevention benefits (Braga, 2001; Weisburd and Eck, 2004). There are a number of factors that might have led to the disappointing outcomes of the evaluation, including the level of geographic focus of the project and the nature of the interventions that characterized the treatment. We conclude that risk-focused policing at places should be focused on more micro units of place and have greater fit between problems and treatments if it is to have strong programmatic outcomes. Richmond's Second Responders: Partnering with Police Against Domestic Violence This study's primary purpose was an evaluation of the Richmond, Virginia Second Responders Program, a collaborative effort of the Richmond Department of Social Services and the Richmond Police Department. The program involved the introduction of social workers, based in the police precincts, to scenes of domestic violence to which police had responded, while the police were still on site. We also examined the researcher/practitioner partnership whose primary members were the Police Foundation, the Richmond Department of Social Services and the Richmond Police Department, with a view to contributing to our knowledge of this model. The Second Responders experiment suggests that police perform better or are perceived to perform better in domestic violence situations when social service workers are present, and that women victims of domestic violence who receive an immediate social service response at the time of the incident may experience reduced incidence and prevalence of domestic violence. The report is available here. |