1. those already wanted on one or more warrants and who could be arrested on sight; and
2. those believed to be criminally active but not currently wanted.

Given the concern over potential civil liberties violations in undercover work, all unit procedures were reviewed by the department’s general counsel, the U.S. Attorney, and the American Civil Liberties Union. Unit supervisors and officers also consulted regularly with these authorities.

The Repeat Offender Project offered a unique opportunity to examine a police unit created to carry out a targeted apprehension strategy. With funding from the National Institute of Justice, the Police Foundation evaluated the effectiveness of the ROP unit and its costs between January 1983 and December 1984.

• How does ROP operate? How do officers select and apprehend their targets?
• Do ROP tactics increase the likelihood that identified criminals will be arrested?
• Do ROP officers arrest more active and serious criminals?
• Are those arrested by ROP officers more likely to be prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned?
• Do ROP officers make more arrests?

Three research components were used. The first determined whether "repeat offenders" were more likely to be arrested due to ROP program activities than they would otherwise. The second compared ROP and non-ROP officers, their arrest productivity, the criminal histories of those they arrested, and subsequent court dispositions. The third observed ROP officers at work and studied how repeat offenders were identified, investigated, and apprehended.

• ROP substantially increased the likelihood that targeted criminals would be arrested.
• Those arrested by ROP officers had longer and more serious criminal records.
• ROP officers made only half as many arrests as non-ROP officers and significantly fewer than they had made in earlier assignments. But they arrested criminals on more serious charges.
• Those arrested by ROP officers were more likely to be prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned on felony charges.

• An ROP unit is expensive to create and operate.
• The number of arrests made by ROP officers fell when they were assigned to ROP in comparison with their arrest activity in previous assignments.
• Although those arrested by ROP officers had longer criminal records, they may not have been the most active criminals; nor can it be determined whether they were committing five or more Part 1 offenses per week.
• "Proactive" activities such as those in ROP programs raise serious civil liberties issues; officers must be supervised carefully to avoid charges of harassment, entrapment, and other civil rights violations.

Additionally, the findings may have been influenced by the unique characteristics of Washington, D.C., its police department, and ROP personnel and leadership.

Further research is needed to determine whether the procedures used to target repeat offenders were effective, and in what ways such units actually help to control crime. The optimal size of such units must also be determined.

The results of the study indicate, however, that ROP units can play a significant role in police efforts to control crime. They also call into question the practice of using total number of arrests rates to measure officer productivity and suggest that the net impact of each arrest is a better yardstick of productivity.